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Speculation as a Mode of Production in Art and Capital  
Abstract 
Why 'speculation as a mode of production'? The formulation conjoins the two senses of speculation 
pertinent to this thesis – the speculative praxis of art, and the speculative logic of capital. It also 
attempts to give a specific critical valence to the phenomenon of the 'creative industries' which was 
based on the ideological elision of these two registers of the speculative with the goal of founding a 
new regime of accumulation on their union. Since that time, we have seen the global economic and 
social crisis displace this idea from the centre of policy-makers' agendas as the always-latent coercive 
side of 'creativity' is revealed: creativity as a survival strategy for disinvested populations as 'wealth-
creators' go on accumulating. At the same time, there are attempts to re-start accumulation on ever 
more marginal and self-exploiting grounds, at best as homespun alternatives rather than organized 
challenges to the dominance of abstract value. In this situation, it is more than ever necessary to find 
the points of convergence between the desires for capital maximization and social emancipation, and 
ways to disentangle them which the impacts of the crisis may bring to light. I take artistic production as 
my field of analysis because this is where these ideologies intersect most dramatically.  
 
While speculative thought refers mainly to art and aesthetics, particularly in their connection to re-
imagining social relations, the 'speculative logic of capital' can be broadly defined as the self-
expanding, or self-valorising, dynamic of capital as such – speculation as social form - rather than a 
subset of it which can be named as 'the financial industry', although finance has specificities which are 
discussed in their own right. 'Speculation as a mode of production' thus refers to the open-ended 
processes of art and politics, as well as the overdetermined process of value expansion in capital. It 
seeks to encompass both a subjective and an objective mode for the social expression of capital in the 
ongoing era of neoliberalism. This period has witnessed the subjective qualities of creativity, flexibility 
and innovation become the objective factors of workplace productivity, while objective productivity 
itself shifts to the indeterminacy and risk associated with 'creative financial instruments' as the primary 
mode of capital accumulation. This thesis will draw a parallel between contemporary capital and 
contemporary art as they come to constitute the poles of a society structured around speculation. 
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Speculation as a Mode of Production in Art and Capital  
Preface 
Nineteenth-century English craftsman and political organizer William Morris was known for 
his untiring championing of artisanal production as part and parcel of social revolution, and 
art furnished the prototype: 'Art is the expression of joy in labour rather than an exclusive 
luxury.'1 Over a century later, the relationship between de-alienated labour, artistic labour and 
social change in industrial civilization has undergone many torsions and mutations. One of 
myriad illustrations of these would have to be the artistic work of Christine Hill, which consists 
of producing, enacting and collecting the activities and paraphernalia of small business. She 
both runs a small boutique in Berlin and thematises the processual aspects of this 
proprietorship as part of the enterprise, reflecting on a rapidly 'outmoded' but perhaps back-
in-vogue form of artisanal trade which becomes ever less distinguishable from the economic 
profile of the contemporary artist. Another artist, Jeremy Hutchinson, upends Morris' 
rejection of industrial production by commissioning 'erroneous products' from East Asian 
factories. The resulting objects, the form of which Hutchinson leaves to the discretion of the 
worker in question – some are meticulously destroyed, others whimsically altered - then 
embody the loving, artisanal, 'concrete' labour of factory operatives who otherwise have no 
control over their work. Finally, Theaster Gates has forged a lucrative and critically significant 
career which has mobilized interest and investment in derelict historically African-American 
areas of Chicago through a complex and performative practice involving object-making, 
advocacy and the physical rehabilitation of spaces, a sort of benign artist-run (rather than art-
led) gentrification. What can all these practices be said to share, however provisionally? They 
straddle artistic and non-artistic types of labour, gambling on an artistic practice reaching 
past art – but by means of art - for a critical purchase or real-world effects where art has no 
pre-existing claims. This is the characteristic gesture of 'speculation as a mode of production'. 
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Why 'speculation as a mode of production'? The reason for choosing this formulation is that it 
conjoins the two senses of speculation relevant here – the speculative practices of art, and 
financial speculation as an intensification of capital's intrinsic tendency for future-oriented 
growth. It also attempts to give a specific critical valence to the formation 'creative industries' 
which was based on the ideological elision of these two registers of the speculative with the 
goal of harmonising them and founding a new regime of accumulation on this synthesis. 
While speculative thought is a constant feature of art, particularly in its political dimension, 
'financial speculation' can be more broadly defined as the self-expanding, or self-valorising, 
dynamic of capital as such which is highlighted in value-form analysis – speculation as social 
form - rather than a subset of it which can be named as 'the financial industry', although this 
more specific focus is not excluded. 
 
Given the fading prominence of the 'creative industries' discourse in UK economic policy and 
beyond, it is still worth asking in what sense more recent ideologemes such as 'Big Society' 
continue to refer to the affect and subjectivity of a perhaps more socially inflected notion of 
'creativity', that of co-operation and self-organisation, in order to solicit the kind of legitimacy 
for accomplishing deeply regressive agendas that in earlier periods would have been sought 
by addressing the creative individual. 
 
Hence, 'speculation as a mode of production' refers to the open-ended processes of art and 
politics, as well as the overdetermined processes of the increase of value in capitalism. In this 
way, it seeks to encompass both a subjective and an objective mode for the social expression 
of capital in the present and the recent past, the period of neoliberalism. This period has 
witnessed the subjective qualities of creativity, flexibility and innovation become the objective 
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factors of workplace productivity, while objective productivity itself shifts to the 
indeterminacy and risk associated with 'creative financial instruments' as the dominant mode 
of capital accumulation. Financialisation augurs a normalization of speculative processes as 
the core logic of capital accumulation. This is reflected in the social field in the 
institutionalisation of speculative processes (such as 'risk') in governance, work and welfare. 
The exploitation of risk (or risk-based exploitation) as the cornerstone of social reproduction 
in this period can be substantiated through a panoply of empirical studies and 
argumentation, but the concern here is to draw a parallel between contemporary capital and 
contemporary art as they come to constitute the poles of a society structured around 
speculation, reflected in social practices as diverse as systems of welfare provision to the 
constitution of the self and the image of work. The subjective experience of speculation 
becomes economically codified as 'creativity' in the neoliberal labour market. As a 
consequence, creativity becomes, paradoxically, a characteristic of abstract labour – the 
generic category for the social institution of wage-labour in a capitalist society, indifferent as 
to content. This thesis will argue that such a shift heralds the conversion of the hypostatized 
creativity of art into a pre-eminent instance of speculation as a mode of production, since art 
becomes no longer just a commodity in the market or a gratuitous activity but a tool of 
socialization and re-valorisation of land, populations and political entities. It thus takes on a 
new instrumentality relative to the autonomy and heteronomy assigned to art by Marxist 
critics such as Theodor Adorno .  
 
The profound structural analogy between art and money is that each represents instances of 
self-valorising value, insofar as both are social mediations which are anchored in a self-
referential or reflexive circuit of valorisation – critical value in art is generated from 
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transactions within its semantic domain, much as in speculative finance (or 'fictitious capital', 
in Marx's terms) money generates more money through transactions internal to financial 
markets. This homology, revealing both art and money as marked by the nebulousness and 
reflexivity of value claims, has been picked up by artists who collide so-called 'critical value' 
with 'capital value' in works exploring the social and formal correspondences between works 
of art and money. But the discussion of this symmetry is intended chiefly to illuminate 
another pole of art's relation to the real abstraction of the capital relation, one which is 
constituted by the homologies between art and a self-motivated and creative labour-force 
increasingly encouraged to see itself as an investment, i.e., to model itself on the endless 
productivity of capital rather than labour, but a financialised capital which expands endlessly 
and riskily without identifiable sources of surplus-value, or even property rights, to draw 
upon. 
 
One aspect of this is the re-invention of labour as 'human capital', a shift which serves to 
eliminate labour as a separate and potentially antagonistic pole in the capital-labour relation. 
Labour also experiences itself as capital in its direct relationship to the financial system 
through the privatisation of social reproduction. This is the subsumption of key public assets 
such as pensions, housing and education into credit markets; public provision founded on 
social solidarity into commodified market assets founded on self-investment. Thus we can 
propose that speculation as a mode of production also implies a becoming-speculative of 
reproduction as well. This is where art becomes important, as it projects and promulgates 
forms of community and sociality, whether ideally or participatively, that re-socialize the 
subject of human capital and 'ask questions' in times of political quiescence. Art's ability to 
add value to places and situations with subjective and incalculable means gives an 
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emancipatory imago to labour and material conditions grown ever more exploitative, opaque 
and unalterable, and to its subjects, who seek to 'add value' to themselves as creative 
commodities ) in the labour market (in perverse continuity with Marxian understandings of 
the ‘peculiar’ commodity of labour-power as the only one capable of ‘adding value’.  
 
With art undergoing a dissemination over the last fifty years into social practices, policy 
frameworks and economic activities outside its usual domain, it is 'instrumentalised' or gets 
nearer to 'use-value', departing from its formal, or even structural, correspondence to pure 
exchange-value or, the 'absolute commodity', in Adorno's terms (absolute because the 
autonomous artwork is principally without use-value). At the same time, its constitutive other 
since the Modern era, wage-labour, comes to be decided more and more under the aegis of 
creativity, with use-values increasingly eclipsed by the 'exchange-values' of capacities and 
potentials rather than products, and wages frequently deferred or cancelled in favour of 
'experience'. This emphasizes the ambiguity of 'use-value' in a society dominated by the form 
of value, and the ongoing structural proximity of art and capital in their common definition by 
exchange-value, despite, or even more firmly because of, a tendential emphasis on the use-
value of art by its administrators. This use-value may be indissociable from exchange-value, as 
in arts-led property development, or it may be deemed indirectly useful if targeted at 
'problem' communities - boosting economic participation, entrepreneurial habits and social 
cohesion. Here, art and labour, creativity and training, become harder and harder to tell apart. 
The growing proximity between art and labour starts to emerge as a zone of indistinction, 
signalling a re-shaping of labour by capital in its own mutable and restless image. Art, with its 
problematic relationship to use-value, emerges as a disciplinary apparatus able to 
differentiate between human capital which can and cannot be valorised, those who can 
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identify with their creativity as capital and those who cannot. This seems to call for a re-
consideration of the role of use-value and labour for capital in its speculative mode of 
production and correspondingly what strategies can serve to displace or negate it. 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in press release for Christine Hall's Small Business exhibition at Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, New York, 17 
November – 22 December 2012. Also used in 2008 for an 'Art. Design. Jewellery. Exhibition.' at Zurich's Sold 
Gallery: “For the first time ever OH DEAR presents her work at a solo exhibition and thereby enriches the 
international art jewellery scene. Simple and graphical. Subtle and delicate. Brute and romantic. Honest. 
Narrative, and always with a slight wink.'http://www.spare-magazine.com/ index.php? men1=2 & 
outside=587 Both accessed 18 November 2012. The original source for this quotation turned out to be 
untraceable. 
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Speculation as a Mode of Production in Art and Capital  
Introduction 
'Speculation as a mode of production' is a heuristic term which I am introducing in order to 
more closely examine the dimension of capital which seeks to directly commodify subjectivity 
and social relations as individual capital. It thus aligns the characteristic mode of capital 
accumulation -self-expanding value - with the self-realization of the subject. 'Speculation as a 
mode of production', then, attempts to conceptualize the relationship of artistic speculation 
to speculative capital as a biopolitical device for the production of subjects who identify with 
capital immanently, rather than ideologically. The historical mutations of art and of labour in 
capitalist modernity provide the key to such an examination, which will be conducted 
predominantly with the tools of value-form analysis and Marxian critical aesthetic theory. 
Here, the generic social form of labour in capital – abstract labour – and the generic form of 
artistic production – non-labour – will serve as the parameters of the inquiry, as they 
engender forms of subjectivity and subjectivation in attraction to and repulsion from the 
'automatic subject' of value. 
 
Speculation and Abstraction 
Speculation as a mode of production is marked by the dependence of normal accumulation 
on the de-valorisation of labour and social reproduction rather than the expansion of total 
social capital.1 As capital's main product has always been the class relation between capital 
and labour which ensures capital's expanded reproduction, it is necessary to track whether 
these circumstances engender a shift in this class relation. For this, we need to return 
consistently to the categories of real abstraction and abstract labour in order to see how the 
shift from production to speculation unfolds in the production of subjectivity and in the social 
division of labour, an account to which art, as a form of 'emancipated labour', is essential. The 
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parallels between the contemporary articulations of art and labour, as well as the blurring of 
their distinctiveness, allows us to track this shift. The notion of speculation as a mode of 
production can be elucidated by reference to the industrialization of creativity, as well as the 
refashioning of state cultural support for the arts in line with neoliberal social and economic 
policy. These are all aspects of the dominance of the value-form in arenas of social production 
and reproduction which neither produce value in the classical sense nor seem amenable to 
the law of value as a measure of what they do produce.  
 
A critique of political economy that would be adequate to this context should be interested in 
the place of art in these processes because the artistic mode of production is often used as a 
dissimulation of capitalist work, a way of hooking the affective investment in the escape from 
alienated work onto the imposition of free labour. While it is crucial to distinguish the unpaid 
intern in a cultural centre from the artist producing commodities or just 'research' for an 
uncertain market, in either case the valorisation of creativity is a mode of producing 
subjectivity that aligns the interests of workers with the speculative nature of capital, a way of 
installing speculation at the most intimate levels of subjective existence (whereas the 
'ordinary' instance of the wage-relation sees the interests of labour and capital aligned 
through the wage, which is separable from the person). This calls for a delineation of the 
current determinate forms of 'real abstraction' as they both exceed the politics of labour and 
the forms of class belonging they presupposed, and prefigure other ones. 
 
The prism of recent post-conceptual art, with its ontology of self-expanding and self-
referential value is apposite here. Although Conceptual Art was initially impelled by anti-
commodity principles (the famed, and famously misleading, 'de-materialization' thesis), it 
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actually reflected and anticipated a transition in capitalism from an economy centred on the 
production of industrial commodities to an economy centred on the control of intellectual 
property, trade in speculative assets, and financialised modes of accumulation while post-
object art forms such as performance forecast a shift to (self-)'performance' as the standard 
metric of all labour. Further, at a more generic level, art has a symmetry with capital in both its 
formal independence from labour, particularly in the moment of money capital, and the 
disavowal of its dependence on labour as the source of value. The re-contextualisation of 
non-artistic modes of labour and social processes within art, which is specific to art produced 
in the last few decades (and which, according to some, has been a red thread of Modernism 
much earlier, since Duchamp and Dada) presents an analogy with the extension of the 
commodity-form to previously un-capitalised or de-commodified sectors of social 
production. Thus we can see contemporary art as enacting a species of 'primitive 
accumulation'. From this standpoint, art in the era of speculative production has to be 
compared both with the category of abstract labour as generic social productivity structured 
by the wage and the value-form and with the category of money as self-valorising value as 
the two key expressions of real abstraction in capital. Such an investigation would start with 
analysing the fetishism of creativity as a kind of commodity-fetishism. In this, ‘creativity’ 
appears as a further and an exemplary case of the attribution to capital of the capacities of 
social production, capital as the 'body of the despot' Marx termed the basis of the 'Asiatic 
mode of production'.2 Labour is represented in the 'creative economy' via an analogy 
between the infinite productivity of the creative subject and the infinite productivity of capital, 
an analogy which evokes ideological terms such as 'human capital' in neo-liberal governance 
and economics. The reification of creativity means equating it with the self-valorising 
capacities of capital, and effacing concepts of creativity which resist integration into a value 
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chain or which could be understood as more broadly social or transformative, rather than 
individualizing and profit-oriented (and profit more often for the rights-holder than the 
'bearer' of such creative labour).  
 
On this path, it is also imperative to take into account how the current phenomena of 
capitalist crisis are accelerating the objective and affective hollowing-out of the content of 
labour, whether it is the degradation of working conditions, an absence of overt class struggle 
or any subjective attachment to the job. The de-valorisation of labour-power as reflected in 
escalating unemployment but also the deficit cutbacks in the reproductive sphere exposes 
the contradiction between the rigid rule of the value-form over the mode of production and 
the dogma of 'flexibility' as the template for capital and 'human capital' alike. Labour's 
material identification with capital intensifies as credit rather than wages come to guarantee 
the necessities of life in times of plenty and austerity alike, suturing the interests of capital and 
labour closer together. Thus, the ideologeme of 'human capital' comes to embody a truth, the 
truth of social abstraction as it is experienced on the most prosaic and inescapable level. 
 
Art as Abstract Labour? 
Abstract labour is the category Marx uses to define the specific form of social labour as it is 
performed in capitalism – value-producing labour. It overdetermines concrete instances of 
labour insofar as they are generic and interchangeable instances of labour for a wage. Yet 
there must be a qualitative change when this abstraction infuses the concrete to the extent 
that generic creativity (potential as such rather than a specifically skilled potential) becomes 
the archetype of capitalist work. On its face, proposing the notion of art as abstract labour is 
problematic because art production is not value-producing labour. It is a social institution 
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which mediates value produced elsewhere but which operates at a distance from the law of 
value as it structures wage-labour. Abstract labour may happen within art production, when 
outsourcing and industrial methods enter into the production process, but not directly in the 
concept of art production itself, which is aligned with an artisanal logic. Yet, when art comes 
to emulate other kinds of activity in its post-conceptual trajectory, including many which 
would be subsumed under 'labour', and when labour is increasingly performed under the 
aegis of qualities such as creativity, flexibility and indeterminacy, in the profile of the 'creative 
industries' as much as the temp-agency service or factory worker, art can be thought in a new 
conjunction with Marx's definition of abstract labour.  
 
The Falling Price of Abstract Labour 
Part of the growing confusion between what constitutes artistic labour and abstract labour, 
aside from the promotion of generic creativity as the condition for all work, is the health of 
the art market and the elevation of the globally mobile entrepreneurial artist. This coincides 
with worsened conditions for those in employment, and the escalation of structural 
unemployment. It is unsurprising that artistic labour should grow more appealing as abstract 
labour is increasingly socially and economically de-valued. In the current moment, abstract 
labour as labour performed under the rule of the value-form grows more socially coercive 
inversely to the numbers fortunate enough to find situations of gainful exploitation, even 
fewer of which are productive of surplus-value – the latter a situation compounded by the 
spread of market-emulating models in the public sector. This is an outcome of the secular 
tendency to maintain the rate of profit through the de-valuation of labour. This de-valuation 
is triggered by factors like technological change, the expansion of the global labour market, 
and the shifting of resources from investment in surplus-value producing industries 
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('productive' capital) to speculation (financial capital as the primary form of accumulation). 
The de-valuation of labour is corollary to a de-valued capital when less surplus-value is 
generated by workforces shrunk by automation and job export. This surplus value then has 
less chance to be realized when that workforce becomes a shrinking market – a quandary 
which can temporarily be patched over by the credit boom, consequent on decades of 
restrictive monetary policy in the West that seeks to keep wages and inflation down to 
enhance profitability. This can be discussed in terms of a kind of 'fiscal Keynesianism'3 wherein 
demand is boosted through interest-rate manipulation and credit instruments as real wages 
sink or flatten out. While this or other variations on the theory of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall will not form a substantial part of my exposition, it deserves mention as an 
influential factor in the changing circumstances for labour in recent decades, in the West and 
increasingly elsewhere. De-valuation of this kind is also behind the 'realization problem' that 
drives the switch to financialisation as the major strategy of accumulation. Such 'speculative 
capital' is often contrasted to the more socially responsible 'productive capital'. 
 
Is There a Speculative Mode of Production? 
However, the argument here will be that speculative capital is not unproductive capital but 
that speculation itself constitutes a mode of production. Here I agree with Christian Marazzi 
when he puts forward the proposition that 'financialization is not an unproductive/parasitic 
deviation of growing quotas of surplus-value . . . but rather the form of capital accumulation 
symmetrical with new processes of value production.'4 This would be heterodox going by 
Marx's sense of the term 'productive capital' to mean capital that extracts surplus-value from 
labour and reinvests it in expanding production, rather than capital that grows through 
derivative transactions, which would be termed 'fictitious capital'.5 Yet what has to be 
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considered here is capital's contradictions and the solutions it has found to them since Marx's 
time, such as the hypertrophied growth of the financial sector to address issues of stagnation 
of profit rates and find new areas of investment. This shows that we have to be attentive not 
just to capital's operations under particular historical conditions, but to the status of finance 
as capital in its, so to speak, pure state: M – M'.6 The production of anything is just a detour to 
the augmentation of money. How does such a 'pure' state function when it attains a social 
dominance on the scale observable in the present moment? Does the freedom of self-
valorising value come to be identified with the freedom of the human subject, and how? Does 
art as the designated realm of the unconditioned and experimental in social life, in every way 
opposed to regimented and oppressive wage-labour, provide a topos to understand this? A 
caveat here is that I am considering art not so much in its character as an exceptional 
commodity but at a more integral analytic level as an activity that harbours emancipatory 
agency which can be commodified insofar as or because it seems to counter the universality 
of alienation and value. The utopia of money likewise seems to rest on the premise of 
escaping the contradictions of life overdetermined by the value-form. In this sense, both art 
and capital exert an ideological force through and against the negativity and constraint 
represented by labour. The expulsion of labour is more evident in financialised capitalism and 
in post-conceptual art practices, characterized as they both are by formal systems of 
validation and a denegation of the object, if industrial capitalism and ‘pre-conceptual’ art 
amplified labour and the aura of the material object. These tendencies then come to 
increasingly rebound on the properties of abstract labour. 
 
We are now in a position to see the valorisation structures of art and the valorisation of capital 
as the two determinants of contemporary regimes of managing and performing labour. The 
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affinities and antagonisms between the speculative activity of art and the speculative activity 
of capital as the parameters of contemporary work happen through a reliance on what is 
most 'generic' in the subject common both to 'socially engaged' or otherwise expanded art 
practices and what is provisionally termed 'immaterial labour'. It is principally in this sense 
that it might be revealing to inquire whether art does not in fact become a variant of 'abstract 
labour' due to its codification of the 'generic' of human or social activity and due to the 
migration of creativity out of its association with art to become the byword for all labour. 
Does this perspective enable us to find antagonisms capable of being generalized to 
contemporary work which would be undetectable from the viewpoint of abstract labour as 
simply coextensive with wage-labour? A central notion here will be that the constitutive 
indeterminacy of the aesthetic driving the speculative mode of production can become an 
active negativity essential both for a rupture with that mode of production and for instituting 
the speculative as social change. For this we need to evaluate both the negativity and the 
progressive dimension of abstraction as discussed by Marx in order to dislodge art from its 
compensatory or affirmative role in the dominant formation of labour and capital united by 
speculation. 
 
Chapter Outline of Thesis 
The first chapter will delineate the specific form of subjectivity that belongs to speculation as 
a mode of production. For this, I will first distinguish 'speculation as a mode of production' 
from the category of 'financialisation' as an account of speculative markets exerting an 
increasing influence on social, economic and political life in recent decades. 
 
The understanding of subjectivity that is relevant here is of subjectivity as something which is 
thoroughly social and historical. As a social and historical category, the notion of subjectivity 
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at stake here calls initially for an ideological critique of the 'creativity' which models 
subjectivity on self-valorising value in line with the social dominance of self-valorising value in 
the shape of financialised capital. The concept of real abstraction joins up with that of the 
fetish character of the commodity to frame a definition of ideology which is generated 
reciprocally, if sometimes obliquely, with social reality, as that reality comes to be increasingly 
permeated by ideas of human nature as self-valorising value. This will lead to a discussion of 
'human capital', tracing its basic features to the economic and discursive shifts usually named 
'neo-liberalism' through a reading of, primarily, Michel Foucault's lectures in The Birth of 
Biopolitics, Jason Read, Gary S. Becker , and Michel Feher. The consolidation of a model of 
personhood based on the entrepreneur and/or the consumer which these accounts 
reconstruct and, in Becker's case, represent, have certain consequences. On the one hand, 
there is the reversal entailed by the notion of the capitalist as a worker and the worker as the 
owner of 'human capital', which both appropriates and cancels the political subjectivity of 
work as alienation, and, on the other, the monadic notion of experience that stems from this 
consumer personhood, which leads to a politics construing change on exclusively personal 
and self-maximising grounds, bearing out the truth of 'human capital' ideology (which, like all 
ideologies, creates the grounds for its own legitimation). These accounts, however, do not 
exhaust the story of how the open-ended contingency of creativity becomes reconciled with 
value in the production of subjectivity. Later in the thesis, I approach this process through the 
category of 'real subsumption', thus attending to how (social) subjectivity is shaped by the 
structures of production and property. The contiguity between empowerment and 
exploitation is starkly present in the notion of 'human capital', though in some ways this is a 
re-statement of the much older appropriation by capital of the liberal notion of 'freedom', an 
individual freedom which is then extrapolated to corporate formations such as business and 
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the state and is opposed to collective formations such as workers' self-organization. The 
elision of economic rationality with the generic transformative capacity of the human that 
Marx terms 'species-being' is summed up in 'human capital', but also points beyond itself. To 
make that more precise, I will be referring briefly to the arguments of Jean-François Lyotard, 
who in Libidinal Economy tries to disrupt the reconciliation between human and capital with a 
negative anthropology of excess, waste and intensity. 
 
The second chapter will start with a comparison between the foregoing depiction of waste 
and uselessness as a decisively aesthetic project of negation which can be extended to the 
increasingly socially displaced, politically inchoate and materially atomized role of labour in 
capital.7 What is meant by an 'aesthetic project of negation' will be established by reference to 
the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition of Romantic aesthetics,8 including the work of Marxist 
critical aesthetic theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Stewart Martin, which sees art 
operating at a constitutive distance to socially useful activity. It will trace the disjunction 
between labour and freedom in the vision of human autonomy proposed in this legacy of 
critical aesthetics: the well-known dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy. In the critical vision 
of post-Kantian and Romantic aesthetics, unlike in e.g. autonomist Marxism, human freedom 
cannot result from the appropriation of humanity's productive powers – labour – from capital, 
since labour is understood as always and by its nature unfree or compulsory, counterpoised 
to play as the definitively human capacity for free and purposeless creation.  
 
Interestingly, there is a similar dissonance between creativity and labour in the industrialized 
creativity of the 'creative economy'. The rent-seeking forms of value-extraction typical of this 
economy try to sever all social or ontological links with labour, preferring to valorise 
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commodities whose component of labour seems to have dropped down to almost no value, 
as in digital products and the marketing data valorised by Facebook. This is also the case in 
those instances of 'creative industries' where market metrics proletarianise 'creative labour', 
or subsume that which has so far not been subsumed as value-producing processes: areas of 
cultural or knowledge production that operate on public subsidy. The tensions and 
contradictions which emerge not only in labour thus uncertainly subsumed, but in the 
subsumption of all labour in capital will be developed through an exposition of the 
arguments of Moishe Postone and Christopher Arthur on, respectively, abstract labour as the 
definitive form of capitalist social relations and on 'counter-production', labour's resistance to 
total incorporation in the process of value expansion. 
 
The question of autonomy and heteronomy frames the inquiry into the constitutive bind of 
art as being both like and unlike socially necessary labour in capitalism. Art as a realization of 
freedom as posed by Romanticism discloses its implicit contradiction – its denial of labour, in 
which it also opposes Marx's concept of 'species-being' – but also that this contradiction 
cannot be eradicated by 'socializing' art or dissolving its distinction from labour since art does 
contain a yet-abstract freedom from capitalist work, capitalist time and capitalist value, a 
freedom which is only accessible through and despite its commodity status: the condition of 
its critical distance.9 What happens to this dialectic under the conditions of industrialized 
creativity and the degeneration of labour as a political and economic category – eroding the 
specificity of both art and labour in the process? The figure of the artist as a mediator, 
manager or entrepreneur co-ordinating disparate and multiple kinds of activity, including the 
labour of others, will be explored from its Conceptual and post-conceptual trajectories, citing 
artistic practices that have attempted to translate labour into art, as well as artists who have 
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enacted pointed analogies between the value structures of art and money, such as Robert 
Morris, Maria Eichhorn, Jan-Peter Hammer and others. This managerial-investment strand of 
contemporary art as one manner of reflecting on the emergence of a generic artistic 
subjectivity after Duchamp and after Modernism will be discussed in counterpoint with the 
'workerist' strands thrown up in relational and participatory forms anticipated by the 1960s 
and 1970s practices, where I single out 'The Trainee' (2008) by Pilvi Takala. Here I will allude to 
the critical investigations of John Roberts on 'de-skilling' and 're-skilling' as categories of art's 
relationship to labour. In all these cases, what is at issue is using the abstraction of activity 
possible in art production as a point of leverage in the relations of production and power that 
obtain in the 'real world', in real abstraction. As has been observed in recent curatorial and 
art-critical interventions, the figure of the artist as service provider rather than maker of 
objects coincided with the transition from goods to services in economic primacy in the 
West.10 Yet, whatever the homologies between art and labour, the thematizations of labour in 
art, or the role of art in social inclusion agendas ('regeneration', 'employability'), the social 
division of labour in capital dictates that art is the exception upholding the rule of the 
universality of labour determined by abstract value. The self-legislating uniqueness of art 
provides a model for human autonomy, even a political vision of such autonomy achieved, 
only on the condition it is separated from the heteronomy that is the rule elsewhere.11 Thus it 
is self-cancelling as well as self-legislating and the history briefly sketched out above can also 
be viewed as examples of self-cancellation, the attempted negation and re-vindication of the 
exceptionality of the artistic subject and her work which is not labour. The artist as a 'blue-sky' 
thinker is not solely the preserve of 'creative industry' ideologues, seeking to re-shape all 
forms of work into infinite self-realization without guarantees. This conception also prevails 
within the institution of art.12 This chapter will be about tracking the philosophical, aesthetic 
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and critical quandaries of the position of the artist as a prototypical worker in the age of 
creative abstract labour, and will try to reformulate them in terms of the negativity inherent in 
the indeterminacy of generic creativity as a rule for labour; or, in terms recognizable to 
Adorno, the negativity that marks autonomy as the scar of its break with the heteronomous. 
Throughout, I will be using 'indeterminacy' in the sense given to it by Immanuel Kant in his 
definition of the role of indeterminacy in 'aesthetic judgement' and the 'free play of the 
faculties'.13 I will contend that the passage through labour for art, and the passage through 
art for labour are both crucial; the creative subject of labour needs to traverse the de-
subjectivation, materiality and illegitimacy of artistic activity, while artistic production needs 
to traverse the negativity of abstract labour as its own most intimate parameter. Negativity is 
also a question pivotal to the calculations of profit and risk that animate financial markets. I 
will finish by taking a look at contingency, probability and temporality as they operate in 
speculative finance as ways of mediating negativity and entropy. Speculative finance is a form 
of valorisation predicated on the arbitrage of value asymmetries in time, provided that the 
homogeneous and empty time of capital extends indefinitely into the future. Financialisation's 
main social form, debt, provides a perfect illustration of how the future (and the present) is 
cancelled by the expansion of value. However, the priority of finance and its regimes of debt-
servicing eventually starts to menace value's expansion by restricting production and 
consumption, as we see now. 
 
In the third chapter, I would like to continue and deepen the analysis of the autonomy/ 
heteronomy distinction that renders art both the constitutive exception and the inverted 
mirror image of 'unfree' labour by looking at the immanence of freedom to the concept of 
capital. The contrast between the 'coercion of the economic' and the reign of 'perfect liberty, 
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equality, property and Bentham' was picked out by Marx as the key difference between 
previous modes of production and capitalism, with its strict separation of the political and 
economic.14 Further, this separation was integral to the radical disconnection between the 
idealization of the free marketplace as the template for all social interaction, and the hidden 
abode of production' (and reproduction, as we will see). The existence of two realms which 
were fully interdependent – the formal equality of politics and state institutions and the 
substantive inequality of the relations of production and economic institutions - is grounded 
on a mystification of equality which, on the one hand, sees economic and political freedom as 
utterly separate, and on the other, makes no distinction between the mutual antagonism of a 
civic freedom which render all citizens equal before the law and private property which is 
predicated on class hierarchy. Marx contends that such a notion of equality is both modelled 
upon and echoes the equality of commodities in a market, which would make the liberal 
concept of equality a species of commodity-fetishism.15 
 
The voluntary nature of the contractual relation at the heart of capitalist social relations is of 
paramount importance, as it is the axis of both stability and instability of those relations. The 
domestic labour debates in Marxist feminism and the Wages for Housework campaign, as 
well as the rise of practices redolent of the service sector in Conceptual and post-conceptual 
art, (such as the 'Maintenance Art' of Mierle Laderman Ukeles in the 1970s – housework in 
museums), interestingly captures these tensions in the sphere of reproductive labour. Here, 
the voluntary was used as an ideological bulwark against the wage-contract, with the help of 
regressive notions of gender that portrayed women as finding their fulfilment in the home; 
hence, the demand for a wage was seen as key to breaking this alliance, and then as potential 
leverage to challenge waged exploitation as well. The imbrication of 'free' and 'unfree' labour 
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as different relations to the primacy of abstract labour are emphasised in the example of 
housework as an art practice, as it throws a light on not only the blurring between service-
sector work and its appearance in the institution of art either in representational or 
performative ways, but on the reliance of that institution, and the broader dimensions of the 
'creative industries', on unpaid work and feudal and informal species of labour relations. In all 
these cases, the desire to escape from alienated and alienating work becomes a mechanism 
for imposing work, and the voluntary nature of the capitalist contract is suspended, or rather, 
the 'contractual' aspect is split off from the 'voluntary', which grows at its expense. Here, 
envisioning the institution of art to be as much subordinated to abstract labour as any other 
workplace can help us examine how much affective investment in capital’s  promise of 
freedom subsists as a subjective refusal of capitalist relations of production that objectively 
reinforces them. Just as the kinds of labour and subjectivity operative in art enter into new 
relations to abstract labour under conditions of a generalized and industrialized creativity, 
labour re-configured as limitless creativity enters into a new relation with the structurally 
crucial voluntary aspect of the capitalist social contract – as well as modifying the relationship 
between potentiality as the content of labour-power and labour as the substance of value.  
 
The boundaries between art and labour become indistinct with the expansion of finance and 
the expansion of art in the speculative mode of production; yet it is the loss of identification 
with the source of employment and the growth of its existential as well as objective 
contingency that argues not just a crisis of class politics, but a crisis of reproduction of the 
class relation. The de-valorisation of labour-power as reflected in low or stagnant wages and 
dwindling conditions and the retrenchment of the 'social wage' of the welfare state is both a 
result of and a precondition for this crisis. From the side of capital, value can now be extracted 
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twice: in the workplace, and through the credit system into which workers become integrated 
through the necessary recourse to personal finance for education, health care, acceptable 
standards of consumption, etc. This is speculation as an unavoidable way of life for those who 
do not control the means of production and reproduction, and for those who do, a de-
valorised labour force subject to a de-valorising capital which can at least generate wealth for 
itself through their securitised debt. The use of debt as a policy instrument to discourage 
working-class militancy and social demands is hardly new – the federal promotion of home 
ownership through mortgage subsidies since the 1930s had just this character, and this 
historical trend is crucial to the American 'cultural preference' for home ownership that 
fuelled the subprime mortgage crisis. And further back, Marx already in Capital speaks of ' the 
public debt' as a major tool of capitalist discipline over the working class on a global scale. 
However, debt acquires a new ubiquity and hegemonic quality when the working-class is 
recomposed in the image of speculative capital. Here it would be relevant to again mention 
the 'tendency of the rate of profit to fall', the Marxian principle (and inveterate bugbear of 
Marxist economics) that with technological change, fewer wage-labourers are required and 
the greater the numbers of the population expelled from production. As labour is the 
substance of value, minimizing labour means that there is less surplus-value produced, and 
the profit rate (eventually, given an equality of technology and enough market saturation) 
plummets, thus the attempts to maintain it through financialisation and rent-seeking, much 
of which is enabled by precisely those technological changes tending to expel labour from 
the production process.16 The constant absorption and expulsion of labour is perhaps one of 
capital's main contradictions. While capital's attempt to solve this contradiction with the 
'flight into credit' and speculative valorisation is historically not new, if exacerbated in the 
recent past and in the present, the re-composition of workers as speculative 'human capital' 
  17 
throws up yet another set of contradictions. Some of these are posed by the re-configuring of 
artistic practices through the politics of wage labour, which is seen as a re-politicization of the 
speculative 'creative' subject as it is reproduced in the institutions of art.  
 
This chapter will then re-visit some of the themes in the second chapter on Romantic 
aesthetics and the role of art in the vision of an emancipated human community, which will be 
developed in chapter four as well. I will inquire into what is meant by a specifically aesthetic 
form of negativity with relation to the 'generic' as it comes to define post-Duchampian artistic 
practices and 'post-Fordist' labour alike. Here, I will be engaging chiefly with Giorgio 
Agamben's analysis of the 'groundless ground' of the aesthetic subject17 and Kant's concept 
of aesthetic judgment.18  
 
In the fourth and final chapter, I intend to ground my account of how forms of creative labour 
operate at a distance to the law of value without thereby being antithetical to or subversive of 
the value-form. I start out with Thierry de Duve's account of the emergence of 'whatever' as 
the parameter for art production after Duchamp: the modern abstraction of 'purposeless 
purpose' is fulfilled by the post-modern indeterminacy of what qualifies as art.19 A roster of 
creative practices whose mode of production is artisanal, with value captured in primary and 
secondary markets, such as art, or more industrialized forms which capture value primarily 
through intellectual property regulations, can be termed 'speculative' because, like financial 
capital, their economic base consists of value produced elsewhere (although there have been 
arguments that the augmentation processes of 'fictitious capital' is strictly speaking 
production of value, rather than capture of future value produced by labour).20 As Ben Fine 
and Costas Lapavitsas note, 'the forms of value become the general means for facilitating 
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economic intercourse regardless of the relation of particular activities to abstract labour.'21 
Although I will attempt in this thesis to widen the definition of 'abstract labour' so that it can 
encompass precisely those 'particular activities' that Fine and Lapavitsas claim are unrelated 
to it, the point that it is the forms of value we should be looking at is salient, as it is precisely 
through tracing those relations that the generic social form of labour operating at this 
historical stage of capital can be determined.  
 
The previous chapters will have depicted the erosion of subjective identification with work as 
an erosion of the division between art and labour. This makes it possible to see the coming-
together of art and labour on the common ground of ‘uselessness’, with labour emulating 
art in its performativity and uncertain relation to value-production. The artwork is an 
'absolute commodity', according to Adorno, because in it is present only exchange-value; art 
is by definition not an object of utility, and has no use-value. If, as is increasingly the case, 
many forms of work for a wage can also not lay a claim to be producing 'use-values', while 
many artistic projects are undertaken for socially useful ends, this allows us to see the 
contingency of the prevalent notion of 'use', mediated as it is by exchange-value. The de-
legitimation of use-value has so far meant an escalation of exchange-value, and has 
strengthened the grip of value. The confusion between exchange-value and use-value in the 
'self-valorisation' of human capital is perhaps the most glaring symptom of this, followed 
closely by 'socially engaged practices' in contemporary art.  
 
The elimination of the value-form, rather than the affirmation of the power of labour, is the 
essential ingredient to displacing capitalism. The generic and alienating character of abstract 
labour means that (contra much orthodox historical materialism) labour has no positive 
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content to be affirmed (labour only has value for capital), while its empirical blurring in the 
spread of modes of exploitation that do not produce value and tend, if anything, toward non-
reproduction of older and more typical valorisation mechanisms (speculation opposed to 
investment, for example), or which do not produce use-value, like finance and art, all point to 
the value-form as the pre-eminent object of critical praxis, and to the necessity of widening 
the margins of waste and unproductivity having the (contingent) potential of negating the 
continued domination of the value-form which for now they merely exemplify. Such an 
understanding would foreground social reproduction as prominently as I have so far 
foregrounded the equivocal forms of labour which tendentially and ideologically narrow the 
gap between the valorisation of labour and the valorisation of capital under the aegis of 
creativity. The idea of art itself as a form of social reproduction is important here. It will be 
developed in two ways, one with regard to art as an 'automatic subject', and the artist as the 
reproducer of herself as an instance of this subject, and the other with reference to the 
practice of UK's Artist Placement Group, who sought to come up with a new concept of 
socially necessary activity for the artist which placed the artist squarely in the midst of 
economic and administrative activity as a producer of speculative value. This example 
corroborates the contention that use value and exchange value cannot be thought outside 
the social form of value as it obtains in a capitalist society, and art registers use or uselessness 
according to the changes undergone by this social form. What happens when both use and 
uselessness are sublated in the form of the speculative? Such an indistinction, as it obtains for 
labour and for art, can be held to be  symptomatic of barriers to accumulation reached by the 
speculative mode of production, as well as the forms of antagonism that can arise from this 
impasse.22  
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In the thesis conclusion, I try to both recapitulate the thesis' central arguments and point to 
some further directions for research in how to specify art for speculation as a mode of 
production. While the thesis mainly dwelt on art's relationship to abstract labour in the 
regime of the speculative, future substantive work needs to be done in examining 'value-
reflexive' and 'value-critical' practices in art, where the logic of value relations becomes both 
the principle and the content of the artwork. This would also imply a closer analysis of how art 
functions in its own markets, markets which can in many ways be considered paradigmatic for 
speculation as a mode of production.23 I additionally sum up the implications of the previous 
chapter's discussions of subsumption as a determination of art's relationship to labour and to 
value by mobilizing the categories of 'imaginary subsumption' and 'intrinsic value' as 
apparatuses that instil value relations on terrains where they seem neither relevant nor 
necessary according to the ostensible logic of capital . Besides allowing us to think of the 
salience of 'exceptions' to value, such as art, for capital accumulation, there are specific 
historical reasons which obtain on the importance of such 'imaginary subsumption' for 
resolving crises of accumulation, such as driving down the cost of labour-power, naturalizing 
capital logics as disciplines for all kinds of activity, and making labour disappear under the 
guise of freely chosen social reproduction as well as debt. I then return to aesthetic 
judgement via the category of the 'generic' as an increasingly normative, but also abstract, 
parameter for both art and labour. Finally, I suggest that 'artistic research' can operate as 
practical critique by exploiting the indeterminacy of the aesthetic with respect to use and 
exchange in order to disrupt the operation of commodity logic in present-day knowledge 
production, as well as the academicism of art-institutional invocation of radical themes and 
histories. It would have to be a mode of disruption which developed forms of partisanship 
that would axiomatically go beyond 'asking questions', but also beyond the enactment of 
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political forms within art as edifying spectacle. These two directions – a socially reflexive form 
of partisan artistic research and 'value-reflexive' practices – constitute the trajectory for 
carrying the current project forward. A project which can be summed up as reflecting on the 
volatile relations between value and its others through the lens of art, and its structural 
contradictions. 
 
Although the range of arguments and references alluded to so far may appear forbiddingly 
broad, encompassing ideology critique, political philosophy, critical political economy, 
Marxist social theory, aesthetics, and art history, the scope of the thesis is focused around 
three questions. Can the category of 'abstract labour' in Marx help to chart the changes in the 
production of subjectivity and the production of value in the present conjuncture? Does art 
enter into another relation with abstract labour when creativity, relationality and performance 
are the watchwords of the integration of labour with capital? And does the particular mode of 
open-ended speculative practice contained in art production stand to reveal new potentials 
for negation and antagonism when it becomes generalized (in the experience of social 
relations such as work and the accumulation strategies of financialised economies)? The 
proposition 'speculation as a mode of production' will rest – or drift – on the credibility of the 
answers. 
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In this chapter I would like to make my initial approach to considering the changing 
relationship between the ostensibly opposed activities of art and wage-labour by considering 
the key neoliberal concept of 'human capital'. Human capital marks the reconciliation 
between free creativity and alienated labour under the sign of capital expansion, now re-
located to the scale of the individual. The autonomy of art and the heteronomy of labour, 
which put them into an uneasy but fruitful dialectical relation, starts to erode as the identities 
of the artist and the employee start become less clear in the period of capital's re-structuring 
often referred to as neoliberalism. Given the attacks on the wage and on working-class 
movements in this era, alongside its promotion of the infinite flexibility of 'the creative', 
'human capital' emerges as not just a piece of economists' jargon, but the structural 
imperative to self-invest and self-expand like capital, without capital's social power and 
guarantees. My contention here will be that 'human capital' is the pre-eminent figure which 
both describes and allegorizes the socialization of capital through the use of creativity. We 
would then need to think what kinds of negativity to the forms of life propagated by capital 
through the modalities of labour and art continue to inhere in them, despite and against this 
deployment: a negativity founded on their shared recalcitrance to value-expansion. Such 
negativity, coupled with the affirmative side represented by the imperative to self-invest and 
self-expand (valorise) - linking the subjective to the social - together constitute what I am 
calling 'speculation as a mode of production'.  
 
In this light, there is a need to significantly re-think the Adornian schema of art as the 
'absolute commodity'. Art, in this schema, draws its critical and utopian impulse from the 
 26 
 
insoluble bind of being caught between autonomy (answerable only to self-given laws and 
setting its own parameters of value) and heteronomy (being marked by capital value in its 
production and circulation). Recent developments in the labour market have seen this critical 
and utopian impulse of art commodified and turned into work under imprimaturs like 
'creativity' and 'flexibility'. It has been noted that the traditional critical standpoints which see 
art either as detached from the instrumentality of economic and political activity or as 
progressively dissolving into living praxis, have both become exhausted at this stage in 
history.1 Yet it is important to keep in mind that this exhaustion is not simply one of critical 
models, but of a certain understanding of where art ends and social life, particularly the role 
played in it by labour, begins: an understanding shaped by capital’s own needs, as well as 
resistance to them. The crisis of models that dictate either critical distance or immersion as 
proper to the emancipatory potential of art is rooted in concrete historical developments of 
capital as value in motion, which inevitably tends to erase distinctions between types of 
productive activity – such as art and labour – while upholding the hierarchies of exploitation. 
Along with this, the current financialised phase of capitalism intensifies 'real abstraction' as it 
attempts to reconcile the difficulties of measuring value produced by labour with the 
valorisation imperatives of 'fictitious capital'.2 In that sense, the shifts in the relationship 
between art and labour have to be placed in a more fluid and idiosyncratic, possibly even 
'negative', dialectic than they have been hitherto. It is the relationship between art and labour 
that is crucial to understanding how the 'speculative mode of production' operates also as a 
mode of production of subjectivity when creativity has become workplace discipline, while art 
has become an element of social remediation by the state and an analogue of 'self-valorising 
value' by the market. Thus, my argument will be that the Adornian schema is worth retaining, 
and that re-conceiving the critical utopian impulse of art under the current conditions 
requires us to read the anomalous, specific and opaque aspects of art as a social practice 
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through Marx's category of abstract labour, at least as a hypothesis. The main point of doing 
this is not only to attest to the viability of Adorno's negative dialectic of art as indispensable to 
a dialectical notion of the relationship between art and labour in neoliberal capitalism, but to 
locate a core of negativity and refusal in the generally ameliorative and frictionless role art is 
called upon to play; not solely when rendered in the terms of 'creativity' or 'becoming-artist' 
of every worker whose workplace no longer has guarantees or collective bargaining, but also 
in the financialised restructuring of public services, regional development and other instances 
of large-scale ‘risk’ that have 'instrumentalised' the contingent modes of valorisation that 
were once the almost exclusive preserve of art. Such a negativity, furthermore, travels to the 
very heart of the opposition between labour as the producer of use-values and art as 
producing indefinite or no value; their gradual merging highlights the dependency of use-
value on exchange-value in capitalism, both categorically and structurally, and evacuates 'use-
value' of the normative or emancipatory currency given it by the orthodox Left, in tandem 
with affirmations of 'productive labour' and 'real economy' – which would have been deemed 
misguided, if not outright category errors, by Marx. 
 
Here I would like to demarcate my use of the terms 'speculation as a mode of production' and 
'financialisation'. There is clearly a need to distinguish my account of speculation as a mode of 
production from financialisation as a secular tendency in capitalist accumulation in the 
decades since the advent of neoliberalism as the organizing logic of state finances and social 
contracts. The secular tendency of financialisation is well defined by Costas Lapavitsas, who 
writes that financialisation is a change in balance in the economy between production and 
circulation, and entails a vastly extended role for financial institutions and intermediaries in 
corporate financing and in incorporation of workers' incomes, whether that be through 
borrowing (consumer credit, mortgages) or assets (pensions, insurance). The sphere of 
 28 
 
circulation expands dynamically in comparison with the sphere of production: 
In some respects the ﬁnancialisation of major developed countries during the last three   
 decades is apparent to the point of triviality. The ﬁnancial sector has grown relative to the rest   
 of the economy, including with regard to labour employed; ﬁnancial assets have become a   
 large part of the assets of non‐ﬁnancial corporations; individual borrowing for housing,   
 consumption, education, and health has grown substantially, as have individual assets held   
for pensions, insurance and so on; global ﬁnancial markets have become increasingly 
integrated; international money and capital ﬂows have reached unprecedented levels. The   list 
could be easily extended.
3  
 
Other commentators such as David McNally discuss financialisation in terms of floating 
currency, deregulation, and the resulting vast expansion of risk and volatility of value 
measures throughout an increasingly integrated economy processing millions of micro-
trades per second in products with fictitious value claims such as derivatives: 'Currency 
markets thus seemed to offer a capitalist utopia in which money breeds money', while Swiss 
economist and theorist Christian Marazzi calls financialisation more generally 'the form of 
capital accumulation symmetrical with new processes of value production'.4 What is meant by 
these 'new processes of value production' will not be discussed extensively in this work. It can 
be suggested however that Marazzi would include concepts such as the 'becoming-rent' of 
profits, as well as the rather capacious one of 'biocapitalism', which seems to be a conjugation 
of Foucauldian bio-power with the autonomist argument about the real subsumption of all 
social life in the current development of capital, leading to its 'crisis of measure'.5 
 
However, my notion of speculation as a mode of production, or the speculative mode of 
production is both narrower and wider than this – narrower within the parameters I've 
defined with regard to art and the production of a capitalistically self-valorising subjectivity, 
but also broader as it attempts to use this account as a basis for thinking about which forms 
of negation and abstraction emerge from that situation to enable us to get an idea of the 
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structural determinations for the subjective character of current struggles, or as yet 
unarticulated potentials within them. 
 
Following on from this, if in some ways preliminary to it, the term 'production of subjectivity' 
under the conditions laid out above needs to be determined. Although this thesis will attempt 
to do so largely through a reading of Marx and Moishe Postone, it will be recognized that the 
concepts of 'human capital' and 'labour-as-capital', as well as a new proximity between art 
and  abstract labour, also have strong bearing on the question of how the speculative mode 
comes to take hold of subjectivity and class relations, foremost as an erosion of antagonism 
and only latently as a force of contradiction.6 Thus a discussion of 'human capital' as the 
emblem of the production of subjectivity in the current phase of capitalism will take centre 
stage in this chapter. The specific 'figure' or 'character' of speculation as a mode of production 
is human capital because it refers to the subject whose infinite capacity for creativity and self-
invention aligns her with the structure of capital as self-valorising value. The humanization of 
financialisation, in other words. Such an analytic framework, however, needs to consider the 
structural role of speculation in social reproduction as well as the production of the subject. 
This means the worker's investment in the health of capital and the financial system as her 
reproduction and consumption requires instruments of credit such as mortgages, credit 
cards, pension funds and so forth in an era of depressed wages and greatly diminished 
working-class bargaining power and cohesion. The subjects of the speculative mode of 
production would include also artists, whose labour is un-valued (unwaged) and it is only 
their products which appreciate or depreciate in the art market. I will examine more closely in 






At this stage, some caveats are in order. To counter the proposition that this is a variant of the 
argument from 'immaterial labour' (that sees a novelty and unprecedented political potential 
in the assimilation of the full spectrum of subjective and relational human capacities into the 
reproduction of capital, once the multitude throws off the attentions of the capitalist 
vampire), it needs to be stated that such an assimilation argues the power of capital rather 
than the power of labour, and that such capacities are not generically human but fully social 
and historical, thus in great measure created by capital. Labour in capital is social cooperation 
for capital and not an autonomous agent of constitution of another mode of production. The 
agency of labour emerges through antagonism and the determinate negation of its existence 
as labour, although it may first have to emerge as a political subject in and through its 
condition as labour for capital. Here, we would also have to think of the immanent 
overcoming of 'dependent labour' proposed by the thesis that the emergence of the 'general 
intellect', advanced by technological development and forms of socialization, implies that 
workers are now their own means of production or 'fixed capital' and all that remains is the 
political project of throwing off the parasitic exploitation of the capitalist class. With regard to 
this point, the counter-claim can be made that the capitalization of the 'general intellect' is a 
measure of proletarianization and impoverishment; rather than a co-optation of the 
productive powers of the multitude by capital, it is a mark of the de-valorisation of labour, and 
a symptom of the valorisation crisis of capital. The productive powers of labour appropriated 
as the productive powers of capital – money that works, while labour is a cost – are rather 
always the productive powers of capital, except, as we see in the current unfolding crisis, they 
are less and less 'productive'.7 
 
The scepticism expressed here about rich and polyvalent concepts like 'self-valorisation' or 
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'immaterial/cognitive labour', concepts with long histories in Marxist theoretical debate and 
movements, is articulated as such in order to bracket off those kinds of analysis from the 
exposition of the role of 'creativity' in the re-structuring of capital and the changing 
conditions of labour at issue here. Elsewhere in this thesis, I will be employing other concepts 
from the 'autonomist' or 'post-Operaist' trajectory of Marxist thought such as 'antagonism', 
'refusal of work' and 'class composition', since I am interested in how the dialectical core of 
those concepts can be fleshed out when brought into relation with the more Hegelian 
variants of negativity I am working with in the project of developing 'speculation' as a 
structure of art and labour in the current stage of capital. However, 'self-valorisation' taken as 
the creation of social and productive relations autonomous of capital for their reproduction 
and expansion seems to me like a political concept thinkable in times of social contestation or 
even insurrection, and it can be discussed to what extent capital 'paves the way' for these to 
emerge, but this is not my object here. My object here is rather the various forms of 
dependency between the self and the valorisation of capital. This is why I am advancing a 
somewhat polemical proximity between 'human capital' and 'self-valorisation', as well to 
underline the inaptness of the concept of self-valorisation for describing the imposed 
atomization and precarity of contemporary labour-in-debt. The abolition of work and value 
relations is a precondition for 'self-valorisation' to be put forward as a coherent concept. The 
alternative is to draw on the re-structuring of work by capital – in which workers are 
encouraged to think of themselves as individual profit centres - as a cue for thinking the 
autonomy of labour, which is a move as politically problematic as it is philosophically, drawing 
as it does on an 'ontology of production'.8 
 
The elision of the antagonism between labour and capital in 'human capital' theory is not an 
ideological confusion, but a facet of ideology in a Marxian sense, that is, real abstraction, the 
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actual existence of abstractions such as value in the concrete phenomena of social life. An 
example would be the debt burden and privatised social services which reduce the incentive 
for workplace militancy, while the dwindling of workplace militancy reinforces the truth of 
atomisation which supports the 'human capital' version of human nature and its social 
implications. With the secular expansion of the 'community of capital' to fill the space where 
working-class interests used to affirm themselves, can the status of 'human capital' provide a 
new avenue for a challenge to the 'whole' on the immanent ground of capital, with the 
possibility of a defence of separate interests bereft of both the illusion of integration and the 
illusion of autonomy? 
 
The relevance of art to the narrative of 'human capital' is not its proximity to discourses of 
self-valorisation but its separation from the productivity orienting those discourses. There is, 
however, a production of subjectivity characteristic of art as a type of labour which is not 
capitalist work. The production of subjectivity in art is defined by a notion of freedom which is 
both isomorphic to, and irreducible to, the model of freedom as self-valorising value which is 
proposed both by 'human capital' and 'creative economy' narratives as well as the 'immaterial 
labour' concept. Art functions with an immanent set of laws and generates products and 
activities which are not productive of value even though they can attain a price; although it 
will be proposed that the capitalization of art now happens in many other ways. These are 
closer to the principles of human capital as a way of describing and regulating capitalist work 
and workers at a time when labour is vanishing as a self-conscious social or political agent – 
not only due to capitalist re-structuring (globalisation, anti-union laws) but labouring 
subjects' own desire not to work and not to be workers. It is primarily the potentiality (and 
actuality) of art as a mode of 'unproduction' and de-subjectivation which concerns us here, 
one which seems key to an understanding of class struggle starting from the current outlook 
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of financialised austerity, de-composition and division. Or, to put it differently, the potential 
productive desire not to work, and to what extent that terrain can be recaptured from the 
mimesis of self-valorising value which no longer assigns a time or place to work. This would 
be the question of what other kind of speculation is conceivable here: a speculation that 
registers the impact, the radical deformation wrought by the other, financial kind, rather than 
posing an ineffectual, spiritualised opposite to it. 
 
A final note on the distinction between this inquiry and much of the autonomist-inflected 
theory that works with the term 'self-valorisation' would be to establish that looking to the 
extant capitalist relations of production to derive the forms of their overcoming is important 
but can only get us so far, apart for the truism that the form taken by the current regime of 
valorisation will inevitably harbour contradictions which might be turned against it. The very 
notion of emancipation at issue stems from that regime, as Marx notes in this passage on the 
relation between abstract labour and abstract equality, and it couldn't be otherwise: 
 The secret of the expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence of all kinds of labour 
 because and in so far as they are human labour in general, could not be deciphered until the 
 concept of human equality had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion. 
 This however becomes possible only in a society where the commodity-form is the universal 
 form of the product of labour, hence the dominant social relation is the relation between men 
 as possessors of commodities.
9 
 
Further to this, we can think of Alfred Sohn-Rethel's argument that it is the rise of abstract 
commodity exchange that first engenders the characteristic categories of abstract thought 
such as linear time, quantity, quality, and equivalence, or even of John Locke's rooting of 
political liberty and equality in private property rights, which begin with possession of oneself 
and one's labour-power as an exclusive proprietor.10 And of course, historically and still, such 
mainstays of contractual individualism and abstract, or civil, equality are far from universal as 
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'fixed popular prejudices', since vast numbers of persons continue to exist who are 
commodities rather than commodity owners, or are otherwise not endowed with the full 
complement of civil personhood (slaves and subjects of various kinds of bonded labour, 
illegal migrants, in all their gendered and racialised stratifications). 
 
Finally, we should also take into consideration Michel Foucault's proposal, discussed also by 
Michel Feher and Jason Read, that the subject of exchange outlined by Marx above is 
precisely that subject that has been made obsolete by the neo-liberal subject of 
competition.11 The subject of competition speculates on his/her abilities, and takes only 
individual advancement into consideration, which is mirrored back to her by the 
decomposition of collective structures, such as class. There is no longer a presumption of 
equality of values obtaining here, i.e. a hard day's pay for a hard day's work, but only unequal 
awards attainable by merit. The fetish of the wage is displaced by the fetish of individual 
effort as the bedrock of justice and equality in capital – fetishes because in both cases they 
conceal the state of power relations obtaining between capital and labour, depicting 
expropriation as fair exchange, compulsion as choice and submission as sovereignty.12 
 
In this sense, the objective re-structuring of the workplace and welfare state bears out Marx's 
argument even if the figure has changed: it is not until the concept of human competition has 
acquired the permanence of fixed popular opinion that we have a dominant social relation 
between people as possessors of human capital. In a similar fashion, the model of freedom 
posited in and through art is eminently one of competitive particularity rather than abstract 
equality. Art has of course long been considered a haven of particularity and non-equivalence 
over and against the dominance of abstract exchange elsewhere in capitalist society. 
However, in a financialised capital which is driven precisely by the non-equivalence of values 
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and profits from arbitrage between them, as well as the effect of ideologies of competition on 
the 'equal exchange' presumed in the wage contract, those assumptions are long due for re-
examination. This is all the more so, given the role that art's status as a haven for particularity 
and non-fungible relations between objects and persons has consistently played in 
legitimating the very converse of those relations which obtain elsewhere in bourgeois society, 
since it makes a place for them to exist in 'relative autonomy'.13 
 
Fetishism and the Production of Subjectivity 
The notion of art as a sort of talisman or substitute for a freedom denied elsewhere in 
capitalist social relations seems to bring us closer to a discussion of fetishism, especially when 
it is art objects that are often invested with this fetishised freedom, in common with, if not 
identical to, all other commodities. If we can say, with Marx, that the chief product of the 
capitalist mode of production is the production of the class-relation, then the production of 
subjectivity is inseparable from that relation.14 This subjectivity can be described as the 
internalisation of objectivity as a fetish, insofar as the structure of commodity-fetishism is 
replicated in the reification of historically specific social relations as timeless and natural. Just 
as the social relations of production are effaced in the circulation and consumption of the 
product, the historical processes which slowly, aggregatively and contingently ensure the 
reproduction of class relations in capital are effaced in the present of that development. They 
acquire an affect of inevitability in their designation as natural laws and market mechanisms, a 
set of universals that constantly reproduce, and in reproducing deny their basis in, the class 
relation. 'The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, 
tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident 
natural laws.'15 
 
This fetishism is in many ways an invariant of the capitalist mode of production, and is also 
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tied to that mode of production being the first to legitimate itself with reference to equality 
and freedom. However, it may be argued that the global re-structuring of accumulation in the 
last four decades or so over the period which has been contentiously labelled as 'neoliberal' 
or 'post-Fordist' has seen an intensification of that fetishism as the objective condition for the 
production of subjectivity linked to the class position of the wage-worker, certainly in many 
parts of the West and the 'developed world' more generally. 
 
Financialisation has introduced a new common sense into existing ideological alignments 
around production, consumption, wealth and perception of self.16 The logic of financialisation 
creates the conditions for this logic to exert objective validity and self-evidence. The ability to 
obtain credit becomes more decisive than the level of wages earned in the feeling of 
affluence and access to social wealth, and the ability to obtain credit, for housing as a key 
instance, generalizes the stakes in the health of an exploitative financial system, while 
impacting the viability of traditional measures to improve a collective position within it, such 
as going on strike. Investment in the cultivation of one's putatively marketable skills acquires 
objective validity in times of disinvestment from public education and reduction in employee 
benefits.17 In the course of lectures collected and published in English as The Birth of 
Biopolitics, Michel Foucault traces the origins of neoliberal subjectivity to the introduction of 
a split between labour as an income stream and labour as a political identity. It can be noted, 
however, that Foucault's account of neo-liberalism does not contain an account of the class 
relations and class character of this ideological formation, in common with the rest of his 
project.  
 
This split then guides the material identification of the worker with capital rather than with the 
work she does; her work is no longer a source of collective social identity, and is frequently 
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unsatisfactory as an income stream as well. Political identification then stems from what 
neoclassical economics, human capital theory, as well as connectionist-network theory, terms 
'interests,' which may occur in the reproductive sphere or consumption rather than in the 
workplace. Rather than the 'social factory' thesis of Italian Autonomist Marxism, which saw 
the antagonism of the labour-capital contradiction diffusing throughout society, this is the 
eradication of antagonism in the diffusion of capitalism as co-extensive with the social field, 
with choice rather than change establishing the horizon of the social world: 
 Neoliberalism can be considered a particular version of 'capitalism without capitalism', a way 
 of maintaining not only private property but the existing distribution of wealth in capitalism 
 while simultaneously doing away with the antagonism and social insecurity of capitalism, in this 




Here it would be pivotal to consider to what degree it is precisely the vehicle of 'creativity' 
that mediates the extension of capitalism to all of society. Creativity rephrases Hobbesian 
competition in an uneven labour market, riven by Virno's 'opportunism' and 'submission' in 
the markedly friendlier terms of novelty and rebellion.19 With Foucault, however, we would 
also need to decipher the link between notions of creativity in reconstituting workers as 
infinitely self-enhancing assets or 'human capital' and governmentality. While this can only be 
touched on here, creativity as a complex of overt and implicit presuppositions about the 
relation between labour and value does not just generalize the 'creativity of capital to labour 
but marks the point where management intervenes in labour, where management is 
internalized. The mobilization of the entrepreneur is guided by creativity as both a productive 
norm at work and a way to transcend the constraints of labour while of course not escaping 
the demands of value. Creativity thus marks the joint between self-management and self-
exploitation, autonomy and heteronomy. The capacity of creativity to be easily internalized as 
a workplace norm renders it the form of governmentality that obtains specifically in the 
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workplace, even as the entrepreneur can principally operate anywhere, most visibly in cultural 
field and as a labour template for the putatively autonomous artist. Creativity thus functions 
as capitalist populism, assuring every exploited worker and discontented artist that capital's 
interests and their social interests coincide in the performance of labour that is inventive, 
fulfilling and that would be a joyful experience whether or not there was money involved.  
 
Real Subsumption and the Rise of Human Capital 
As noted in the Introduction, the figure of 'human capital' is pivotal at this stage of the inquiry 
since it depicts quite crudely how the subject is both structurally and ideologically situated as 
a site of capital accumulation through the premise of self-investment and self-realization, a 
personalized autonomy of capital available to each and every creative producer. Here I will 
start out by examining the nature of the link between the production of subjectivity and the 
idea that we are living in an era of intensified 'real subsumption' (the capitalization of all social 
and natural life, in many accounts). 
 
Following the preceding discussion, it may now be proposed that rather than subjectivity 
becoming the ground of resistance through and against the inscription of affect, social 
relations, etc. into the process of capitalist valorisation, the extent to which subjectivity is 
incorporated into the valorisation processes is rather the extent to which it ratifies those 
processes as subjective truths. Much recent work has discussed this process of incorporation, 
or, put otherwise, the extension of commodity relations into hitherto untouched domains, as 
a type of 'real subsumption'. This is a way of placing into a social and subjective register 
Marx's distinction between formal and real subsumption as the the shift from capital as a 
quantitative agent (superficially taking hold of or interposing itself into existing relations of 
production) to a qualitative agent (transforming relations and techniques of production from 




However, the dimension of subjectivity in the reproduction of the class relation is something 
other than its direct valorisation at work. With the shift from surplus-value extraction in 
industrial production to the commodification of services on the one side and 'cognitive 
industries' on the other, the role of subjectivity in abstract labour is no longer simply generic 
subjectivity, 'merely congealed quantities of homogeneous human labour' which appear in 
the shape of commodities, but the commodification of that abstraction as economically 
viable 'creativity'. Capital's realisation problem – the commodities may not be sold, the labour 
might not have been socially necessary – then migrates into the production process and 
becomes recursive: this creativity might not happen, and might yield neither surplus-value 
nor profit in the form of rent. This financial trade may fail, or this intellectual property might 
not ever be produced. Indeterminacy and contingency become both the conditions of work, 
and the conditions of failure. The consequences have been elaborated in the work of theorists 
such as Paolo Virno and Christian Marazzi, with Virno developing a political-economic 
anthropology of the 'post-Fordist' workplace whose salient quality is 'opportunism', the 
capitalisation of behaviours, affects and habits acquired in social life outside the workplace to 
maximise success in a workplace that is seen not as bounded in time and space but as 
coincidental with the subject's personal trajectory. He also delineates the importance of rule-
following behaviour, bureaucracy and arbitrary hierarchies.20 Generic subjectivity would mean 
here a standardised assemblage of tenets like individual freedom and the development of 
'creativity' (personal and social). It is materially predicated upon the ability to do anything 
whatever, to follow arbitrary orders and submit to contingent hierarchies. Such a detached 
adaptivity is the genuine emblem of 'real subsumption' as a term for these social and 
subjective conditions, a naturalisation which is no longer experienced as either natural or 
imposed, but simply as what is the case, a facticity which may be accommodated or avoided 
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but is too trivial and transparent to be worth challenging. On this point, Stefano Harney refers 
to 'logistical subjectivities':  
 ...subjectivity that mines information for compatibility, one that can plug itself in anywhere, 
 without an adapter, as the laboring conduit between disparate forms of information, goods, 
 cultures, languages, finances and affinities. This logistic subjectivity is the one we talk about 
 when we talk about our teaching, when we say it is not the content of the play or poem or 
 ethnography we are teaching that transfers skills to the student, but some general capacity to 
 move between such contents, connecting them in a process of lifelong learning.
21 
 
This is the formation of human capital that would recognize itself as such and valorise, 
without being too concerned over how that value is compounded or to whom it accrues. As 
the law of value is the highest law in the only possible world, it is a sheer waste of time to 
conspire against it. The subject of human capital should see neither a practical nor critical 
difference between the goals of capital and individual goals, since self-valorisation is common 
to both, regardless of how this is achieved.  
 
The significance of the insertion of 'creativity' into 'abstract labour' - the social form of 
capitalist work - and its relatively recent promotion in neoliberal economic restructuring, is 
not that the interests of wage-labour are identified with the interests of capital – this is an 
ideological desideratum of capital from its beginning, as is the attempt to ease any 
distinctions between the interests of capitalist valorisation and the 'general social interest', as 
it were. The difference now may be that this interest has absorbed any differential logics into 
the practical immanence of the logic of capital to any social participation or self-definition. It 
is not simply labour which is alienated, but all other human capacities, simply through their 
potential to produce value from generic 'creativity' (the generic is what makes it analogous to 
abstract labour), even if no actual value is or can be produced.22 At the same time, the 
contingency of financialised accumulation comes to be identified with the contingency of 
social freedom as such, even as it sets rigid constraints for that freedom in its delimitation of 
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access to social wealth. Ultimately, then, it comes to stand for the cancellation of this 
contingency, as human capital can in its definition only maximise along the same trajectory as 
capital. It will be examined further on if this is necessarily the case, using Michel Feher's 'Left' 
articulation of human capital.  
 
Given that 'the socially productive power of labour develops as a free gift to capital', at a time 
of dissolution of the political claims of organized labour and their inability to raise the price of 
labour or influence life prospects for the majority of workers, the position of capital seems 
more desirable.23 The resilience of capital as its political claims are promoted by the state in a 
time of capitalist crisis contrasts unfavourably with the negligible impact of such claims from 
workers or the unemployed. The practical repudiation of workers by capital and state – this 
encompassing both political claims and availability of employment – testifies to the 
ideological rejection of the social claims of work and its constraint on the freedom of capital 
as the hallmark of neoliberal restructuring. This has been accompanied by an unprecedented 
intensification of work, showing an almost inverse correlation between the social validation of 
labour and the average level of exploitation. The highest levels of exploitation seem to co-
exist with a subjective refusal of work by those in the most menial to the most relatively elite 
circumstances, an attitude that encompasses dissociation from transient or degrading 
employment conditions to the embrace of work as an economic recognition of the subject's 
spontaneous creative inclinations. Such an acquiescent modality of refusal raises the question 
of whether work has first to be recognized in order to be refused, which touches on a much 
more substantive debate about the role of recognition and representation in movements for 
social change, as well as the dialectics of affirmation and negation that Marx takes over from 
Hegel. Conventionally, it would seem to be impossible that a working-class negate itself as a 
working-class without first coming to a practical awareness of itself as a working-class in 
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antagonism with an owning class. But there may be other modes of political agency 
conceivable in the absence of this awareness or the clear distinctions they require, an absence 
which reflects structural changes in the 'real abstraction' of capitalist organization and 
socialization, as much or more than it does any deficit of politics . A self-negation of the 
working-class in order to subjectively identify with capital makes sense when capital has 
made work disappear by making it so general it is no longer experienced as particular, if it is 
experienced at all.24 
 
It might help to examine 'human capital' in light of the point made by Jason Read that the 
advance of neo-liberal doctrine over liberalism lay precisely in its move to bring labour back 
into the picture with the notion of 'human capital'.25 Much as Marx demonstrated that the 
relationship of concrete social labour to the abstraction of value was 'abstract labour', the 
theorists of 'human capital' were concerned to demonstrate that the abstraction of labour 
could be resolved by positing the capitalist as a worker, and the worker as proprietor of a 
labour-power redefined as 'human capital'. The original theorist of human capital, and the 
one cited most frequently by Foucault in his lectures on neoliberalism is Gary S. Becker (who 
was building on a line of research initiated by T.W. Schultz and other Chicago School 
economists in the 1950s). The idea of human capital is essentially that of applying cost:benefit 
analysis to 'intangibles' such as education, family, health or cultural interests and viewing 
them as rational investments made by individuals in their employability, social mobility and 
financial security: 
 Schooling, a computer training course, expenditures on medical care, and lectures on the 
 virtues of punctuality and honesty are capital too in the sense that they improve health, raise 
 earnings, or add to a person's appreciation of literature . . . Consequently, it is fully in keeping 
 with the capital concept as traditionally defined to say that [these expenditures] are 
 investments in capital. However, these produce human, not physical or financial, capital 
 because you cannot separate a person from his or her knowledge, skills, health and values the 





Though showing a risible parochialism, which is permeated by class anxiety while rejecting 
any analytic significance for class ('Many studies show that education promotes health, 
reduces smoking, raises the propensity to vote, improves birth control knowledge, and 
stimulates the appreciation of classical music, literature, and even tennis.'),27 this account 
displays the habitual features of Chicago School economic analysis in its inheritance of the 
classical economists' version of capital as a neutral and ahistorical term for a 'stock' of useful 
materials which can be optimally mobilized in the same way regardless of productive 
relations, and its utilitarian reading of subjectivity, as well as in its downplaying of collective 
structures or political activity as influential in the life chances of 'human capital', with an 
emphasis on paid work and commodified education as the main determinants of those 
chances, as well as the driving forces of social change. It is clear that the ideological thrust of 
the concept of 'human capital' is precisely to eradicate any analytic or critical distinction 
between labour and capital, between owning and not owning the means of production. With 
'human capital' everyone owns the means of production, since each individual is in fact her 
own means of production. The status of 'human capital' does evolve from the time of its initial 
enunciation. For Becker and his econometrics in the 1960s, charted by Foucault in the 1970s, 
the human is still 'fixed capital' which can be measured.28 In the 1980s , 'human capital' had 
been eclipsed by the more aspirational figure of the 'entrepreneur', the mobilizer of her and 
others' human capital in an 'enterprise society', insofar as there was a society. By the 1990s 
and 2000s, a far more nebulous notion of 'creativity' had come to dominate policy analysis, 
management theory and economic prognostications. Creativity could not really be measured, 
but it could be valued. It signalled the indeterminacy of a 'new economy' where management 
was the only measure of a precarious and fugitive 'value'. In the present era, however, of 
unwinding asset values and contracting markets and services, ideologemes such as the 'Big 
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Society'' and 'the nudge', along with behavioural economics seem to be putting 'human' and 
‘social capital back on the agenda. This becomes dramatically evident in the coming 
deflation of the 'student loan' bubble and the incipient trade in 'human capital futures'.29 We 
can conjecture that this announces the convergence in speculative finance of labour-power as 
variable capital with the 'stock' of Becker's notion of human capital. 
    
From another perspective, the relevance of human capital is immeasurably expanded with the 
ascendancy of 'creativity' as the general baseline for much contemporary work. As creativity is 
both indeterminate and intimate to the worker, it is a variable whose valorisation would seem 
to oppose the law of value, with its emphasis on definite outcomes within finite time frames, 
the relationship of the price of labour to the time worked. If we turn now to art, it can be said 
that it is the centrality of 'creativity' to the artisanal mode of production through which most 
art is made that makes its structures of valorisation and validation so inimical to the law of 
value as it applies elsewhere, and that the spread of 'creativity' to this 'elsewhere' introduces 
certain aporias in how waged, rather than artisanal, labour is to be valued, and what value, if 
any, it actually produces. It has been observed that this ostensible loss of measure should 
perhaps be more accurately termed a 'granularity' of value as the distortions introduced by 
the subsumption of 'creative' activity into capitalist processes of valorisation are resolved by 
the accounting of targets, outcomes in the public services and the intellectual property 
regimes common to both public and private sector businesses. But what may be more 
apposite to this inquiry is both how 'human capital' can be discussed with regard to the 
category of 'abstract labour' and whether labour reconfigured as capital can still harbour any 
transformative capacities. It is important to examine these points as they are germane for the 
argument that the expansion of 'creativity' constitutes art – as creativity's originary domain in 
bourgeois society – as a form of abstract labour, and that the precondition of this kind of 
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generalised social creativity is the subjectivity of 'human capital' as a labour-denying vector of 
risk-embracing and self-valorising value. This will in turn provide the bedrock for the 
investigation of whether art – as the major sphere of codification of this creativity, and one 
which seems to enter into a direct relation with capital without the mediation of wage-labour 
- offers a form of subjectivity negating of or contradictory to labour which is different from 
human capital's cancellation of labour modelled on capital. As mentioned, the hypothesis that 
art is becoming a kind of abstract labour will have to be tested further in order to answer this 
question. First it may be important to delimit precisely what is meant by 'abstract labour' in 
this analysis. 
 
Abstract Labour: an Abstract 
In the first volume of Capital, Marx defines abstract labour as the general category for all 
labour performed in capitalism. This is without regard to the diversity of concrete labours, 
insofar as the rendering of all labour homogeneous by value is the specifically capitalist mode 
of existence of the transhistorical category of human productive activity that is referred to as 
labour.30 It is eminently not labour performed for its own sake, or labour performed to satisfy 
needs however these are defined, but labour performed for the generation of surplus-value. 
Again here we see the dilemma of attempting to fuse the polarities of 'art' and 'abstract 
labour', since it is evident that art does not partake of the logic of abstract and 
undifferentiated productive activity performed to generate surplus-value; it is the very 
epitome of concrete, particular and self-directed activity, which is why it has always held the 
character of the constitutive exception in capitalist modernity, the 'unconditioned, in Kant's 
terms.31 But if the purpose of bringing the terms 'art' and 'abstract labour' into proximity is to 
highlight the mutual interpenetration of art's characteristic modes of production (creativity in 
all its facets) with the humdrum world of work, then it may perhaps be revealing to follow 
how abstract labour functions as a form of social domination rather than just a technical 
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category for value-producing labour. This discussion will be expanded in the second chapter's 
focus on the specific determinations of the links between art and abstract labour in the 
present, so will have to be relatively cursory for now. 
 
Moishe Postone helps here. He seeks to delineate the concept of 'abstract labour' as not 
simply a term for the homogeneous quality of labour in capitalism which is the substance of 
value across heterogeneous commodities – the 'form' of that value - but also as a category 
central to capitalist social relations dominated by real abstraction; the form for 'values', as it 
were.32 The salience of Postone's representation of 'abstract labour' as a social mediation 
rather than as the general analytic category for innumerable concrete labours or as a 
physiological quantum of average socially necessary labour is that it emphasizes the 
fetishistic character of labour performed in capitalism, that is, labour produced under the 
value-form. In this it obviates both the 'essentialist' stance frequently assigned to Marx's 
conception of labour as affirming a transhistorical constant of human interaction with the 
world, and the tensions implicit in the retrieval of a concept of 'living labour' within and 
against abstract labour which is found in many post-autonomist accounts.33 Postone develops 
a concept of 'abstract labour' as 'abstract social domination' which functions in the absence 
or occlusion of direct social relations, installing labour as a mediation which takes on the 
status of an 'objective' fact for productive and social relations: 
 [I]t is the social function of labor which makes it general. As a socially mediating activity, labor is 
 abstracted from the specificity of its product, hence, from the specificity of its own concrete 
 form. In Marx's analysis, the category of abstract labor expresses this real social process of 
 abstraction; it is not simply based on a conceptual process of abstraction. […] commodity-
 producing labor, in the process of objectifying itself as concrete labor in particular use values, 
 also objectifies itself as abstract labor in social relations. […]  overcoming capitalism would 
 entail the abolition – not the realization – of the“substance,”of labor's role in constituting a 




In Postone's account, '[l]abour as such does not constitute society per se; labour in capitalism, 
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however, does constitute that society'.35 It is the extent of this dominance which must be 
contested and mystified by 'human capital'; it must efface both the centrality of value-
producing labour to the reproduction of capital and social life in capital (total social capital, in 
Marx's term), and the centrality of this labour to the experience of the subjects of social 
relations in capital. Again, insofar as the structure of the reproduction of capital relies on the 
incorporation of the productive powers of labour, effacing labour in its own augmentation, 
the specific ideological shift announced by 'human capital' is not a novelty. It is the specific 
ways in which the 'human capital' notion acts to eliminate labour ideologically which need to 
be investigated. The mode of production of subjectivity offered by 'human capital' has already 
been described as mimetic of capitalist valorisation and indexical of the real subsumption of 
subjectivity to this mode of valorisation. It is also of interest to the critique of labour in 
capitalism, as traced above in Postone's position, which informs the position adopted in this 
thesis. It is, in fact, of singular interest, since it is the clearest illustration of the ideological 
erasure of labour which is elsewhere being practically erased by changes in technology, the 
differential expansion of the global market in labour, and the spread of de-industrialisation 
and de-valorisation of labour in the West; as pointed out earlier, it is a way of 'including out' 
labour (inclusion through absorption) which establishes a marked symmetry between the 
ideological stance of neoliberalism and the actual movements of capital. Such a  symmetry 
discloses a further symmetry – the reflection of the objective economic circumstances of the 
speculative mode of production in the self-understanding promoted to workers, and often 
imposed on them by the conditions of existence rather than as a matter of faith. The indebted 
subject, for instance, is a site of accumulation for financial entities, and forms a source of 
'human capital' for them as much as a stock of 'human capital' for herself.  
 
This seems to position 'human capital' as an 'objective social mediation' in the same way as 
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Postone has argued for the category of 'abstract labour', or, perhaps, a pretender to its place 
which underlines the diminished social and political claims of labour. Not through the 
overcoming of capital, as Postone notes is the purpose of the negation of labour as objective 
social mediation, but in order to universalize it as the only horizon. 
 
Self-Appreciation? 
The concept of human capital has often been conjugated with 'creativity' in the publications 
of sociologists offering new paradigms for urban development and the shaping of labour-
markets to the policy planners of post-industrial metropolises. Perhaps the most well-known 
of the proponents of human capital theory in the more palatable guise of 'creativity' as factor 
in governance and growth is Richard Florida.36 His formulation of the 'creative city' enjoys 
tremendous influence, as well as tremendous on-the-ground impact, an influence which has 
not significantly waned from the 'boom' years of the early-mid 2000s in which it first took 
hold up to the changed landscape of the austere present. Florida is an avowed social and 
market liberal with a vision of re-fashioning cities in the image of a 'creative class' who 
engage in an elite consumption and self-reliant production ecologically and economically 
appropriate to slimmed-down welfare states and de-industrialised urban cores. Interestingly, 
Florida, as an erstwhile Marxist, retains the language of class in his programme of bohemian 
embourgeoisement, although it is a class formed entirely by forces of circulation and 
consumption, with the larger forces homogenizing urban areas as habitats for the moneyed 
and creative kept firmly in abeyance in his analysis (though he does acknowledge that the 
most 'creative' will eventually be displaced by the less creative of greater means). For Florida, 
'human capital' is, as for most mainstream academic sociologists, a neutral descriptive term, 
useful to analyse e.g. different life prospects amongst e.g. more or less entrepreneurial 
individuals from 'communities' with different economic and ethnic attributes. The reference 
to 'class' is a  shorthand and has no heuristic or critical bearing on the embrace of the reified 
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conceptual vocabulary of orthodox economics this variant of academic sociology takes as its 
benchmark. 
 
The sociologist Michel Feher proposes a somewhat different take on 'human capital', finding 
a set of implications which could be qualified as a 'Left' reading of the concept. His point of 
departure coalesces around the simultaneous rejection and appropriation by earlier (19th and 
20th c.) Socialist movements of the concept of alienated labour. Liberal ideology sought to 
frame workers as free owners of labour-power whereas in practice they were neither free nor 
owners; however, it was precisely the 'empty promise' of liberal freedom that they took on 
and sought to realize in agitating for workers' power, legitimating their cause in those 
universal and humanist terms. With the evacuation in recent decades of the strength and 
visibility of labour movements, Feher moves to considering what aspirations are embodied 
but programmatically obscured in the notion of 'human capital'. The 'dominant subjective 
form' of human capital 'allow[s] it to express aspirations and demands that its neoliberal 
promoters had neither intended nor foreseen'.37 These aspirations and demands, for Feher, 
rest largely in the fact that 'human capital' has been explicated in terms which allow for non-
economic benefits to enter into the assets proper to such capital. But this is not sufficient, 
since writers such as Schultz and Becker project a 'utilitarian' view of profiting from 
accumulated potential ('fixed capital') which is at odds with the neoliberal era of constant 
value appreciation in the short-term; in other words, there is a shift from 'monetary and/or 
psychic income' to self-appreciation in 'stock value'.38 It is this 'self-appreciation' which 
describes the agency of the subject of 'human capital', a self-appreciation which goes beyond 
divisions between production and reproduction or production and consumption, and 
maintains a 'portfolio of conducts' for a self envisioned as a stock value. Paradoxically, such a 
financialised grasp of subjectivity is the condition that must be appropriated and taken as the 
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ground of contestation for a 'Left adequate to neo-liberalism'. In Feher's view, this has to be a 
contestation over the best ways for this human capital to self-appreciate. Rather than being 
possessors of labour power or owners of their human capital, a relationship between a 
distinct person and a distinct commodity which can be alienated, the subject of human capital 
is rather an investor or 'speculator' in her accumulated value.  
 
Feher proceeds in his argument by outlining the New Left critique of the workers' movement 
as reproducing the structure of capitalist subjection in its embrace of humanist norms of 
liberal freedom – a critique which was also extended to the State socialist (or State capitalist) 
bloc, a critique since then codified mainly through the Foucauldian term of 'governmentality'. 
The contention was that this subjection militated against a revolution in society along the axis 
of autonomy and self-realization, or any social change which exceeded the metabolics of class 
interest or universalizing moral norms. 'Human capital' thus registers the mainstay of New 
Left politics, 'the personal is political' (though it is debatable as to how representative this was 
as a tenet on the New Left before second-wave feminism came along), and the 'personal is 
political' forms the cornerstone of the social claims of 'self-appreciation': 'the contest [for the] 
conditions under which we may appreciate ourselves is politically decisive.'39 This coming to 
terms with the legacy of the 'new social movements' in their purported historical eclipse of 
the 'workers movements' means that human capital provides a vehicle for radicalising the 
neoliberal condition from within, relaunching a politics of the personal in a time when the 
collective dimension seems to have become radically inaccessible. Aspirations which take no 
cognizance of the split between life and work are exemplary of the radicalising potential of 
'human capital'. Examples of this direction include the programmes of 'flexicurity' and the 
'guaranteed social wage' which aim to further workers' navigation of capital's demands for 
flexibility by giving them social and professional latitude to increase their human capital in or 
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out of work.40 It also manifests in struggles over intellectual property, which can be framed as 
challenges to the property relations that stand in the way of access to social wealth – the 
enclosure of non-scarce resources. 
 
Feher's account of the subversive potential of human capital, while suggestive and insightful 
in many points, is not ultimately persuasive. Its main flaw is the failure to consider the 
totalising logic of capital, which need not be or even principally is not coextensive with the 
'self-appreciation' of human capital. The logic of capital is totalising and the potentiality of 
subjects is indeterminate. They cannot coincide; or, rather, they can, but only in the interests 
of capital.41 Human capital would then simply name the site where the incompatibility 
between accumulation of value and any other priorities is posited and then foreclosed by the 
terms of neo-classical economics. 'Self-appreciation' seems to be substantively identical to 
'self-valorisation', and is thus subject to all the contradictions of an affirmative use of that 
term in post-Operaist or 'immaterial labour' analyses; the self in question has to be affirmed 
either in terms of self-valorising value or productive labour-power. It remains murky whether 
the replacement of a possessive relation to a labour-power which can be alienated by a 
speculative relationship with a self configured as a portfolio of assets can be seen as an 
advance over the liberal-era obfuscation of the links between production and reproduction. 
Such an assessment seems to be tendentious, and this is underlined in the discussion of the 
progressive aspects of the logic of human capital. 'Flexicurity', while perhaps an admirable 
effort to wrest some room to manoeuvre for a significantly inessential labour force from the 
incessantly de-valorising imperatives of capital, succeeds to the extent that it thwarts those 
imperatives. It presumes the existence of regulation, which is a codification of competing and 
non-congruent interests rather than an affirmation of capital's interests on its own behalf, or, 
even more implausibly, a corporatist conflation of interests (even if this is usually the way 
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labour regulation is portrayed). So long as labour is a dependent variable of capital, which it 
constitutively has to be for capital to exist, it can neither recognize nor advance its interests by 
identifying them with those of capital; nor, significantly, can it jettison or reshape the nature 
or role of 'interests', as Feher claims for the 'new social movements', by reverting to one of the 
poles in the social field that those new social movements attempted to displace or expand, 
that is, a social field polarized by the labour-capital relation. Similarly, the challenge to 
intellectual property regimes from the standpoint of human capital appreciation runs into the 
same problem that Marx diagnosed in the use of 'equality' as a terrain of social claims 
between labour and capital: between equal rights, force decides. Between two capitals, force 
decides, and it's not human capital which is currently in a position to mobilize that force. A 
negation of the logic of capital as a social mediation is at stake – coupled with an affirmation 
of another logic - overtly or covertly, in both the 'flexicurity' and the intellectual property 
scenario; it is disingenuous to repudiate the role of such a negation, although the nature of 
the negation or the counter-logic/s may be rightfully investigated. Finally, and not 
inconsequentially, the appreciation of human capital, although an intriguing thought 
experiment for political theorists, would appear to have very little mobilizing force for 
collectivities; it is doubtful whether the political claims Feher identifies with 'human capital' 
could be advanced using the terms of 'human capital'. Humanism dies harder than he 
imagines, which is why capital seeks recourse to 'human capital' in the first place. The 
incongruity rather than the harmony of the combination should be the focus.  
 
 
From Self to Species-Being 
However, Feher's point about the necessary reference to some universal concept of freedom 
for the development of a political subjectivity can be approached more extensively. The 
inadequacy of either abstract labour or human capital to a substantial concept of socially 
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determined human freedom is related to the unfreedom portended by the domination of 
value in both of these social forms. Therefore, a few articulations of social activity untethered 
from the value-form - such as 'species-being' in Marx, 'libidinal economy' in Lyotard, and the 
'purposeless purpose' of art in Kantian and Romantic aesthetics – are several vectors which 
could be examined here insofar as they prefigure some aspects of the 'abolition' of an 
abstract labour involved also in the production of subjectivity as well as the reproduction of 
capital.  
 
In the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx puts forward the idea of species-
being as the defining characteristic of humanity in distinction both from other animals, and 
from a humanity subjugated by alienated labour: 
 Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious 
 life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity 
 distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a 
 species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that 
 his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. Estranged labor 
 reverses the relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his 
 life activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence.42 
 
 The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species-being, or his manifestation as a real 
 species-being (i.e., as a human being), is only possible if he really brings out all his species-
 powers – something which in turn is only possible through the cooperative action of all of 
 mankind, only as the result of history  – and treats these powers as objects: and this, to begin 




This second passage presents a dialectic of 'estranged' or alienated labour, which accords 
with the idea that capital is a progressive force in history, rending asunder traditional social 
relations and de-mystifying them with the universal solvent of the value-form (albeit re-
mystifying them in commodity fetishism). Following Hegel, humanity can historically 
appropriate its species-being only after the separation from and objectification of its 
productive powers in alienated labour. From this, it is clear that it is not in appropriating its 
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labour from its alienating conditions that humanity can recover or posit its species-being, but 
in appropriating its species-being from alienated labour. Species-being is the open-ended 
indeterminacy – species-becoming is more apt than species-being – which can be realized 
only after it has passed through the historical stage of abstraction and homogenization as 
labour in capital; from labour's earlier status of religiously or politically grounded duty to the 
social mediation of value-producing labour, which is purely formal and axiomatic. The 
negativity of this abstract social domination is, in the Hegelian schema Marx is tracing here, 
inseparable from humanity's emergence out of its 'pre-history' in the appropriation of its 
'species-being' as the capacity to transform the conditions of its life. Species-being is 
elsewhere defined in terms reminiscent of Giambattista Vico's writings on history as the 
science most transparent to human knowledge because it is made by humans; thus, species-
being is simply the presupposition that the human species is the only species that can act 
self-consciously in changing its environment and change itself in the process.44 Hence the call 
for a negation of that estrangement of its powers which has been a necessary stage on the 
way to the emergence of the human species from 'pre-history'. 
 
Value Equals Zero 
This is the dialectical schema which is questioned by Jean-François Lyotard in his early book 
Libidinal Economy. For him, the negation of the negation which structures the concept of 
species-being, and traverses much of Marx and Marxism, carries a theological freight. The 
impetus driving his investigation seems to be a kind of perverse and non-Hegelian 'tarrying 
with the negative', that is, dwelling in the mediation of alienated labour or excavating the 
alienation of labour as the site of a non-productive and excessive fetishism. Production and 
exchange must both be demolished for a libidinal economy that dispenses with ratio, basing 
itself instead on struggle and on affect, rather than affirming a harmonious vision of liberated 
production at the basis of its critique. It preserves and exacerbates the negativity of Marx's 
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vision of the proletariat as the self-annihilating agent that in doing away with its status as 
proletariat annihilates the entire order – but the proletariat is now formulated as a disease of 
capital, and the first victim of this disease. The emptying-out of ties and social orders, the 
subjugation to the empty form of value and the disaffection and intensity produced thereby 
are evoked as the corrosive agents of capitalist social organization rather than the justified 
collectivity of workers organized for the advancement of their interests. But these affects and 
conditions are also agents of propulsion, like the schizophrenic assemblages in the work of 
Lyotard's contemporaries Deleuze and Guattari. The 'tyranny of the sign', be it the revolution, 
the proletariat, democracy or capital, is seen as a domestication of this corrosive emptiness of 
the form of value, which is at its height in the speculative circuit, M-C-M' ('The Nihilist Theory 
of the Zero of Credit'): 
 We must grasp that currency (more generally every object in the system of capital, since they 
 are commodities and therefore currency), actual or potential, is not merely a convertible value 
 in a universal process of production, but indiscernibly (and not oppositionally, dialectically) a 
 charge of libidinal intensity. We must grasp the fact that the system of capital is not the site of 




The romanticism of alienation lies also, for Lyotard, in the assumption of a positive or whole 
subject who can collectively appropriate and produce use-values once that subject and those 
use-values are liberated from the impositions of capital. This kind of subject of alienation, an 
owning subject whose subjectivity can be alienated and recaptured like a property, needs to 
be countered by a subject that comes into being through alienation and whose radical 
dispossession is the starting point of any elaboration of non-capitalist life.46 This lends 
another valence to the foregoing discussion of 'human capital', as it can be proposed that 
that concept at the same time dispenses with the alienated subject (the worker) while 
recuperating it in virtually the same gesture with the ideal and centred subject of appreciating 
values – or better, in Feher's terminology, an investor in a portfolio of assets. It would seem 
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that in either case, there is an unexplored possibility for antagonism, dispersion and non-
identity which is constitutive of the negativity of the capitalist subject, whether figured as a 
worker or as self-entrepreneur. 
 
What is important for Lyotard (as it was for contemporaries such as Jean-Joseph Goux and, in 
a different key, for Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) in demoting the subject of alienation in 
favour of a de-subjectivation that would be the potential destruction of the sign, the symbolic 
(Lacan) realm which organizes the productive relations of the subject in relation to not just an 
alienating but a monstrous objectivity.47 The destruction of the sign is accompanied by the 
destruction of the body, e.g. in industrial labour. This is the impact of capital's de-subjectifying 
operation, which operates directly on the libido.48 Therefore, it is important to frontally take 
on this de-subjectifying operation by capital – which is now an accomplished historical fact - 
and exceed it in negativity until it shatters, rather than pine for a wholesome subject to be re-
captured or emancipated.  
 
By locating the site of subversion of the value-form within the value-form, the destruction of 
capitalist labour in the abstraction of that labour, Lyotard attempts to short-circuit the 
transitive equivalences of the dialectic by displacing the negativity inherent to dialectics and 
leveraging it against the positive signs which dialectical negation ultimately guarantees. The 
moment of negation is extended into a monstrous affirmation, a sort of dialectic-proof 
sublime rather than a Hegelian synthesis, an economy without equivalence, and certainly not 
the equivalence between the Rational and the Real. With regard to the notion of species-
being adumbrated earlier, the notion of the subjectivity of labour as intrinsically excessive and 
perverse evokes a species-being as dedicated to its own destruction as to its realization, or 




The implications of Libidinal Economy 's 'theory of the zero of credit' (rather than the 'labour 
theory of value') for the speculative mode of production cannot be developed further here, 
although it is very suggestive. For now, we can note that Lyotard's discussion of libidinal 
economy offers one further direction for the analysis of 'human capital' as an ideological term 
which takes the measure of the superfluity and waste, the negativity of labour, and 
supersedes it with the open-ended indeterminacy, the 'zero' of capital, as a new name for the 
relation of labour – that does not want to be labour, a subjectivity that does not recognize its 
singularity in labour – to a capital which has absorbed and erased abstract labour not simply 
as a means to valorise itself, but as a means of signification. We can then wonder if species-
being is recuperable from abstract labour when it seems the only way for labour to gain 
recognition is to either disappear into capital or become capital. This reflection would also 
have to address how to think about the negativity and excess represented by labour at a time 
when accumulation has again become 'primitive' enough to not only seek to absorb 
previously de-commodified goods, but consign large portions of the global population to the 
status of 'excess' and 'waste'. The negativity and excess posed by labour as capital's 
antagonistic source of value mutates into the negativity borne by capital with respect the 
excess posed to it by ever-more unproductive human life that stands no chance of being or 
accumulating 'human capital'.49 
 
But closer to the topoi of this work, we could also venture that insofar as the rationalization of 
'creativity' is one of the principal symptoms of the insertion of 'species-being' into abstract 
labour, this is simply the reality of commodity fetishism extended from social relations to the 
constitution of subjectivity. Just as in Lacan 'there is no sexual relationship' because of and 
despite the fetishisation of the Real (the authenticity impossibly borne by this kind of 
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relationship), there is no relationship between capital and labour when commodity fetishism 
has reached this stage because the distinction has ceased to apply. And yet labour, as the 
source of surplus value, is still the negativity to capital's pure self-valorising value, even when, 
or especially when, it is folded into capital as subject. And if this negativity is most easily 
grasped as a loss of the social salience of labour, the dominance of abstract exchange and the 
metastasis of value in all relations, it comes into a new proximity to the form of labour which 
has always been defined as non-labour since it only produces exchange-value and not use-
value in capitalism: art. An art which has itself been detached from its material and 
ornamental affiliations to subsist as the exercise of pure subjective freedom.50 In what way can 
we speak of art and labour thus coming onto a shared terrain of 'uselessness', albeit with 
radically different experiences of the rule of the value-form in their respective performance? 
As Marx says in the chapter on the commodity, 'If the thing is useless, so is the labour 
contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates no value.'51 This 
phrase, unrelated to such discussion of art's role in capital as there is in Marx but pertinent to 
mine, will guide the next chapter's explorations. What is artistic labour's relationship to the 
value-form, how does this reflect the transformations in the space of waged work, and how 
does the form of value itself change under the torsion of financialisation and its 'absolute 
contingencies'?52 
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to underplay the extent to which this conception also held for Marx, ran through Hegel, and flourished in anti-
work, left-communist and critical theory currents among Marx's contemporaries and later adherents, such as 
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Topologies of Speculation: Art, Labour, Finance and Time  
 
Introduction 
'Speculation as a mode of production' in art and capital is a proposition intended to clarify 
how the commodity character of art and of labour-power, examined from the formal-
logical, the social and the aesthetic point of view, undergoes a shift in an era of valorisation 
which I have described as speculative. The relation between art and labour, as two contrary 
social forms, one which is predicated on uselessness and the other on a social use-value, 
start to lose their contours as a more immanent experience of abstract value determines 
the conditions for both. The speculative subject, whether of aesthetics or labour-power, is 
thus key to understanding how capital in its current mode – a mode that has been defined 
in terms of 'fictitious capital' as well as  a 'double decoupling' between labour and capital1 
– drives a re-orientation of art and labour away from the discrete terrains set out for them 
by a previous mode of accumulation towards a problematic convergence of self-
expanding value couched in notions such as 'creativity' or 'human capital'. This is what I 
aim to bring together under the rubric 'speculation'. 
 
I have aimed to delineate the specific form of subjectivity that belongs to speculation as a 
mode of production. This called upon an understanding of subjectivity as a thoroughly 
social rather than a psychological or individual category – an 'objective' subjectivity that 
should be read from and against its social conditions of possibility. Here, 'subjectivity' can 
also be seen as an objectivity which becomes internalized, and individualized. This is 
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grounded in the fetishised character of the individual in capitalism. The liberal notion of 
the individual is by definition a being who is under-determined by, and primary to, social 
and historical processes. However, it can be argued that the dividing line between 
subjectivity and objectivity itself is an index of social and historical process.2 The category 
of 'subjectivity' and its conditions of production is useful because this category enables us 
to think about the repressed politics in a dominant notion of 'creativity' which models 
subjectivity on self-valorising value in line with the social dominance of self-valorising 
value as modelled by financialised capital.3 This brings us to an essentially 'economic' 
concept of creativity, with the entrepreneurial bearer of this subjectivity as the 'bearer' or 
manager of their own 'human capital'. The accounts of the 'human capital' concept that I 
surveyed in the previous chapter, however, do not exhaust the story of how the open-
ended contingency of creativity becomes reconciled with value in the production of 
subjectivity. Later, I will approach this assumed reconciliation through the lens of the 
concept of 'real subsumption', enabling me to how track how subjectivity is 'capitalised' 
through developments in production and property.  
 
The account of the emergence of human capital as this kind of 'capitalization of the 
human' needs to be supplemented with an account of the 'humanization of capital' 
corollary to the precepts of creative work, creative management, and arts-led economic 
strategies native to the 'creative industries' discourse. My approach throughout this thesis 
follows critical aesthetics and value-form theory, which dictate a negative traversal and 
inhabitation of such 'economistic' notions for what they teach us about what social forms 
can be dialectically extracted from them. However, as already noted, I am also interested in 
 67 
 
certain concepts from Marxist autonomist theory for their proximity, as well as their 
distance, from such a project. Thus I am interested, without committing to a fuller 
exploration here, in the post-Operaist debates around 'immaterial labour' and the 'general 
intellect'. Insofar as they fail to adequately link their accounts of capital and their accounts 
of production historically rather than ontologically, they can echo certain aspects of the 
affirmation of labour in the discussions of the 'creative industries', albeit for very different 
theoretical and tactical reasons. Such a tendency is a danger courted by, for example, the 
Spinozist and Nietzchean tenor of social production in the work of Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri.4 It is, however, a thread that arguably runs through the work influenced by 
Marxist autonomist thought, since it stakes much on the liberation of labour from capital, 
rather than their mutual implication in the drive to abolish both. 
 
I now intend to build upon the conjecture that the foregoing depiction of waste and 
uselessness e.g. in Lyotard is a decisively aesthetic project of negation, linked to the role 
played by labour in the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition of Romantic aesthetics. When 
we say 'aesthetic project', this is meant to signify the sublation of labour in 'free activity' 
rather than in capital, which latter the previous chapter mainly focused on. Both in 'human 
capital' and in 'libidinal economy', there is a cancellation of labour by capital, whether this 
is an antagonistic or affirmative one. With critical or post-Romantic Marxist aesthetics, 
there is a cancellation of labour by a notion of free activity prefigured by art. In both cases, 
there is a tension between overcoming or simply sidestepping the domination of abstract 




The post-Romantic tradition of critical aesthetics charts the disjunction between labour 
and freedom in a dialectical vision of human autonomy, that is, the dialectic of autonomy 
and heteronomy.5 In this corpus, human freedom cannot result from the appropriation of 
humanity's productive powers from capital, since labour is understood as always and by its 
nature unfree or compulsory, counterpoised to play or mimesis as the definitively human 
capacity for free and purposeless creation. Here there is a suggestive crossover between 
the critique of labour in critical and Marxist aesthetics, and the critique of labour in Marxist 
value-form theory, with exponents such as Isaac Rubin, Moishe Postone and Christopher 
Arthur, as well as the writers of the 'communisation current' that depart from value-form 
theory, such as the Endnotes group.6 The crossover can be described as a common 
rejection of a positive concept of use-value or of labour which can be extracted from the 
social relations of capital; use-value is an aspect of value, and labour is always an aspect of 
value-determined labour, or, 'abstract labour'. The 'negation of labour' perspective, further, 
recurs in the thought of Italian Operaismo as 'refusal of work', most saliently in the work of 
Mario Tronti.7 Thus I will be interested in juxtaposing the critique of labour deriving from 
critical aesthetics with the critique of labour in critical political economy and Marxist 
philosophy on their common ground of a dialectic of negation. From this perspective, 
'speculation as a mode of production' can also start to describe a mode of conceptual 
production whose impetus is to find the 'speculative' aspect of every concept. This is not 
simply to deploy the dialectic as a speculative mode of thought, but to intensify the 
speculative potential of every category based on its materializations in the real practices 
which are distributed under those categories. Categories such as art, labour, value, 
subsumption, autonomy, heteronomy, negation – all these are speculative categories 
 69 
 
rather than self-sufficient theoretical principles. They are thus incomplete and open to re-
articulation in their concrete historical situation. While this echoes the structure of thinking 
set out by Theodor Adorno in Negative Dialectics, where objects will always exceed their 
concepts, it should be noted that negation would itself have to be determined as one of 
those concepts. 
 
The question of autonomy and heteronomy frames the inquiry into the constitutive bind of 
art as being both like and unlike socially necessary labour in capitalism. Art as a realization 
of freedom as posed by critical aesthetics discloses its implicit contradiction – its denial of 
labour – but also that this contradiction cannot be eradicated by 'socializing' art or 
dissolving its distinction from labour since it does contain a yet-abstract freedom from 
capitalist work, capitalist time and capitalist value, a freedom which is only accessible 
through and despite its commodity status. This commodity status is posited as the 
condition of its critical distance.8 What happens to this dialectic under the conditions of 
industrialized creativity? Further, what happens if the opposite pole to art in this critical 
tradition – labour – declines as a political and economic category? Does the specificity of 
both art and labour decline as well?  
 
An important aim of this chapter is to theorize the conditions of possibility for an 'artistic 
worker' and to reformulate them in terms of the negativity inherent in the indeterminacy of 
generic creativity as a rule for labour; or, in terms recognizable to Adorno, the negativity 
that marks autonomy as the scar of its break with the heteronomous. I will contend that the 
passage through labour for art, and the passage through art for labour are both crucial; the 
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creative subject of labour needs to traverse the de-subjectivation, formalism and 
illegitimacy of artistic activity, while artistic production needs to traverse the negativity and 
constraint of abstract labour as its own most intimate parameter. This chapter will specify 
the place and morphology of 'speculation' in the analysis, and how the negativity of the 
value-form diverges in its two expressions as finance and as labour, prior to following how 
this negativity registers in the conditions for art.  
 
An initial approach could be to see what happens if we try and re-figure art as itself a kind 
of 'abstract labour' under conditions of generalized 'creativity', or, as I have been putting it, 
'speculation'. When it comes to figuring the proximity between art and labour, the 
commodity form of art and the commodity form of labour-power have to be elucidated 
prior to seeing in what sense it is possible to speak of both art and labour-power in their 
social character of abstract labour. Keeping in mind my reference in the Introduction to the 
difficulty of re-defining art as a form of abstract labour due to its incompatibility with 
hallmarks of abstract labour such as the wage-form and capitalist production process, I will 
first cite the classical definition of abstract labour in Marx, supplementing it with 
illuminating recent discussion in Moishe Postone and Christopher Arthur. I will contend 
that in order to bring the critique of capitalist productive relations in critical aesthetics into 
the present social and economic configuration, art can be viewed as a form of abstract 
labour – and thus part of abstract labour's negativity in capital - so that it can perform the 
critical function imputed to it by critical aesthetics effectively in a situation where art and 
labour no longer stand in opposition. Here the proximity of 'art' and 'abstract labour' 
demonstrates the potential of holding them both as speculative categories. Here I will also 
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be hedging my bets slightly. In addition to the attempted re-formulation of art as abstract 
labour, I will also approach the elision between art and labour from the standpoint of the 
value-form more broadly: I will be drawing a link between the expansion of the category of 
art and the expansion of the value-form in the dynamics of social production and 
reproduction in recent times. Such an expansion, I will argue, is an index of the crisis in the 
relations of production that have kept art and labour separate, a separation that can no 
longer hold once that crisis is considered not just a general malfunctioning of a discrete 
logic of valorisation called 'finance' but a crisis in the capital-labour relation more 
generally, a crisis that derives from the terminal logic (for capital) of finance as abstraction.  
 
'Counterproductive' and Abstract Labour 
'The social form of labour during capitalism as abstract labour corresponds to the commodity as the 
social form of the products of labour.'
9  
 
Abstract labour is the substance held in common by commodities which enables them to 
enter into a relation of equivalence with one another mediated by money, the general 
equivalent. For Marx, abstract labour is the general social character, or expression, of the 
different private instances of concrete labour that constitute the capitalist mode of 
production, and it is abstract because it is the form of social labour established in a society 
dominated by the real abstraction of value. Abstract labour is then not a specific type of 
content of labour, a labour rendered insubstantial, generic or relational by its specific 
product or production process ('immaterial labour'), so much as an analytical category that 
describes the social form of all labour in capital per se: 
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as the use value which confronts money posited as capital, labour is not this or another 
labour,  but labour pure and simple, abstract labour; absolutely indifferent to its particular 
specificity [Bestimmtheit], but capable of all specificities. […] it becomes more and more a 
purely abstract activity, a purely mechanical activity, hence indifferent to its particular form; 
a merely formal activity, or, what is the same, a merely material [stofflich] activity, activity 
pure and simple, regardless of its form.
10 
 
The general value-form, in which all the products of labour are presented as mere 
congealed quantities of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is 
the social expression of the world of commodities. In this way it is made plain that within this 
world the general human character of labour forms its specific social character.
11 
 
Elsewhere, Marx emphasizes that the indifference to the particular form of the labouring 
activity is not simply the result of the alienated encounter between the wage-labourer and 
the job she has been hired to perform, nor is it the irrelevance of the content of labour 
detected by the critical analyst of capital who sees only abstract value; abstract labour is a 
social form because it structures the social relation between the worker and the capitalist, 
thus this indifference is shared by the capitalist and the worker – both see any particular 
working situation as a means to making money. 'This indifference towards the speciﬁc 
content of labour is not only an abstraction made by us; it is also made by capital, and it 
belongs to its essential character.'12 
 
Here we see two things which will be important for the following discussion: the necessary 
social form of labour as the crux of its existence in the capitalist relation, which tends to 
undermine any account that would see this labour as a positive pole in non- or anti-
capitalist productive relations and their concomitant politics; and the dialectic of the social 
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form as a 'mere' form, a negativity devoid of positive content or necessity, which must be 
'tarried with' and traversed in all its socially embedded destitution in order to potentially 
arrive at another social praxis. In other words, we can see in the capitalist social form of 
abstract labour and its 'purely mechanical activity' insofar as it is a means to a monetary 
end, regardless of degree of specialization, personal satisfaction or fulfilment of social 
needs in particular instances of that labour, the elements of the 'abstract activity' which is 
the basis of 'free activity'.13 As such, it is relevant for the historical and material contingency 
at the heart of 'species-being' – or the autonomy proper to human emancipation in 
Romantic antecedents of Marx such as Friedrich Schiller, or the divergent idealisms of Kant 
and Hegel, all of which informed Marx's thinking at the time the concept of 'species-being' 
first emerged in his writing.  
 
However, the becoming-activity of the labour-capital relation, which requires that both 
poles of this relation are overcome, is distinct from the negation of labour performed by 
the value-form in the capitalist social relation as part of its normal operations of 
valorisation. Earlier in the section of the Grundrisse from which the above quote was 
drawn, Marx writes that labour in its subjective moment, prior to becoming a commodity in 
a relation with capital, is 'not-value'; it is the source of all value, the 'general possibility' of 
all value, value in the abstract, but in itself is not value. Once it is objectified in capital, it 
loses its antagonistic, or even distinct, character as labour; inasmuch as this character is 
preserved, it is as dead labour, indistinguishable from capital.  
 
It is the nebulous position of labour in its subjective moment – which can also be called 
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'living labour' – that frames the sense in which theorists such as Paolo Virno and Giorgio 
Agamben, among others, have drawn on the Aristotelian category of 'potentiality' to 
discuss labour-power which is purchased with a view towards a possible but not 
necessarily actualized generation of value, especially when that labour-power is a portion 
of the 'general intellect' and is resistant to measure and standardization.14 In principle, 
labour-power is a paradoxical commodity since it is sold in a state of potentiality, although 
it may be more accurate to say that it is rented with payment due in the future, when it has 
already generated the expected quantum of surplus-value (an additional complication 
would be that this value may or may not be realized on the market, and is thus keeps the 
character of potentiality after it has already been paid for). We shall see whether this 
character of labour-power as a commodity bought in a state of potentiality resonates with 
the abstraction of labour as a social form, and with the indeterminacy at the heart of both 
the value relation (self-valorisation of capital indifferent to content or means of this 
valorisation) and the aesthetic. This would require establishing that the ideological basis of 
speculation as a mode of production relies principally on fusing the indeterminacy of a 
labour re-formulated as self-valorising creativity with the heightened contingency in the 
valorisation process native to financialised capitalism. Such an articulation crucially 
depends on a positive – hence ideological – meaning of this shared indeterminacy, that is, 
a conflation of the subjective self-valorisation of her own human capital by the 
entrepreneurial subject and the self-valorisation of capital as such. This should then be 
countered with an assessment of the negativity proper to the labour-capital relation which 
refers back to the empty or abstract form of value that controls this relation, and how this 
negativity is correlated to emancipation in critical aesthetics and art. This chapter will 
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develop this intuition through a precise attention to the role of temporality and 
subjectivity in financial speculation, and whether the kinds of contingency such speculation 
depends on are akin to the speculation of aesthetic, or, eventually, political praxis. At issue 
is whether the contingencies associated with processes of speculative value-creation in 
finance are truly negative in such a way as to put their own premises into question. To give 
a more comprehensive account of this negativity, we will stay with the implications of 
labour as 'not-value'. 
 
Christopher Arthur associates abstract labour with the term 'not-value' in the following 
sense: 
behind the positivity of value lies a process of negation. Capital accumulation realises itself 
only by negating that which resists the valorisation process, labour as 'not-value'. This new 




That is to say, labour only becomes productive when it is absorbed by capital and becomes 
'not-labour'; in its friction within or separation from this process, it is 'not-value', and 'not-
value' becomes value when its antagonistic character of living labour is negated and 
absorbed into capital. This echoes the preceding idea of labour in its subjective moment as 
'not-value' which is not only its constitutive opposition to being subsumed by capital in the 
production process as sketched out above, but its potential to be something other than 
labour as the source of value. This resistance to being subsumed is called by Arthur 
'counterproductive labour': 
Albeit that the production process is really subsumed by capital, the problem for capital is 
that it needs the agency of labour. […] Thus, even if Marx is right that the productive power 
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of labour is absorbed into that of capital to all intents, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
capital  still depends upon it. Moreover, the repressed subjectivity of the workers remains a 
threat to capital's purposes in this respect. [...] Capital is limited by the extent to which it can 
enforce the 'pumping out' (Marx) of labour services. The consequence of this special feature 
of labour is that the relation of capital and labour is intrinsically antagonistic and that in this 
sense there is reason to speak of waged labour not so much as 'productive labour' but as 
'counterproductive labour' in that the workers are actually or potentially recalcitrant to 
capital's effort to compel their labour.
16 
 
Here there are unmistakeable echoes of the autonomist thesis of the potentiality of 
labour-power, especially the 'virtuoso' labour-power that produces nothing but an 
experience or a service, to exceed its dominated character and become a 'public sphere', a 
common space where the performance of sociality can be turned to socially constitutive 
rather than profit-making ends.17 The 'counter-productivity' of labour names the space of 
this potentiality insofar as it resists being absorbed into the self-positing of capital. 
However, rather than stay with the alternate productivity of 'potentiality', we will here look 
rather at the implications of the 'intrinsically antagonistic' relation of labour and capital for 
abstract labour. This is to stay with Arthur's use of 'counter-productive' as an immanent 
tendency of the labour-capital relation, one which would perhaps resist being 'put to work' 
by the positive entity 'counter-productivity'. 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined Moishe Postone's concept of abstract labour as social 
form, and the social form most integral to defining capitalism as a social relation, more 
integral even than exchange. This is a conception shared by Arthur, and they both ground 
it in Isaac I. Rubin's essays on value in which capitalist commodity exchange is shown to be 
predicated on abstract labour.18 Postone takes this in a direction influenced by his 
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engagement with the Frankfurt School to situate abstract labour as the 'ground of social 
domination'.19 Here I would just like to return to a specific point in Postone's exposition, 
which will help to elucidate the discussion that will follow on the political valences of 
aesthetic negativity.  
 
Postone is concerned with a methodological point as well as a critical one, or rather the 
relationship between methodology and the critical character of Marx's analysis of labour. 
For him, Marx's mode of immanent critique is both the ground for its effectiveness as a 
critique of capital and its political economy, and a source of confusion for subsequent 
Marxist theorists. The immanence of the critique means that it is not always evident when 
the categories of capital are being employed critically.  
social relations in capitalism appear in the form of the relations among objects and, hence 
seem to be trans-historical. [...] for Marx, even categories of the “essence”of the capitalist 
social formation such as“value”and“abstract human labor”are reified – and not only for 
their categorial forms of appearance such as exchange value and, on a more manifest level, 
price and profit. This is extremely crucial, for it would demonstrate that the categories of 
Marx's analysis of the essential forms underlying the various categorial forms of appearance 
are intended not as ontological, transhistorically valid categories, but purportedly grasp 
social forms that themselves are historically specific. Because of their peculiar character, 
however, these social forms appear to be ontological.
20 
 
Thus many writers following Marx tend to appropriate critical categories as positive ones, 
and end up fetishising labour and use-value as the non-capitalist core of a socialist future, 
once these are freed from the integuments of value (or even simply exchange-value).21 
They thus impute a trans-historical and often ontological currency to the categories of 
labour and value, missing that Marx's analysis is not a critique of the exploitation of labour, 
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but of labour as a capitalist social form which is perpetuated precisely via its timeless, 
generic appearance. 
  
Autonomy and Real Abstraction 
From this discussion of the historically and socially mediated nature of the abstraction of 
labour in capitalism, we are now in a better position to explore the specific type of 
negation performed by art vis-a-vis labour in a society dominated by the abstraction of 
value. If in recent years, labour has been re-fashioned as 'creativity' and the creative 
gyrations of finance have become the primary engines of accumulation, we have also 
witnessed art as in no previous period assimilated into the economy not purely as 
ornament or market commodity but as a structure of legitimation for both those 
processes, a 'structure of feeling' that lends an emancipatory valence to an ever more 
predatory landscape of social relations. The accepted Modernist form of the negation 
performed by art in opposition to labour in a capitalist society – art is autonomous, an 
ensemble of activities done for its own sake, while labour is heteronomous, done for 
extrinsic ends- can no longer hold, even in the rigorously dialectical version proposed by 
Theodor Adorno. With speculation as a mode of production, the dialectic between 
autonomy and heteronomy becomes insufficient because autonomy acquires a new 
instrumentality in heteronomy: it becomes a style or an affect, rather than a structural 
opposition in capitalist value relations. However, it is the extent to which this autonomy 
manages to deny or repel these value relations –relating to them only obliquely, if at all - 
that it can be instrumentalised. Autonomy becomes a kind of immanent refusal within 
heteronomy, and no longer as a counter-power to which power (heteronomy) is 
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immanent, as it is Adorno's account. A generalized speculation sees art as the emblem of 
reconciliation between subjective freedom and the freedom of capital. 
 
Adorno's version of the autonomy of art goes as follows: the separation of art and labour 
must have deep roots in how both of these social forms relate to the commodity. These 
contradictions then should be located at the heart of the social character of art itself, which 
emerges as an uneven topology of autonomy and heteronomy – autonomy understood as 
art's immanence to its own laws, and heteronomy as social determinations external to 
those laws. In the essay 'Art, Society, Aesthetics', Adorno makes a few statements along 
these lines, statements that poise art as a constitutive exclusion to e.g. the 'profane world' 
of productive relations and instrumental reason: 'Art can be understood only by its laws of 
movement, not according to any set of invariants. It is defined by its relation to what it is 
not. The specifically artistic in art must be derived concretely from its other'.22 What this 
implies is that for 'the demands of a materialistic-dialectical aesthetics' proposed by 
Adorno to be fulfilled, there has to be an idea of a strong, yet contingent and incomplete, 
relationship between art objects and the social ground against which they are defined, 
and, precisely, against which they are defined. For him, art is a form of social labour that is 
intimately connected to productive labour by its severance from it, and by the conditions 
that perpetuate that separation as a norm: 'Yet, it is precisely as artifacts, as products of 
social labour, that they also communicate with the empirical experience that they reject 
and from which they draw their content.'23 Art is symptomatic in its capacity to both 
disclose and disavow the canceling of human agency or creativity that obtains in a totally 
administered world under the rule of the commodity-form, a role which has to be 
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historicized, as should be the categories of 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy'. This paradoxical 
position of art both affirming and denying the loss of social or subjective agency in the rest 
of human praxis is summed up in this way: 'By virtue of its rejection of the empirical world – 
a rejection that inheres in art's concept and thus is no mere escape, but a law immanent to 
it – art sanctions the primacy of reality.'24 Further, '[t]he idea of freedom, akin to aesthetic 
autonomy, was shaped by domination, which it universalized. This holds true as well for 
artworks.'25 Succinctly, art works (or the experience of a separate realm of human activity 
called art) critique commodity relations by being apart and unlike those relations, yet by 
being apart and unlike, they also forsake the claim to any power to affect the universal 
reach of those relations.  
 
But this paradoxical position is not simply the site of a conceptual tension; it is also a real 
contradiction, and this holds insofar as art needs to be apprehended as a particular type of 
commodity, one both like and unlike the commodity labour-power, for example. This 
particularity inheres in artworks' singularity, a singularity secured through their mode of 
production (artisanal, as opposed to industrial) and not subsumed to the technical division 
of labour native to mass production; as well as through their production being determined 
by artistic subjectivity rather than social objectivity, and their status, at least principally, as 
unreproducible and hallowed by the mark of original authorship. These are the artwork's 
conditions of autonomy, which should perhaps be better spelled out as the artistic mode 
of production's conditions of autonomy, so as to keep in clearer focus the dependence of 
these conditions on what they reject, i.e. the heteronomy of productive labour. Here it is 
vital to distinguish the role of autonomy in conditioning discrete art practices in the recent 
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or 'contemporary' period, from its role with regard to the field of art as a whole. While 
recent art (from the 'neo-avant garde' of the 1960s onwards) has been very much about 
critically interrogating artistic autonomy and highlighting art's interpenetration with and 
dependence on conditions outside the limits of the art object (heteronomy), from art 
institutions to the larger parameters of existence such as time, weather, land, media, 
narrative, the body, experience, the economy, as well as labour, the various ways of 
dramatizing these dependencies and entanglements have relied on the relative autonomy 
of art as a totality, as a distinct realm of semiotic and productive methods which is 
regulated by immanent laws and can in no way be conflated with any of the conditions it 
increasingly incorporates.26 Rather, art's ability to incorporate or emulate those conditions, 
whereby it challenges autonomy on a 'micro'-scale, is guaranteed by the durability of that 
autonomy on a 'macro'- scale, which itself tends to have a reproductive role to play with 
regard to the conditions interrogated. For our purposes, the social efficacy of art's 
autonomy as a field is the result of the social division of labour, and, more precisely, the 
division between mental and manual labour. It may be that this division is deepened in the 
speculative mode of production, with its emphasis on valorisation without labour, an 
emphasis that refracts in proliferating forms of 'de-skilled' and 'meta-' gesturality within 
art. Art, as both a non-alienated form of labour and a sphere of inflated asset-values, 
comes to stand in for the opposite of this division, however: not only the overcoming of 
the divide between mental and manual labour, but the reconciliation of labour and capital 
as the paradigmatic form of 'human capital', providing a reflexivity within the speculative 




As such, the autonomy of art in its totality as a social practice is invariably the autonomy of 
the fetish, liable to play down the dependent conditions of this autonomy and displace 
them into a reified self-sufficiency. John Roberts, for example, writing on Adorno, 
summarizes the special commodity status of art as follows: '[b]ecause unreproducible 
artworks are not subsumable under the law of value, paradoxically, they transcend their 
own status as commodity fetishes by becoming, in a sense, bloated and absolute kinds of 
fetish, absolute commodities.'27 This is despite the fact that 'the freely sensuous, 
unreproducible artwork secures an image of liberated labour'. The dialectic of liberated 
labour has a further dimension when it comes to art: the artwork always refers beyond 
itself, to a non-purposeful or liberated time in which the division of labour and commodity 
relations cease to have effect; labour-power also is always more than it is, since it produces 
more value than it consumes and, as living labour, always exceeds its condition as 
objectified, value-producing labour; counterproductive labour, in Arthur's terms. With 
reference to Marx's discussion of labour as 'not-value', as subjectivity which exists in a state 
of negativity to its valorisation – and eradication as labour – by capital, we can see art as 
the reification of this negativity. Its constitutive separation from capital's law of value in its 
mode of production puts it at once outside the conditions of labour and capital, and 
ensures its dependency on both. This problematic separation is summed up by Adorno in 
these terms: 
 Art exists in the real world and has a function in it, and the two are connected by a large 




If we take 'that which is the case' to be capitalist social relations, it is clear that art exists as 
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an antithesis to e.g. subsumed or waged labour, more prone to alignment with other  
social forms within those relations, such as the market (also owing to the particularities of 
its still largely artisanal production regime). Art, through this reified separation from wage-
labour, can be considered a surplus of negativity, when compared to the negativity already 
ascribed to labour in and against capital, since it also comes with a relation of negativity 
with respect to labour. Nonetheless, it is precisely this surplus of negativity which is diluted 
or converted into a positivity when 'creativity' becomes the condition for all wage-labour. 
As a result, art merges with its other, abstract labour: not just with regard to a specious 
creativity as a demand imposed on contemporary work, but through the routinization and 
industrialization imposed on art production itself through its embedding in social policy 
initiatives and micro-managed funding structures. We must therefore explore, as I will do 
in the following section, whether this negativity can be retrieved in another way – through 
speculative capital's relationship to contingency. If art as a mode of speculative praxis can 
be demonstrated to radicalize the speculation performed by capital in its financial 
modalities, which remains tethered to the self-expanding form of value, we will get an idea 
of whether it's meaningful to speak of art as 'subsumed' to either of these heteronomous 
conditions, and what the critical implications of this might be . 
 
Speculation and Contingency 
“Modernity”means contingency. It points to a social order which has turned from the worship of 
ancestors and past authorities to the pursuit of a projected future – of goods, pleasures, freedoms, 
forms of control over nature, or infinities of information.
29 
 
Thinking about speculation as a modality of negativity to 'that which is the case'- the 
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continuum of a frozen reality - a schema starts to emerge wherein art's counter-position to 
abstract labour seems like a face-off between speculative praxis and the production of 
use-values according to that which is the case. But of course it is not only art which 
counters use-values with speculation: it is also, and perhaps pre-eminently, finance. This 
leads to a certain kind of 'disjunctive synthesis' between art and finance. The negativity and 
open-endedness heralded by the 'speculative' generates abstraction and indeterminacy, 
and also a formalism - the hermetic quality common to works of art and innovative 
financial instruments. The kind of 'fictitious capital' represented by the derivative and the 
fictions mobilized by art share an idiom of opacity, a smokescreen behind which games of 
self-referential value expansion may unfold. Such opaqueness looks like a surplus of 
freedom compared to the workaday reality or productive investment or the wage-labour it 
relies on. This freedom is, however, mediated by the need to subjugate and discount 
labour in order to realize the value of either art or finance in the market. This subjugation 
also has to, perhaps pre-eminently, happen symbolically; the invisibility of labour, labour 
which is deemed profane and 'unproductive' of this freedom that only money can 
guarantee in its frictionless self-valorisation, is a result of the emergence of speculation as 
the template for economic, but also personal and social valorisation. Speculation as a 
social form thus seems to arise in the division between mental and manual labour, in the 
attribution of innovative thought and praxis to a class of people who are not constrained 
by material need: the visionaries of art and of finance. The connection to the 
undetermined, to the future, to the unknown and to possibility is removed from labour and 
becomes the property of this creative class, whose dependence on labour is henceforth 
mediated as the access to universality lent by independence from material constraint, an 
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autonomy from interest. The genesis of such a class division and social division of labour in 
the concomitant emergence of Enlightenment rationality and industrial capitalism will 
have to be passed over here. The point here is merely to underline, albeit in passing, that 
the historical autonomy of art is tied to the division between mental and manual labour 
which presupposes the generalization of alienated labour as the hallmark of capitalist 
social relations. 
 
Art as a distinct sphere of human endeavour, as indeed the sphere that generates 
'distinction' and particularity, enjoys a strong correspondence with the value-form insofar 
as indeterminacy lies at the basis of both. The value-form is a way of organizing and 
extracting surplus, and art is a materialization or socialization of that surplus as open-
ended speculation – in the sense of speculative thought. This speculation is suffused with 
the ideological freight of open-endedness, the utopian moment, that is also corollary to 
capital – the relationship between the 'unconditioned' that is art, and the pure abstraction 
that is the core of capital, the pure algebra of self-valorising value. This is not to downplay 
the more strictly ideological role of art as affirmation of the freedom in capitalist social 
relations, as cited earlier, the 'services rendered' of the durable fiction of autonomy, 
however provisional and fragile that autonomy is understood to be by now. It should be 
noted that 'speculation' has another purchase as well: it is not simply the space of a 
utopian or complicit indeterminacy qua Kant, making it amenable to characteristically 
financial mediations, such as gambling or the commodity production of subjectivity. 
Speculation is also a type of political thought which departs from the parameters of the 
actual and draws on them for its sense of possibility when envisioning or constructing 
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change. This implies speculation can also operate in a dystopian or prefigurative mode, 
both of which are more determined by the suppressed possibilities of the present and past 
than the vacuum of the utopian. Frederic Jameson, writing on Bertolt Brecht's notion of the 
scientific in aesthetic praxis as the 'experimental attitude' which secures aesthetic praxis as 
non-alienated labour, discusses speculation in these terms: 
Brecht's particular vision of science was for him the means of annulling the separation 
between physical and mental activity and the fundamental division of labour (not least that 
between worker and intellectual) that resulted from it: it puts knowing the world back 
together with changing the world, and at the same time unites an ideal of praxis with a 
conception of  production. […] In the Brechtian aesthetic, indeed, the idea of realism is not a 
purely aesthetic and formal category, but rather governs the relationship of the work of art 
to reality itself,  characterizing a particular stance towards it. The spirit of realism designates 
an active, curious, experimental, subversive – in a word scientific – attitude towards social 
institutions and the material world . . . 30 
 
This idea captures something important about the nature of art in the speculative mode of 
production, if this mode of production implies a new centrality for social activities defined 
by their intimate relationship to speculation, such as art and finance. Insofar as art charts 
for itself a vector of speculative praxis, it can prefigure or model social relations whose 
speculative power is gauged by their negation of speculation as a normative force of 
capital valorisation. Thus art and capital in the speculative mode of production can find 
themselves severed by this 'experimental' attitude which does not stop at capital as its 
horizon of possibility. However, we would need to determine where does it go, if it doesn't 
stop there, given that the example of Brecht brings with it a certain specificity of negation 




Suspending for a moment the implications of this kind of aesthetic praxis for the division of 
labour or for social change, we can attend to how speculation performs a more stabilizing 
function in the current period. The shift of speculation from being an elite or marginal 
activity to being a normative parameter for all labour and exchange marks the eclipse of an 
understanding of class interests as real, divergent and institutionally mediated. The loss of 
the external referent that labour posed to capital, (or use-value to exchange-value), has 
resulted in the situation of capitalist self-referentiality that the social logic of speculation 
needs in order to flourish. This self-referentiality, the harmonious self-regulation that 
neoclassical economics have propounded for decades, if not centuries, as the regulative 
ideal of social relations and market transactions alike, produces a kind of loss of measuring 
capacity which has at times been called the obsolescence of the law of value.31 But perhaps 
such an erosion of measure speaks simply of the great expansion, diffusion, and 
refinement of that law; it has nothing to measure any longer but its own effects if we are 
indeed in an are of full 'real subsumption'. It now centres on the proliferation of metrics of 
abstraction, rather than the institution of abstract equivalence between labour-time and 
the wage. Thus, the proximity between art thought as abstract labour and abstract labour 
thought as creative (human) capital is exemplified by the loss of measure in both under the 
sign of finance, by the indeterminacy and expansion of art and the indeterminacy and 
expansion of work determined by the sociality, and subjectivity, of finance. 
 
The social expansion of finance and art should be seen in strict analogy with the 
contraction of labour; both are indexes of this phase of real abstraction. The phase is one in 
which processes of social domination grow ever more abstract in daily life, in reproduction, 
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while that reproduction is located more and more closely within the sphere of finance. Why 
this should be the case – that art should play the legitimating role it does for the rule of 
finance – can perhaps be found in art's privileged relation to contingency, that is, 
contingency understood as novelty, unpredictability, the creation of as yet untested and 
potentially infinite value. Art has the capacity to socialize rather financial imperatives such 
as this, since art is the name for innovative praxis in a capitalist society, unconditioned by 
economic or other deterministic interests, a social 'research and development' site even, or 
especially, after decades of intensified proximity to market behaviour and government 
policy. Thus contingency seems to belong to both art and finance insofar as both are 
speculative practices. It could also be said that contingency is a kind of negativity as well, 
an 'antithesis to that which is the case'. Among the relationships that bind artworks to the 
political economy of their times, one of the primary ones is named by Theodor Adorno, 
who conceives of 'aesthetic forces of production' that inescapably imprint the artwork: 'the 
artist works as social agent, indifferent to society's own consciousness. He embodies the 
social forces of production without necessarily being bound by the censorship dictated by 
the relations of production.'32 Those relations are legible in art, but encrypted in such a way 
as to underline their contingency. But to go a little more deeply into this link of 
contingency between art and finance, what exactly is the structural role of contingency in 
finance?  
 
On to 'Absolute Contingency' 
Consultant, financial engineer and speculative realist theorist Élie Ayache contends that the 
risk formulas used in derivatives trading, such as the well-known Black-Scholes equation,33 
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are ultimately irrelevant. In order to accurately assess the probability of occurrence for the 
various risk factors of the assets to which probability-based algorithms are applied, the 
algorithms would end up trying to evaluate the volatility of each factor based on its 
relation to the volatility of all the other factors, which volatility itself relates back to the risk 
assessment that influences the trading of the assets, a helplessly recursive exercise.34 
Ayache's simple counter-argument to the use of such probabilistic formulas is that if assets 
traded at the price which risk-assessment value algorithms allocated to them, the trade in 
these assets would be a priori impossible – the trade depends on the recursivity of the 
implied rather than assessed risk of the assets; at a basic level, it is the recursive volatility of 
the market itself which drives trade. Hence he proposes that probability should be 
dispensed with when predicting, describing or regulating what takes place in financial 
markets in favour of what he calls 'contingent claims'. He argues that the entire notion of 
an underlying (static) value in derivative trades should be dispensed with, and that a more 
accurate reflection of the quantum fluidity of market events is the 'contingent claim': 'that's 
why I say that we no longer call derivatives “derivatives”but “contingent claims”so we 
think of them directly, without thinking that they depend on some underlying'.35 The 
'absolute contingency' of asset prices in the market retroactively creates its own 
conditions, which then serve as the basis of the asset prices in the next cycle, and so on. 
Ayache links this to Henri Bergson's concept of creative evolution, Alain Badiou's theory of 
the event, and Gilles Deleuze's thinking around the virtual and the actual.36 All these are 
concepts which operate outside the shadow of probability; the radical unforeseeability of 
the event means that its causes are only discernible in retrospect – the event is an effect 
that creates its own causes: 
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[...] the academic theoretical models try to model the market as if it was an already-written 
reality that implied a certain range of future possibilities; whereas recalibration means that, 
even as they use these models, traders rewrite the market continually in contingent ways 
that these models cannot capture. […] Absolute contingency of the final world gets reflected 
or translated, ahead of time, by the exchange. The market, or the exchange, is how absolute 
contingency projects itself ahead of time. This may even act as a definition of exchange. [...] 
 Therefore to be in the market and to trade contingent claims via a pricing tool that precisely 




Here we can see that financial speculation is formulated as the exemplary instance of 
absolute contingency, since transactions are powered by the contingency of value-claims: 
the market is constantly re-setting itself in line with those encounters between claims to 
value and the contingency of those claims, and this is what keeps the market going – 
absolute contingency is the market's metastability.  
 
Futures and the Future 
It is interesting to juxtapose Ayache's account of the paradoxical aspects of probabilistic 
risk assessment in a milieu of absolute contingency with Marxist political economist David 
McNally's description of the Value at Risk formulas as a cancellation of contingency.38 A 
contrast emerges between their two visions of the relation between finance, contingency 
and freedom. Ayache is concerned to ascribe an emancipatory valence to contingency in 
markets, and tries to articulate it using philosophical concepts usually associated with 
transformative and counter-hegemonic theory.39 McNally, on the other hand, while 
agreeing with Ayache's critique of existing models of quantification of risk, frames the 
critique in a rather different way. For him, market speculation cannot be extracted from its 
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reliance on, or description by, those models, since the speculative agency of finance needs 
to assume the continuity of the market, e.g. of capitalism, and thus can only operate in the 
foreclosure of a different future. Consequently, financial speculation is ultimately anti-
speculative, if 'speculation' is taken chiefly in its experimental or creative-innovative sense, 
since the kind of speculation that happens in markets is concerned to minimize systemic 
change, or at least to subsume all change into the logic of profit. 
 
McNally stresses that 'value-forms have been extended at the same time as value-
measures (and predictions) have become more volatile.'40 This volatility means that 
capitalist measure, in the shape of money, is problematised, as the value of money itself is 
one of the quantities to be measured, or traded. This creates a situation of systemic risk, as 
the very preconditions of trade (weather, agriculture, governance structures) themselves 
became tradeable entities, financial commodities measured by other financial 
commodities. The inclusion of so many parameters into the formulas which often are 
operating at extremely high frequencies leads to exacerbated systemic risk. Systemic risk 
necessitates the design and deployment of all kinds of risk-hedging instruments, whose 
trade was conditional on the volatility these instruments themselves put into play, as in the 
trade of derivatives contracts, CDSs (credit default swaps) and CDOs (collateralized debt 
obligations), and other and more recondite forms of risk insurance. As the markets for risk-
assessment and risk-managing devices expanded, this in its turn entrained an escalated 
level of volatility, a 'positive feedback' loop (or chaos), as most recently witnessed in the 
speculative attacks on the Euro, or the 1990s attack on the pound by George Soros – bets 
on debts going bad are profitable when those debts stand a greater likelihood of going 
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bad due to the inimical market conditions created for those debts by those bets. While 
generating geopolitical turmoil, such speculation tends towards enhancing the stability, 
power and accumulative capacities of the financial markets. Social unrest is an easily 
hedged risk in the global financial architecture, provided it does not impinge on the 
dominance of that architecture as well, that is, on the sanctity of contracts. In distinction 
from the apocryphal derivative trade on 'the end of capitalism' reported in the early days 
of the crash, the stability of this architecture is the ground of the burgeoning levels of 
speculation; the law of value itself cannot enter as a risk factor into the 'absolute 
contingency' of speculative markets. Such an absolute contingency combined with this 
bedrock security is the crux of financialisation, that is, the trade in fictitious capital,41 or 
claims to future surplus-value not yet produced, variants of which have been mentioned in 
the foregoing account, which produces temporal closure, or rather 'securitisation' - the 
indefinite extension of the present, a present quantified by instruments such as the Black-
Scholes equation or the Value at Risk (VaR) formula.42 While McNally sees such instruments 
as clear instances of the 'single metric' tendency of capitalist measure which needs to 
establish common bases for commodity exchange (money as the general equivalent, 
abstract labour as the common substance of value), he links the financial crisis to the 
dysfunctionality of these instruments, and cites this dysfunctionality as a symptom of the 
inability to measure risk in an economic climate of constant currency fluctuation (instability 
of the general equivalent) and where calculations of risk are increasingly recursive and 
unmoored from any of the value they claim to measure: 
And this [successful risk -assessment, normal derivatives trade] requires that derivatives be 
capable of computing all concrete risks –climatological, political, monetary, and more – on a 
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single metric. They must, in other words, be able to translate concrete risks into quantities of 
abstract risk. . . Using a set of models that share a common mathematical framework, VaR is 
supposed to measure literally any asset under any and all conditions. Crucial to the 
operation of VaR assessments is the assumption that all points in time are essentially the 




time is reiﬁed, treated  as a purely quantitative variable, and qualitative breaks or ruptures in 
a temporal continuum are ruled out. […] The process of abstraction these models undertake 
involves treating space and time as mathematical, as nothing more than diﬀerent points on 
a grid. This homogenisation of space and time assumes that what applied at any one spatio-
temporal moment applies in principle at any other. But crises destroy any basis for such 
assumptions …44 
 
This discussion of the time of finance disrupted by crisis recalls the role of time as a social 
form which is a corollary of the relations of production: 
Communism is thus understood not in terms of a new distribution of the same sort of 
wealth  based in labour time, but as founded on a new form of wealth measured in 
disposable time. Communism is about nothing less than a new relation to time, or even a 
different kind of time.
45 
 
It may be added here, parenthetically, that a new relation to time, or even a different kind 
of time is a modality that would seem equally if not more at home in aesthetic practice or 
thought, or, perhaps more broadly, a speculative praxis oriented towards transformation of 
experience, as well as but not limited to the relations of production. While the 'absolute 
contingency' of the market as formulated by Ayache has explanatory power and is 
conceptually suggestive, it seems hard to discount McNally's analysis which finds markets 
operating through the repudiation of the actual contingency that remains the case outside 
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but also increasingly, within markets: an absorption of contingency as assets which is the 
source of both super-profits and an Achilles heel. This is a contingency which seems 
recursive but not in any sense social, or truly contingent as in an event that disrupts 
calculations – 'the blank swan' of Ayache's wishes. It is not an obtuse point to emphasize 
that mitigating against 'absolute contingency' is that other metaphysics of the market, the 
theodicy that the market knows best, the social power it has secured in consequence and 
the contingencies it has either expelled as 'externalities' or ingested as 'contingent claims'. 
Markets are not simply 'made' by millions of discrete trades but actively fostered by the 
state and its legal system, whatever anomalous fluxes and eddies develop within markets, 
or whatever fluxes and eddies markets plug into their arbitrage. Such anomalous events, 
following McNally, could not be internal to markets and the types of contingency which 
animate them. While we can object that McNally's reliance on the VaR formula paints a 
different picture from the one Ayache portrays, one that remains mired in probabilistic 
calculations, it should be noted nonetheless that Ayache may be simply updating the 
abiding 'reflexivity' theory of markets which is probably older than George Soros' 
formulation of it and perhaps as old as Keynes' 'beauty contest' narrative of investors' 
decision-making.46 The reflexivity of markets is a given, and perhaps may be said to go into 
hyperdrive in the age of 'quants' busily writing ever more involved formulas to hedge risk – 
and in this area, Ayache retails his own patented software on his website. However, as he 
says, '[a] future contingency translates into a present price. That's a direct derivation.'47 The 





To recall the earlier discussion of whether finance and art are comparable forms of 
speculation in the speculative mode of production, the foregoing suggests that despite 
certain provocative analogies, they cannot be said to be comparable. Financial speculation 
has to exclude the suspension of the law of value, and is thus only speculative within the 
defined parameters of chronologically attenuated and homogeneous risk. Hence financial 
speculation, the speculation confined to the value-form, lacks the genuine negativity – 
opposition to that which is the case – which would enable it to be actually speculative in 
the philosophical or aesthetic sense Élie Ayache intends for it. This means that financial 
speculation and the indeterminacy of the aesthetic do not really share a common ground, 
despite earlier appearances. In comparison to the deceptive normality of labour's 'use-
value' the form of value does indeed give us an insight into the level of abstraction and 
contingency marshalled against labour performed under capital's value relations as they 
obtain today. But this contingency of exchange value and value, or, negativity with regard 
to use, runs up against the positivity of its own drive to expand. This requires a 
homogeneity of time and stagnation of the social which seem to vitiate the speculative 
drive of the value-form as we have witnessed it in the expansion of finance over the last 
several decades.48 
 
The political theorist Robert Meister has referred to the 'options-form' replacing the 
'commodity-form' as the main form in which value is manufactured and traded, making 
temporality itself the typical commodity for an era in which risk is the main driver of social 
reproduction. His account starts in 1973, when derivatives or options theory developed as 
a way for capitalism to re-think itself once the gold standard was jettisoned – the future 
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orientation is a shift to a kind of reflexivity. He also sees this shift as capital's way of putting 
the struggle with socialism in its past – first conceptually and eventually politically. Class 
struggle becomes a factor of individualized risk management, juggling among economic 
variables, as indicated by human capital theory. And then financialisation as a hedge 
against uncertainty in an ever-more economically volatile and unequal society starts to 
become the dominant logic. Human capital investment – university education, for instance 
– acts like a hedge against the uncertainty that the rule of finance itself has established. If it 
can be priced, it can be commoditised – this is the outcome of turning social contradictions 
into risks that could be hedged. 'What you know long-term simply raises the price of 
uncertainty about what you know will happen next,' Meister states.49 Contingency only has 
value because it is transient. All past history is accumulated in the current price in the 
option-form mode of capital, the speculative mode of production or, here, finance, just as 
all past suffering [dead labour] is accumulated in the current accumulation of wealth 
according to the labour theory of value. The collapse of (commodified) time in financialised 
accumulation has been noted also by Silvia Federici. Echoing Meister's point about 
capitalism putting the struggle with the organized working class behind it, she describes 
financialisation as the shift from capital making long-term investments into the 
reproduction of the working class to capital trying to extract immediate profits from this 
reproduction, turning reproductive institutions such as education and healthcare into asset 
classes. Concomitantly, the debt incurred by users of these services once this shift is 
complete ensures that this source of profits continues to yield far into the future.50 The 
options-form is also interesting with relation to forms of immaterial property such as 
intellectual property. Here rent supplants final sale, no sale is ever complete; rent ensures 
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the sale can happen again and again, under different conditions. Here the shift from the 
commodity-form to the options-form opens up the commodity to time in a radical way, 
leaving behind the closed loop of self-expanding value in the usual sense. The art market 
remains relatively traditional in its transactional forms and property contracts by 
comparison, though it is a truism that the market is driven, or inflated, particularly since the 
last decade, by fortunes made via dealings in 'innovative' financial commodities which 
operate with the kind of risk temporality described above, that is, derivatives and hedges. 
 
Art on the other hand, rather than its markets, derives its 'speculative value' from not just 
the parameters and value-games of art, but also from the suspension or dissolution of art 
itself, and the social relations that subtend its existence. As Jacques Rancière writes, the 
contemporary 'aesthetic regime' of art is precisely predicated on exacerbating the 
confusion about what art is or where it belongs, and putting into question its boundaries 
from other regimes of meaning and practice. Crucially, though not emphasized by 
Rancière , the speculations of art (or, the speculation that is art), measure and dramatize 
their power through art's relation to labour and value, be that a relation of affinity or 
negation.51 In this sense, art cannot be considered in relation to politics without first being 
considered in relation to labour – and this is even more the case when artistic subjectivity 
and modes of production become a supplement to the restructuring of the labour-capital 
relation away from the wage and its equivalences to the precarious and 'infinite' demands 
of creativity. In this final section, I will return to the theme of 'counterproductive labour' to 




Art as Counterproductive Labour 
The autonomy of the artwork is a model of emancipated labour, not the model through which the 
emancipation of labour will be accomplished.
52 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw the various dimensions of a financialised subjectivity in 
'human capital' as an ideological and structural category for the subject of self-expanding 
value who sees themselves directly in relation to or even as capital through debt and credit 
rather than the mediation of the wage and the antagonism it enables. In this chapter, we 
sought to track the intersections and divergences between art and finance as forms of 
speculation which both disavow labour, culminating in a discussion of the importance of 
temporality for speculation. This is exemplified in an art piece that takes on some of these 
questions performatively: labour in a financial (accounting) context rendered speculative 
by its extended, and indeterminate, relationship to time and production. 
 
Pilvi Takala's 2008 video The Trainee depicts the Finnish artist embarking upon a 
placement as a trainee with the international accountancy firm Deloitte. Initially 
undertaking the standard array of tasks allotted her in this role, her behaviour starts to 
subtly shift over time, to the perplexity of her colleagues. After several months, she no 
longer undertakes any tasks. But instead of enacting a Bartleby-like stance of existential 
refusal in the workplace, Takala is actually attempting to live up to the tenets of unfettered 
creativity featured in the rhetoric accompanying her professional development, the tenets 
of spontaneous and ungovernable value creation that each company must learn how to 
foster in its employees if it wants to stay ahead of the game. She spends her days sitting at 
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her desk staring into space. Inquiries meet with responses like 'I am thinking' or 'I'm doing 
brain-work right now.' Occasionally she rides up and down in the lift for hours, explaining 
to curious interlocutors that her thought processes flow better in a dynamic environment. 
 
Here it could be ventured that the artist is dramatizing or parodying the capitalization of 
attention as labour which has been written about extensively in theories of post-Fordism, 
along with the 'virtuosity' explored by Virno, all of which bring art as the suspension of 
labour and labour as the suspension of creativity, closer together to the point of 
indistinction, flowing into a common mode of 'process over product'. In The Trainee, art 
acts as a magnifying lens for the suspension of labour as integral to the actuality of 
contemporary work: the disposition, the readiness to work, is already the chief affective 
and subjective requirement of today's abstract labour.53 Thinking might already be labour, 
might already be attention subsumed to the regime of valorisation, but it might also be 
just thinking, or nothing – clearly Takala's on-the-job performance did not serve to 
advance her accountancy career (this might have also pertained to her lowly status as 
trainee – perhaps had she attained to an executive post, her claim to be 'thinking' as work 
might have been given more credence). While it is not uncommon for motifs appropriated 
from or emulating the world of labour to infiltrate art over the past several decades, if not 
earlier, with the Productivists and Constructivists, Takala's piece is perhaps one of a small 
number which tries to represent the changes to the experience and expectations of work in 
recent times – which can be summed up as its unrepresentability, its loss of definition. Of 
course, there are other ways for art to register these changes which are not 
representational but also, or instead, structural – these are the more 'invisible', relational or 
 100 
 
performative practices I have discussed elsewhere.54 But Takala's action – a performance of 
the indistinction between art and labour that transpires both in the workplace and in her 
art practice – does rehearse the logic of transit between visibility and invisibility of the art 
object, the art 'instance' which has so characterized conceptual art and the practices that 
can be placed in that trajectory. It has been characterized by this equally to its mimetic 
tendency with regard to non-artistic labour, and it is perhaps in its concrete engagements 
with labour (as well as with money) that the speculative logic of (conceptual and post-
conceptual) art that appears in withdrawing and disappears when it is displayed is most 
sharply enunciated. In Takala's case, parenthetically, she had agreed the project with the 
marketing manager but this information was not communicated to any of her colleagues. 
They, in turn, would invariably express their confusion and distress in emails to the 
manager behind her back; emails which are reproduced as part of the installation of the 
piece.55 The visibility of her invisible work was disquieting to her co-workers; one must be 
seen to be doing something, and they couldn't tell what it was she was doing, or if she was 
doing anything. What is she doing there? Arbeiten? Oder Theater?56 This is what 
speculative labour looks like – nothing. Or art.  
 
Takala's speculative gesture recalls the role of the 'market-making' trader in Élie Ayache, 
whose subjective, physical presence is indispensable, even if it is only in manipulating and 
writing the equations for high-frequency automated trades. He thus discerns a logic of 
performance in speculative finance which parallels, without conflating, the performance of 
assets and the performance of traders in unleashing various quantum flows of trades.57 
Takala throws into indistinction her place as an artist or as an employee in a way that 
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estranges the social and ontological features of both. She brings an 'absolute contingency' 
into a workplace that is supposedly already structured by the individualizing and self-
optimizing precepts of 'human capital' but where speculation has to stay within strict, 
routinised bounds. Further, like Ayache's trader who is a microcosm of the market and re-
creates it with every trade, Takala dramatizes the reproductive function for art of the 
sovereign artist: everything she does is art, a condition which The Trainee imagines 
extending to other kinds of socially necessary (and unnecessary) labour. 
 
Here we might recall the earlier discussion on Christopher Arthur's notion of 'counter-
productive labour' as the limit to capital's complete internalization of labour and 
metabolisation of it as value. The 'recalcitrance' of workers to capital's efforts to compel 
their labour is an indispensable feature of the valorisation process, both pushing capital to 
innovate so as to destroy the barriers posed by this recalcitrance, and fostering the political 
subjectivity of workers, inasmuch as they experience their activity as distinct from its 
appropriation and valorisation by capital, as well as from their role as workers.58 The 
antagonism posed by this relation of labour to capital is internal to the production process, 
regardless of its form – labour is counter-productive insofar as it is subsumed by capital, 
it's not a matter of the technological aspect of the work , its greater or lesser 'abstraction'. 
However, this antagonism can also be embodied in another social form which lies outside 
the valorisation process proper: art. The whole distinctiveness of the institution of art in 
capital is that it is not labour, that artistic production is not principally subject to the law of 
value and its heteronomous exigencies. This is how it becomes a repository of values 
deemed extrinsic to the valorisation process, including when that process comes to 
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encompass more and more of the social relations and institutions which formerly were 
constituted though different logics of integration into capital. It thus both enacts the 
suspension of labour and mirrors it, insofar as labour in the era of of speculation, operates 
precisely in the mode of suspension – deprived of class identity or productive virtue. But it 
does remain to be elaborated, if this is the case, why art and labour are still two different 
domains. If art is an allegory for the counterproductive which has gained independence 
from the valorisation process and become its 'own' thing – the antithesis to that which is 
the case – this runs a risk of turning art into a merely privative category, 'if it is not anything 
else, let's call it art.' This formality and ambiguity doubtlessly is what lends art, as a social 
role and a set of practices, its allure for the proponents of a labour transformed in its 
working conditions and self-concept into an analogue for infinitely mutable and self-
expanding – or deferred – value. I will examine the questions arising from this conjunction 
of 'emptying out' and 'putting to work' in the third chapter under the category of the 
'generic' as advanced by the art theorist Thierry de Duve, who locates in art 'after 
Duchamp' not so much a kind of activity as a form of speculative judgement - 'this is art' – 
opening a way to think art out of its specialization as a non-labour and directly in relation 
to the kind of abstract value that lends a social character to all labours. 
 
As The Trainee shows, the question of the sovereignty of the artist that has been 
established since Duchamp as the guarantee that anything that an artist does as art is art is 
put to the test in the workplace, where that sovereignty only stands a chance of being 
acknowledged in the abstract, that is, so long as the content of the work itself does not 
enter into its territory. In Chapter Four, I will be discussing the uncanny effect of the artist in 
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the workplace with reference to the Artist Placement Group and their concept of the 
'Incidental Person'. The autonomy of art and the heteronomy of labour can only meet in 
the space of some undefined creativity, the 'invisible labour' managerial propagandists 
view as common to both, and this is exactly where Takala chooses to act. 
 
There are certainly at least two analytical trajectories that can be followed at this stage. 
One is to see how the intensification of a mutuality of indifference, of abstraction, is 
bringing art and labour closer than ever, and how that both tends to dissolve the artist's 
role as a privileged subjectivity which can present a different, liberated mode of 
production, and reinforce it as a producer of elite, specialised commodities and 
experiences. This would be charting how the division of labour between art and work is 
upheld through other means, means that should be traced both to historical changes in 
art's self-concept and the technical and social restructuring of work – as well as the 
expansion of the commodity-form and the eclipse of work as social fact that was alluded to 
earlier. The other would be to see how these developments are instantiated in the field of 
contemporary art, also with reference to historical examples of how proximity to non-art 
labour, either representatively or performatively, was seen as a politicising trope in 
conceptual or post-medium art from the 1960s and 1970s onwards.  
 
Invisible Labour 
As Takala's piece suggests, labour has become more and more insubstantial and 
contingent. Work might be happening at any time, and it may also it may stop at any time, 
especially in times of crisis like now. The retreat of political forms of workers' identity 
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makes it neither practicable not desirable to see that identity as an oppositional force, or 
even as an identity. The deterioration of work and the deterioration of the social power of 
work are of course part of a Mobius strip, and this is a deterioration that has become more 
marked as more participation and subjective investment is demanded of workers, as Harry 
Braverman already foresaw several decades ago. Class politics based on work have gone 
the same way. With such a spectrality of work increasingly actual for more and more of the 
population, what happens to art as the opposite of capitalist work? 
 
In 2001, the Imaginary Party published 'The Problem of the Head' in their journal or 
mouthpiece Tiqqun. A passage that seems to pertain to our discussion can be found in this 
text:  
The modern invention of work as abstract work, without qualifications, as indifferentiation of 
all the activities under this category affects itself according to a myth: that of the pure act, of 
the act without a how, that reabsorbs itself entirely in its result, and of which the 
accomplishment exhausts all signification. Still today, where the term remains employed, 
“work”designates all that is lived in the imperative degeneration of how. Everywhere the 
question of how acts, things, or words, is suspended, derealized, displaced, there is work. 
Now there is also a modern invention of art, simultaneous and symmetrical to that of work, 
which is an invention of art in so much as special activity, producing oeuvres and not simple 
commodities. And it is in this sector that will concentrate itself henceforth all attention 
previously denied to the how, that will be as  a collection of all the lost signification of 
productive acts...To Art will be thus confided, for the  price of its complicity and silence, the 
monopoly of the how of acts.59 
 
Art and work have drawn closer in that both have become the exercise of 'pure acts' that 
exhaust all signification in their accomplishment, yet art has retained the privilege of 
control over the 'how', the role of the imagination, in the performance of these acts of 
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equivocal significance and the terms of their de-linking with necessity. Art has retained its 
status as a special activity that is not work, even when work has lost all distinctiveness, 
besides enforcing the law of value through the dominance of abstract labour. In that case, 
how can this 'specialness' be mobilized in order to draw attention to or transform the 
conditions that favour it, and can attempts to do this become de facto political, or remain 
simply critical? If we take 'critical' here in Modernist medium-specific sense, then this can 
be radicalised if the medium is understood to be the social field where art is not 
qualitatively distinct from labour, and the 'political' version of this would be a 
confrontation with the commodity relations that tell us they are. If the 'aesthetic relations 
of production – all that in which the productive force is embedded and in which it is active 
– are sedimentations or imprints of social relations of production', then contemporary art 
also has to reflect the social relations of non-production that prevail in the present, as a 
consequence of the reckoning with the 'indifference' between artistic and non-artistic 
labour that arguably began with the readymade.60 It should be possible to refer to current 
and historical practices that evoke some of the political implications of reading 
'indifference' as a category for contemporary art into the social form of contemporary 
labour – of abstraction as a conduit between art and work which figures them both as 
instances of abstract labour, rather than through the heteronomy of an abstract and 
generalized 'creativity'. To begin with, we could look for those political implications in the 
way the indistinction is formalized, or performed, and how that indistinction comes at the 
point of so-called de-materialization – when nothing is produced, except for art – or work. 
It is when non-art labour becomes a subject or method in art that the fragility, and 
importance, of the indistinction between capitalist art and capitalist work, the passage 
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between autonomy and heteronomy, can be exposed and troubled, by means of the 
negative power of human labour, as John Roberts writes.61 It may be productive also to 
think of such transferences and inversions as a type of realism, in the sense intended by 
Allan Sekula: 'Any interest I had in artifice and constructed dialogue was part of a search for 
a certain "realism", a realism not of appearances or social facts but of everyday experience 
and against the grip of advanced capitalism.'62 
 
Visible Finance 
So far, I have developed the link between speculation in finance and in art primarily 
through the latter's approach to labour through the lens of visibility and invisibility. But 
what happens when that speculative lens is turned directly to finance? In many ways, the 
conditions set by the movements of finance provide the material and conceptual 
parameters for art. Art operates in these conditions but also upon them to transform their 
terms. Art is engaged in an endless testing of its own conditions which anticipates 
negations of the determinations of the value form from inside, rather than beyond, its 
tensions.  
 
We can examine instances of conceptualism which approached art as a 'fiduciary' object, 
using speculation as its material. One of these can be seen as the precursor to Robert 
Morris' Money, Abraham Lubelski's Sculptural Daydream (1968). The work itself was a pile 
of paper consisting of 250,000 one-dollar bills borrowed at interest from the Chelsea 
National Bank. The sculpture, exhibited for five days, ran up a bill of three hundred dollars 
in interest. Perhaps intending a pun on the 'disinterested' status of the artwork in Kantian 
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aesthetics, Lubelski here posed the same question as Morris' later and better-known piece, 
namely is the artwork the sculpture (the physical money) or the interest it accrues. Morris, 
however, in common with other examples of 'investment art' and more broadly in the 
current of early conceptualism, showed a lack of interest in the form of the work. With 
Money (1969), the interest (the transactions) is definitely what constitutes the work.63 
Morris had by then developed a vector in his oeuvre that sought to conjugate both 
linguistic and financial abstraction as conditions for the 'dematerialisation' of the art 
object. An earlier piece responded to a collector's non-payment for a work with the 
production of a certificate withdrawing 'aesthetic value' from the unpaid-for work; the 
Statement of Esthetic Withdrawal (1963). Naturally this certificate was also collected and 
displayed, next to the de-aestheticised work (although possibly not by the same collector). 
In response to works like these, Carl Andre wrote 'The most farcical claim of the 
conceptualizing inkpissers is that their works are somehow antibourgeois because they do 
away with objects. In fact, doing away with objects and replacing them with such 
reifications of abstract relations to production as stockshares, contracts and paper money 
itself (which is nothing but the fetishization of the idea of exchange value severed from 
even the dream of production) is exactly the final triumph of the bourgeois revolution.'64 
 
To bring the discussion briefly up to date and into recent and current practice, a  précis of 
recent art which positions itself in the allegorical mode with relation to finance can be 
appended here. There's Maria Eichhorn's well-known Aktiengesellschaft (2002), for one, 
which freezes capital. Or Zachary Formwalt, who works on the relation between circulation 
and visibility of capital: images of crisis in the media show us capital at a standstill, whereas 
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its movements are normally invisible and intangible (and bound to be even more so with 
the nanosecond-speed forms of electronic trading which recently found mention with the 
discovery in particle physics of new forms of temporality not covered by the law of 
relativity).65 Here the publicisation of crisis exacerbates the crisis. Crisis makes circulation 
visible; when circulation freezes, it becomes visible, like Benjamin's 'dialectics at a standstill' 
in the dialectical image. With his 2009 film In Place of Capital, Formwalt scrutinises the 
1847 Henry Fox Talbot photo of the Royal Exchange in London. Here, labour and sociality is 
effaced by technical accident. The long exposures necessary for the state of photographic 
technology at the time means that no people were visible in the streets around the 
building in this image. It is as if these missing multitudes and their labour were blotted out 
by the monumentality of the financial edifice, in absentia (this can be usefully compared to 
Rancière's idea of photographs of serially stacked shipping containers showing the missing 
workers or as allegories for the absence of workers).66 Real abstraction is made visible, and 
it emerges against a background of labour which has been turned into the photographic 
negative of what is finally rendered visible – the monument to exchange, to the 
commodity. This links also to how finance embodies a crisis of representation, even as 
representation augurs a crisis in finance. Credit instruments, financial innovation – 
Formwalt wonders how to represent relations with no correlate in the object world. They 
cannot be represented because they are themselves terms of representation. Finally, Jan-
Peter Hammer's 2011 work, That Which is Seen and That Which is Unseen, stages the 
encounter between money and labour as the evental site of the art work itself. The piece 
consists of a gallery attendant and a pile of money on a plinth – value in its own shape, 
freed from its usual containment in the 'absolute commodity' of the artwork. The attendant 
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watches the money as it grows over the duration of the exhibition, and receives it as 
payment at the exhibition's end. 
 
Conclusion 
The narrative of art in the latest capitalism has featured a certain twisting of the terms of 
modernist autonomy and heteronomy as its parameters. Art's tension with 
commodification has manifested as drives for the dissolution of art into non-art, or, 
conversely, the incorporation of social reality. It gravitates towards uselessness and 
negation when it comes to representing or emulating labour, and towards mimesis when it 
comes to representing or emulating the workings of finance.67 Yet, as we saw with Takala, 
the workings of finance come to increasingly set a template for wage-labour, privileging 
the intangible and relational over the tangible and consumable. As we will see in the fourth 
chapter with the Artist Placement Group, art can also react to this situation by trying to 
directly valorise artistic indeterminacy and art's 'antithesis to that which is the case' as a 
species of 'non-specialist specialism' or consultancy to organizations which are ready to 
accept the uncertain but potentially ground-breaking assets which can be generated by 
the conjunction of speculative artistic and economic praxis. A speculative mode of 
production can also see art acting as a passive agent in the relation between art and 
speculative capital, enacting a simple mimesis of 'social capital' absent reflection on the 
specificity of art and finance's respective structural roles and power relations. This is 
something we can witness for example in the work of Tino Seghal, whose large-scale 
orchestrations of social relations between hired 'participants' and gallerygoers do nothing 
so much as replicate the coerced performance of self common to similarly paid positions in 
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less prestigious sectors of the service industry.68 Importantly, Seghal obeys the 
conventions once vouchsafed as critical in 'de-materialized' conceptual art, even exceeding 
them with his insistence on no ephemera from and no documentation of the 
performances. To say that his work is concerned with the 'experience economy' is to refrain 
from analysis, a move repeated in the work itself. Visitors derive an 'experience' from the 
participants in the most alienated and codified fashion, with the interaction perfectly 
controlled by a managerial layer within the piece itself. This only throws into relief the 
affinity between his practice and 'general performance' as the rule for labour in the 
'speculative mode of production', as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
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The Aesthetic Subject and the Politics of Speculative Labour 
'I have a good conscience; I've written thousands of slips of paper. In the sense of this responsibility 





'A contradiction of all autonomous art is the concealment of the labour that went into it, but in high 
capitalism, with the complete hegemony of exchange value and with the contradictions arising out 






The rationale of this chapter is to outline the connection between the contradictions of the 
social development of artistic labour in capitalism and the formation of the aesthetic 
subject in modernity as the displacement of labour from the category of art, bringing it 
into closer affiliation with the speculative forms of capital valorisation. I will start with a 
brief survey of how artists have approached and appropriated the politics of labour, 
continuing the last chapter's focus on the mimesis of labour within artistic practices in a 
more historiographical and analytic key. I will then discuss real subsumption as a central 
mechanism by which we can come to understand processes of value production that 
transpire elsewhere than the workplace, although they may originate there. Once we have 
seen how the speculative category of real subsumption can function in a discussion of 
artistic production, we will be in a better position to follow the emergence of the aesthetic 
subject as a displacement of labour and a reification of an oppositional space –  not 
necessarily an antagonistic one –  to the social relations of capital accumulation and work. 
This is a space of autonomy that, however, has significant affinity to the 'autonomisation' 
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of capital from labour. Whereas capital and art once confronted each other as heteronomy 
and autonomy, now they seem to share a certain utopian vision of an 'automatic subject' 
that can valorise itself indefinitely. This affinity of course has certain limitations –  art can at 
best be a flattering self-image of capital, which is actuated by profit and is thus as far as 
can be from the aesthetic principle of 'purposiveness without a purpose'. 
 
Crucial to the determination of how the dialectic between autonomy and heteronomy for 
art is displaced in the present is the status of the concept of 'real subsumption'. 'Real 
subsumption' plays a central role in accounts of the restructuring of the valorisation 
processes of capital and their relation to labour as it has developed over time. While we 
can start by thinking about how artistic production has been differentially 'really 
subsumed' by the industrializing circuits of art markets, fairs, biennials, urban branding 
strategies, or even education and social services, this should be situated as part of a 
broader trend. The annexation of art by 'culture' and 'culture' by the economy has been 
seen as a symptom of the 'seizure' of previously 'untouched' areas of subjectivity and 
social life by the valorisation process, or, conversely, the socialization of capital in cultural 
consumption. Processes such as these have been theorized in terms of the periodisation of 
phases of capital accumulation and of the relation between capital and labour within 
them.3 The developmental tendency, then, for the relation between capital and labour is 
that labour not only appears more and more, but is experienced as, a moment of capital. 
This registers both in the objective parameters of reproduction mediated by financial 
rather than welfare state institutions and in the subjective parameters of 'human capital' 
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ideology. Some theorists have also suggested that debt represents a concrete instance of 
the change in the class relation wrought by financialisation. Insofar as debt has the effect 
of individualizing the subject's relation to capital –  whereas the wage once served as a 
common basis for struggle –  it disguises the capital relation of exploitation as 
'self-investment'.4 Thus, the term 'human capital' is hardly an ideological vector pure and 
simple; it simply describes the structural condition of the worker in the era of 
financialisation.  
 
The status of class antagonism in this era of 'self-investment' also undergoes a significant 
change –  labour can no longer be affirmed as a positive counter-pole in a vision of a non- 
or post-capitalist future. Theorists working in the communisation current generally 
contend that any affirmation of autonomy for labour within this relationship becomes an 
affirmation precisely of labour within this relationship, that is, a position devoid of 
mediations or barriers to labour's social absorption into capital (or, conversely, the 
socialization of capital). In this sense, any affirmation of labour is an affirmation of capital.5 
While this account is compelling, it does hazard the elision of the negativity of a 
working-class 'for-itself' (labour militancy, or its political moment) with the affirmation of a 
working class in itself, whereas neither moment can totalise the other, whether it is 
changes in the processes of capitalist accumulation or shifts in the social and political 
composition of the proletariat (employed and not). However, we can use it as a point of 
departure to construct an account of capital formation 'from the inside out', that is to say, 
when capital is presupposed at the affective and operative level of the individual subject 
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insofar as she constitutes a free individual, rather than a worker or any other socially 
determined role. 
 
To do this, we will need to revisit the autonomy/heteronomy nexus as it has played out in 
the emergence of the artistic subject as both the emblematic and oppositional figure of 
modernity, internalizing the abstraction of the capital relation as the innermost truth of its 
existence in the world. Beyond the 'death of art' (Hegel), the artistic subject as isomorphic 
with the 'automatic subject' of capital is advanced as a prototype for all labour. At the same 
time, the artistic subject is the marker of the division of social labour which produces the 
artist and the worker as socially, and even ontologically, distinct. It could even be said that 
it is precisely through the dissolution of the artwork into the field of wider social relations 
(social, participatory, relational and 'invisible' forms of art) that the recuperation of this 
dissolution as individual artistic capital is upheld most forcefully, with the artist emerging 
as both a de-skilled 'service worker' and manager and curator of social creativity or the 
'general intellect'.6 The artist as both not-worker and utopian model of labour which 
mediates these shifts in productive relations serves as an analogue of capital's boundless 
creativity and transformative agency, even or especially in times of crisis and decline, when 
this figure takes on 'anti-capitalist' or oppositional contents within forms which remain 
very much the same. In this sense, the challenges to art's autonomy which have themselves 
solidified into an orthodoxy in the past three or four decades have by and large 
accommodated themselves to the results of these challenges, that is, a conception of 
artistic practices and artistic institutions that are more and more defined by the 
122 
 
heteronomy of the market.  
 
Autonomy thus becomes a style, a form of 'taste' that positions art as a refined 
consumption of social relations whose materiality and imbrication with the institution of 
art's heteronomous conditions of existence must be disavowed as a key part of the 
adherence demanded by this style. These disavowals often take the form of sublimation of 
class, labour (be it artistic or supportive) and material conditions on the level of discursive 
criticality while being increasingly beholden to them materially. The institutional 
conservatism which generates these disavowals is more often defended as a pragmatic 
defence of art's independence and ability to nourish its socially utopian potentials, a stance 
which underpins many recent defences of the 'bourgeois art institution' from the 
depredations of the market. The artist, meanwhile, seems to retain a commitment to 
autonomy as a professional standard, though it is now mediated by the character masks of 
the manager, the researcher, or ethnographer. This quick typology of the objective 
parameters of how autonomy registers in the field of art today centres on the figure of the 
artist as a figure exempt from the relations of exploitation that obtain elsewhere in society. 
The artist is a figure who can be 'autonomous' because she belongs to a productive 
structure that allows her to appropriate and produce cultural material as the expression of 
her subjectivity rather than for profit or survival. She is beyond the capital relation; she has 
the enviably protean nature of capital itself –  as close as 'human capital' can get to the 
idyllic abstraction capital imagines for itself as an entity unencumbered by labour, 
regulation or deflating asset prices. In this way, the formal autonomy of the artist aligns 
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with the 'automatism' of capital as engine of accumulation and self-valorisation that both 
includes and expels 'alien' labour. As we will see later in this chapter in the discussion of 
Agamben and Kant, the historical trajectory of the value-form sees it line up with taste and 
artistic subjectivity insofar as they are constituted by 'indifference' or the 'unconditioned', 
that is, by the deepening of social abstraction. The autonomy of art arises with the 
autonomy of capital as a central phenomenon of modern experience. It invents a category 
of social relation which is not one, a social relation of exemption –  aesthetic judgement or 
'taste'. This forms a central thread of the thesis of 'speculation as a mode of production in 
art and capital' because it is through aesthetic judgement that we can come to perceive 
more clearly the social negativity of art in its separation from labour and use-value, a 
negativity very different to the negativity posed by labour, which was the hostile 
immanence to capital, with a potential for social antagonism predicated on its affirmation 
of use over exchange. But it may be precisely this under-determined form of social 
negativity belonging to art which becomes pivotal when that antagonism is dissolved by 
the re-structuring of the labour:capital relation, when the very 'use-value' of labour is put 
into question by its main consumer, capital. Concomitantly with the loss of definition for 
labour, art assumes a new economic centrality as its indeterminacy is put to work in the 
more 'speculative' modes of accumulation. This encompasses both the market and the 
public institutions of display and education, although the socially reproductive role 
assumed by the latter is increasingly put into question as the legitimating functions of art 




Is Art Working? 
For an adequate understanding of the role of labour in current artistic production, the idea 
of the artist as a manager, an engineer of social processes which she then capitalizes, 
needs to be thought in conjunction with the increasingly pervasive politicization of the 
artist as a worker: a notion with many historical antecedents which cannot be explored fully 
here. The question here would be what happens when labour becomes not just a thematic 
or image for artistic production, but when artistic production is re-imagined as itself a form 
of labour, and the kinds of political forms this produces.  Artists and cultural workers 
assuming the organizational forms and demands of the labour movement such as fair pay 
and equitable working conditions can be briefly encapsulated in the history of Artists 
Unions in the U.K. and U.S7 in the 1970s, the Art Workers' Coalition in New York in the late 
'60s –  mid-70s, as well as current groups such as W.A.G.E. (Working Artists and the Greater 
Economy) and the PWB (Precarious Workers Brigade). There is also a sub-rosa tradition of 
artists 'withdrawing' their labour, such as the Art Strikes initiated by, respectively, the Art 
Workers Coalition (1970), Gustav Metzger (1977-1980) and Stewart Home (1990-93).8 
 
There are many paradoxes thrown up by re-defining artistic production as wage-labour, 
however the wage is calculated. One of these might be that the division of social labour 
that produces the artist as a separate kind of 'non-professional' professional cannot be 
reconciled with a simple agreement that art be valued through the same metrics as all 
other kinds of work, particularly when capitalist work across the board is being rendered 
precarious, contingent and self-realizing for everyone on the classic reactionary model of 
the autonomous (starving) artist.9 Yet this fragile homology between artistic labour and 
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labour in general does furnish the political core of initiatives by artists and cultural workers 
to organize on the traditional lines of labour politics. These initiatives seem to multiply at a 
time when the performance of artistic modalities or services increasingly do not result in 
object commodities. As Hito Steyerl writes, what that means is that such services are 
instantly commodified themselves.10 But are they? While remaining art? Here we can recall 
Marx's comment about labour which does not produce use-values: 'If the thing is useless, 
so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates 
no value.'11 If it was use-value producing labour, it wouldn't be art; and, come to think of it, 
a great variety of waged labour these days hardly produces use-values either. 
 
Aware of the thorny conceptual and practical issues besieging the task of quantifying 
artistic labour, a group like W.A.G.E. focuses on the institutional parameters of the 
distribution of resources. Focusing on contracts, line items in budgets, and sanctions from 
funders, WAGE seeks to programmatically challenge the mystification of artistic labour as 
'investment' which may recompense its maker in the future. They set out to break the 
practical and political tie between artists and (financial) speculators by re-positioning 
artists as workers, itself a socially speculative gesture.12 This bears directly on the 
relationship of art-making to speculation as a form of production. Besides artistic work –  
whether or not recognized as 'labour' - unpaid labour in the cultural sector (typically 
internships, as well as the more humdrum self-exploitation characteristic of most cultural 
work) is paradigmatic of speculation as a mode of production since this kind of labour is 
presented as a speculative investment in one's human capital, with its hallmarks of 
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affective excess, self-management, and submissive auto-valorisation. However, it should 
not be disregarded that the structural prominence of unpaid labour in the cultural sector is 
only pointing to the larger devalorisation of labour in the economy. More expansively, this 
can be discussed as the breakdown of the capital-labour class relation, here with a special 
focus on how art mediates this erosion of categories and guarantees economically and 
subjectively.13 
 
The strategy of organizing around the structure of compensation for artists and cultural 
producers reveals a number of paradoxes from the side of labour politics. In addition to the 
ones cited, the artistic mode of production is so mystified and individualized that labour 
regulation could indeed only be performed by a much more omnipotent state than we are 
ever likely to have, and even that would hardly touch on the opaque and unregulated 
primary and secondary art markets. W.A.G.E. proposes a form of certification or voluntary 
code of best practice that arts institutions can sign up to indicating their commitment to 
paying cultural producers properly. What this misses is first, that an unregulated market 
like the sphere of art production and mediation does not voluntarily self-police and 
second, that art institutions operate within a capitalist social space whose iron law is that 
the rewards of the powerful few come at the expense of the weak many; a structural fact 
not amenable to moral pressure.14 The professionals at the lowest rung of the ladder are 
unpaid so that institutions can function on inadequate budgets; artists don't receive fees 
so that there's more money to pay salaries to administrators to fund-raise from wealthy 
donors. If one of the distinguishing features of art production is that –  by and large –  it is 
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not organized through the same structures as nor accessible to the same forms of measure 
as other kinds of labour, then it is difficult to see how the political forms of labour 
organization can play more than a metaphorical role in pointing out certain social 
injustices of this kind within the institution of art.15 Further, this kind of pointing will swiftly 
need to point to itself, as the expansion of the art world, however unequal the distribution 
of its rewards, is a symptom of extreme wealth inequality, a symptom of vast amounts of 
money being accumulated and invested in e.g. the art market and not e.g. in social 
reproduction.16 Additionally, as John Roberts and Gregory Sholette have written, art 
increasingly functions as a sink for disguised un- and underemployment, as statistically 
larger and larger numbers of people try, with varying degrees of success, to monetise their 
free creative activity in a hostile economic landscape.17 
 
Besides the structural paradoxes from the side of labour and the commodity, there are also 
paradoxes to be found on the side of art. If what is most characteristic of progressive art 
since Modernism is to desire the end of art, to dissolve into life, then re-defining art as 
wage-labour fits into that tradition, while continuing to insist on the cultural exception that 
determines a price for it on the terrain of state and market –  and to accept that capital, 
which ensures the existence of divisions of labour, classes and, of course, the existence of 
art as a class-distinctive pursuit in distinction from labour, is eternal. As already noted, this 
move can mean that the real class divisions that underpin the maintenance of regimes of 
paid and unpaid labour, mental and manual labour, art work and 'shit work', are obscured. 
Also, the move of construing art as labour reduces art to one of its dimensions, namely 
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what it shares with all capitalist work: the commodity form. A labour politics of art boils 
down artistic production to the 'absolute commodity' Theodor Adorno speaks about18 (in 
this case, irrespective of its durational or material form: the commodity of labour-power 
will do) or to abstract social labour in its generality, vitiating the critical inflection art still 
possesses as 'the antithesis of that which is the case.'19 
 
However, raising the issue of the links between art and labour in the speculative mode of 
production can have other, equally if not more urgent, critical and political consequences. 
Art's role in social reproduction –  the 'concealment' of labour Adorno mentions in the 
epigraph –  is problematised when this role is re-defined as production. This is also the 
lesson of the Wages for Housework movement, and indeed any instance when a social 
relation accepted as natural and exceptional to the laws of market exchange is re-defined 
as labour, thus alienated, and alienable: an object for debate. It is not only a matter of 
recognition: once the disregarded is revealed as fundamental, like unwaged labour for the 
system of waged exploitation, the relations in that field can shift into another 
configuration, having repercussions for the 'norm' at issue. On the terrain of art, probably 
still the most elegant and symptomatically precise gesture of this kind was the feminist 
conceptual artist Mierle Laderman Ukeles' 'Maintenance Art' manifesto and artwork. Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles dramatised the nominalist protocols of Conceptual Art when she 
performed domestic labour as an artwork, what she called 'Maintenance Art'.20 Ukeles 
would bustle around exhibits with a duster and cleaning fluid, wash the steps of the 
museum, and hound the administrative staff out of their offices on her cleaning rounds. 
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The point was that the work of maintenance made all other kinds of work possible –  
waged labour, artwork, even 'the revolution'. In proposing a world in which 'maintenance' 
activities were just as legitimately a part of the art as the objects or even the more 
ephemeral propositions or documentations that announced conceptual art, she was 
suspending the division of symbolic and physical labour that ensured work and art 
remained matter and anti-matter, autonomy without a taint of heteronomy. If the daily 
uncompensated labour performed by mainly women in the household could migrate to 
the museum and seek legitimacy as art, then it was no longer self-evident that this labour 
was any less 'creative' than the kind of activity otherwise enshrined as art, and no less 
public than socially necessary wage-labour. It could even be said that her work synthesized 
the political stakes of identifying with 'work' at that time (late 1960s and early 1970s) for art 
and for the feminist movement, since identifying with work was a way of reaching for some 
sort of political collective agency (and, inversely, the political stakes of upgrading 
housework to artwork). The debates around art's relationship to work sounded very similar 
to the domestic labour debates; both were seen as somehow taking place outside the 
social contract of waged labour. 
 
As one of the driving forces of Wages for Housework , the Marxist feminist scholar and 
activist Silvia Federici, wrote in 1984: 
Yet, the demand for wages for housework was crucial from many viewpoints. First it 
recognized that housework is work—the work of producing and reproducing the 
workforce—and in this way it exposed the enormous amount of unpaid labor that goes on 




As soon as an activity, and the identity of those who perform it, is alienated in this way, its 
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stability as a social relation is suspended. In the field of cultural production, it allows the 
question to be posed of what it is about the organization of society that impels some to 
work for no money whatsoever because the alternatives seem even worse. Considered in a 
purely formal manner, it is here that the question of 'self-abolition' –  of the proletariat, of 
social existence under the category 'woman' or 'homosexual' or 'black' –  also becomes a 
question for artistic labour. This returns us to the decomposition of the class relation 
discussed in the first part of this chapter. The relations between the negativity of labour for 
capital and the political affirmation of labour within capital can be seen as an analogue to 
art's heteronomy and autonomy. Art cannot affirm itself as art within the relations of 
capital –  its autonomy - without using that autonomy to disclose the horizon of its own 
erasure, whether that means merging with life (heteronomy) or wider social transformation 
(overcoming the autonomy/heteronomy contradiction). It is clear that the analogy 
between the self-abolition of art and the self-abolition of the proletariat, or other forms of 
social self-abolition, is questionable at a greater level of concretion, which would bring into 
focus the class relations of art and its 'exceptionality'. However, there is the formal 
correspondence in the relation of art to capital and unpaid domestic work to capital that 
looks like a relation of the 'supplement', that which is necessary but must be depicted as 
incidental.22 The constitutive exception, whether it is reproductive labour in the home or 
the unquantifiable reproductive labour of the cultural worker or the serviceable artist: the 
'under labourer' who is the condition of possibility of the system's ability to reproduce 
itself as a whole, the 'work' that must disappear in order for 'the work' to appear, whether 
that work is the waged worker or the art installation. A further question here would be how 
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the participatory, post-conceptual and relational art practices of the past four decades 
have sought to internalize and exhibit this 'work' as part of 'the work' that emerges 
thereby. 
 
How does the social relation of capital mobilize and valorise the 'counter-production' 
discussed in the last chapter (the resistance of labour to be made capital within the labour 
process), the desire to be 'not-labour' that is the founding moment of art and the division 
of labour within which it exists? It will be the task of this chapter to explore this question by 
grounding the alignment between the autonomy of art and the heteronomy of capital as it 
indexes changes in the organization and work (the capital relation) in the figure of the 
artist as type of modern subjectivity which allegorises the real abstraction of capital, 
equating ceaseless flux, change and competition with personal and social freedom. At the 
same time, this alignment generates a negativity which seeks its content in opposition to 
capital's rule, if not always its logic, as the above indicates. This then, does not greatly 
depart from the contradictions of art as meeting place between autonomy and 
heteronomy as Adorno sketched it half a century ago: art de-functionalises subjectivities 
but only as an exception which proves (even if it on occasion contaminates) the rule. Such a 
suspension of use value is performed within limits which are in their turn guaranteed by 
the total mobilization of subjectivity, by the fixed division of social labour, enforced by the 
accumulation needs of capital, within and without the workplace. It can be contended that 
it is precisely art's micro-alienation from productive labour and commodity relations that 
in the age of creative work, creative industries and creative cities, acts to socialize capital 
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on the macro-level, fulfilling art's oft-cited role of being 'the commodity that sells all 
others'. Thus, the affect of emancipation and critique that comprises the 'surplus value' of 
art in this schema is not simply or merely ideological, but wholly structural, flourishing as it 
does in an era of seemingly indefinite capitalist crisis. 
 
Concomitantly, we might look at how art practices and art parameters have globally 
become aligned with the restructuring of labour into ever more arbitrary, placeless, 
transient and performative modes of generating value, including even the value of its 
non-reproduction. By 'non-reproduction' here, I refer to brakes put on expanded social 
reproduction by debt in the case of labour (and capital), or, in the case of art, its 
self-referential continuation beyond and by means of, its own exhaustion and indistinction. 
So here we can approach real subsumption as the restructuring by direct integration into 
capital of arenas of social life that had been principally, though contestably, separate 
instances from value accumulation –  social reproduction as the consumption of 
use-values, art as the production of useless 'higher' values. This heralds a loss of mediation 
on the one hand and its proliferation on the other, when capital's mediations –  financial 
and managerial mechanisms –  expand into and reshape in their own image instances of 
relative autonomy where this autonomy has recently become a barrier for further 
accumulation, a barrier that comes to seem ever more intolerable in periods of crisis. Thus, 
the separation of art and labour, premised on the self-consistent identity of each, is 
transformed by real subsumption, with the decomposition of the sites and senses of work 
on the one hand, and the untenability of proper places and pursuits for art on the other. 
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Hence, the politics stemming from each also –  use versus exchange in the traditional 
iterations of labour politics, and the criticality of useless art against reigning use-values in 
social reality –  themselves are hollowed out by the rationalizations that come with real 
subsumption. This was already the case in the last global economic and social crisis, which 
heralded the onset of the 'neoliberal' era. In the speculative mode of production that has 
prevailed since then, art's attempts to model or embody practices of greater social utility 
itself relied on a vast expansion of debt-financed social spending and culture-led urban 
leveraging. A vast array of types of 'social speculation' pursued by means of contemporary 
art thus claimed critical or even political purchase in the midst of this abundance, 
inequitable as it was. The current crisis punctuates, though it cannot be said to introduce a 
sharp break into, the self-understanding of such practices. The 'supportive infrastructures' 
that art has dedicated itself to prototyping in recent years seem objectively more urgent 
than ever, now joined to an invigorated activist and collectivist impulse in the wake of 
Occupy. But if the respective erosions of art and labour come as symptoms of a crisis, can 
there be a negative as well as a palliative reflection on the current situation, and can this 
negativity also potentially disclose a re-composition, precisely around the crisis of 'value' 
that the social forms of art and labour manifest in their own ways?  
 
Here, we must be careful to distinguish art's relationship to real subsumption from the 
claim that art itself is really subsumed; or, stated otherwise, art's conceptual or 'imaginary' 
subsumption and the real subsumption determining labour must be held apart if we are to 
track how art and labour converge and diverge in the recent period of capital 
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accumulation, and the shift in the mechanisms of subsumption this has brought with it. If 
we look below at the exegesis given by Marx of the category of subsumption (in its formal 
and real variants), it will be clear that the production process of art, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, is not subsumed at all, neither really nor formally.23 I have previously 
discussed this in terms of art having a relationship to the value-form while itself not being 
determined by the law of value; it is this condition of difference which allows it to have a 
relationship to the social instance that does, namely abstract labour and its concrete 
articulations. This allows us to truly, that is to say, structurally, situate art within the 
speculative mode of production as 'speculative labour'. As John Roberts writes in a recent 
essay: 
Artistic praxis certainly plays a part in the accumulation of capital, through opening itself up 
to interdisciplinary and environmental forms of situatedness - as I have said. But as 
speculative labour art lies outside of the value process: most artists, most of the time, don't 
have to work harder and faster in order to produce a range of prototypes to a given 




This will be important to consider also in the conclusion, where I will deploy the concept of 
'imaginary subsumption' to open a consideration of whether art can make the leap from 
non-subsumption directly to 'real subsumption' as a consequence of the shifts in its 
economic role and social agency in the 'speculative mode of production'. My hypothesis is 
that art's non-compatibility with the category of 'real subsumption' is clear when the 
category applied to the characteristic production processes of art, and that this is 
important for reading the specific political potential of art in the speculative mode of 
production and in capital in general, with regard especially to its relationship to 
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revolutionary 'social technique', as Roberts also writes. However, once the broader 
application of 'real subsumption' that has been outlined so far in this chapter is allowed to 
register, it is equally clear that we can discuss art as pivotal –  again, due to its specificity as 
a 'non-labour' - to real subsumption seen as a tendential process of capital investing the 
whole of social reproduction with its value imperatives. 
 
Real Subsumption 
In the Appendix to the first volume of Capital, 'Results of the Immediate Process of 
Production', Marx develops the category of 'real subsumption'. Real subsumption refers to 
the socialization of labour through and by the capitalist production process as it becomes 
properly capitalist, that is, capital shapes the working day and working processes to its 
ends, not merely marketising the exchange relations within which traditional working 
practices continue. This would be considered formal subsumption and is logically (not 
chronologically) prior to real subsumption. In real subsumption, the majority of the 
population are proletarianized: they have no means, no reserves, for reproducing 
themselves besides the sale of their labour-power for a wage: 
 the working population must have ceased either to be part of the objective conditions of 
    labour, or to enter the market-places as producers of commodities; instead of selling the 
products of its labour it must sell that labour itself, or, more accurately, its labour-power. 
Only then can it be said that production has becomes the production of commodities 
through its entire length and breadth.25 
 
Later in the chapter, Marx emphasises that it is under real subsumption that the powers of 
labour appear as what they 'are', the powers of capital: 
Since –  within the process of production –  living labour has already been absorbed into 
136 
 
capital, all the social productive forces of labour appear as the productive forces of capital, 
as intrinsic attributes of capital, just as in the case of money, the creative power of labour 
had seemed to possess the qualities of a thing.26 
and finally:   
  
Capital employs labour. This in itself exhibits the relationship in its simple form and entails 
the personification of things and the reification [Versachlichung] of persons. 
  
The relationship becomes more complicated, however, and apparently more mysterious, 
with the emergence of the specifically capitalist mode of production. Here we find that it is 
not only such things –  the products of labour, both use-values and exchange-values –  that 
rise up on their hind legs and face the worker and confront him as 'Capital'. But even the 
social forms of labour appear as a form of development of capital, and hence the productive 
forces of social labour so developed appear as the productive forces of capitalism [… ] The 
same transformation may be observed in the forces of nature and science, the products of 
the general development of history in its abstract quintessence. They too confront the 
workers as the powers of capital. They become separated effectively from the skill and the 
knowledge of the individual worker; and even though they are themselves the products of 




Marx here stages the later discussion of real subsumption with a depiction of how it is that 
concrete social labour is incorporated into the expansion of abstract value. Importantly, the 
analytic transition between formal and real subsumption is linked to the distinction 
between absolute and relative surplus value. While absolute surplus value extraction relies 
on the simple extension of the working day or intensification of labour, relative surplus 
value extraction is pursued by means such as automation or strict divisions of labour which 
are only possible once capital has seized control of the production process as well as the 
products for the purposes of its valorisation, that is, with real subsumption. Once this 
valorisation starts to extend to sectors having to do with the reproduction of labour- 
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power, such as health or education, then it becomes possible to discuss a 'real 
subsumption' of sectors outside the workplace, up to and including culture. However, real 
subsumption is a speculative rather than a descriptive category. It is capable of indicating 
the contours of valorisation on an abstract scale, but it becomes problematic when used to 
make historical arguments, such as ones about the periodisation of the capital relation. It is 
even more speculative when applied to labour processes themselves. This is exemplified by 
artistic production and artistic labour, which in no way can be demonstrated to be really 
subsumed as a labour process typically, but as a sector of valorisation of capital does lend 
itself to this critical category of political economy. The notion of 'speculation as a mode of 
production' in art does in fact have everything to do with how we can position artistic 
production with regard to processes of real subsumption. Although 'capitalisation' seems 
initially more apt when talking about how value is generated within art, it is only with 
reference to 'real subsumption' that the contradictions of artistic labour, rather than e.g. 
the art market, can come into view. 
 
The discussion of real subsumption here is intended to underline and extend the 
discussion in the last chapter, which followed Christopher Arthur's28 account by 
determining labour within the production process as a moment of capital's 
self-valorisation, yet a moment which can run 'counter' to this structural role insofar as it is 
also living labour, resistant to its break-down and absorption in this process. This is 
important for two reasons. One is that it allows us to distinguish between a 'negative' and 
an 'affirmative' status of labour in capital. Insofar as it is an alien and resistant element that 
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can resist or erode its role in valorising capital, and this refusal is potentially collective 
insofar as capital orchestrates labour as a collective force of production, then this 
negativity vis-a-vis capital can have emancipatory political effects. However, labour as such 
is something that cannot be affirmed politically as an independent source of value, only 
negatively (as not-capital and inimical to its interests). Labour 'as such' does not exist 
outside the historically specific capital relation - and its class relations - and any movement 
looking to definitively overcome this relation must seek to overcome labour and use-value 
just as much as it opposes capital and exchange-value, as both are instances of the social 
form of value. It is in this way that any communist politics should be an 'antiwork politics'29 
and must take account of this double status of labour in capital: insofar as labour valorises 
capital, it is a threat to its self-expansion and its rule (negativity of labour); insofar as labour 
valorises capital, it must be undermined, principally by the subjects of that labour (whether 
employed or not, productive or unproductive) lest it establish itself as an independent 
source of value abstractly without breaking its dependence on capital. The latter can 
extend to any workerism, and, more complicatedly, to the 'refusal of work' which employed 
the unfortunate term of 'self-valorisation' for activities which were intended as directly 
hostile to capitalist value production and extraction. Insofar as labour presents an 
antagonistic, albeit internal, relation to capital, its negativity can shed light on a politics of 
art and work which can depart from the antagonism in order to help us re-imagine the 
relation, with a view to overcoming it in its totality.  
 
The problematisation of labour as a positive pole in the capital-labour relation can, I would 
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propose, be performed by looking at the re-structuring and de-composing influences of 
finance and art on labour as respectively, but also aporetically, the 'objective' and 
'subjective' moments of capital's drive to subsume labour. Financialisation strengthens the 
rule of capital over production and reproduction, while artistic subjectivity mirrors capital's 
self-expansion on the subjective scale as a liberating exception to wage-labour. On the 
other hand this re-structuring and de-composition also starts to exert a corrosive effect on 
the capital side of the relation. One example would be the devalorisation of capital, as well 
as of labour, engendered by the financial crisis, along with the more long-term effects of 
financialisation, growing organic composition and expulsion of workers on capital's 
valorisation prospects. These prospects become more volatile and short-term as 
valorisation becomes 'fictitious', or internal to a speculative economy of risks and 
expectations rather than capital-expanding investment. The flourishing art market would 
be a prominent instance of the tendency towards this kind of 'unproductive' investment 
which continues since the era of the bubble with hardly a dent.  
 
However, matters become yet more complex when the category of 'real subsumption' is 
taken up and used to denote phenomena such as 'commodification' and 'reification' 
extending over, or inserted into, more and more areas of social reproduction as well as 
production, and this is then formulated as a phenomenon of 'periodisation', that is, a 
historical account of specific stages of capitalist development rather than e.g. categories 
which may obtain concurrently and 'unevenly' in different geographical and political 
circumstances.30 The boundaries between production and reproduction themselves are 
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less and less tenable, socially or politically, and the politics which were founded on that 
division become problematic, as Kathi Weeks notes in her discussion of the limitations of a 
politics of reproduction to be drawn from the history of Marxist feminism31 when she 
writes 'under the conditions of post-industrial, post-Fordist, and post-Taylorist production, 
the always vexing exercise of distinguishing between production and reproduction 
whether by sphere, task, or relationship to the wage becomes even more difficult.'32 Here, 
it remains to be noted that it was Italian Autonomist Marxist feminists who initially 
demonstrated the extent to which social reproduction was always already incorporated 
into the capital relation through the unwaged production of the commodity of 
'labour-power' in the gendered and racialised domestic sphere –  the care that was a 
precondition for entering and staying in the labour-market or indeed anywhere in the 
'social factory'. However, this is somewhat oblique to the theorization of 'real subsumption' 
since the question of value-production or labour discipline when it came to domestic 
labour was always very thorny in this debate, prone to metaphor and generality. 
Redefining domestic labour as productive work was always more of a strategic move in the 
relations between Marxist feminism and the workers' movement, enabling it to redefine an 
activity deemed invisible and insignificant, the 'realm of nature', as a contested sphere of 
work andantagonism, hence of proletarian politics. The analytic coherence of the move is 
equivocal and perhaps distracts from the historical and political possibilities opened up by 
this move.33 
 
These kinds of 'anti-work politics' become complicated at a point when the socialization of 
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capital means that social agents undergo collective and individual 'total mobilization' as 
risk-taking and growth-maximising agents of their own capital,34 in the wake of class 
de-composition and the erosion of social guarantees. Everyone must become a speculator 
in order to participate in a society where speculation has become not just structurally 
enforced, but normatively affirmed. This leads to an inversion, and eventually, implosion of 
any production of subjectivity which would be grounded in a negativity towards the 
conditions that currently obtain, since struggle has no place in individual maximisation of 
value –  and it is through the inescapability of a purely individual maximisation of value 
that capital socializes itself. Bernard Stiegler depicts the speculative tendency of a capital 
which socializes itself financially –  aptly in the context of the previous chapter's account of 
the recursive character of speculative finance –  when he writes: 
capital, however, tends to become purely speculative when it no longer measures a capital 
of confidence in the future of the assets of the production apparatus –  in relation to which 
it constitutes, as a system of anticipations, capacities for investment –  but instead relies on 
operations which are either purely self-referential (such that anticipations created by the 
financial sub-system anticipate nothing but itself and come at the expense of the 
production system), or else are oriented toward the production apparatus, but are 





This resonates with the previous chapter's discussion of the relationship between finance, 
temporality and the social, where finance is seen as both oriented towards the present –  
extraction of value in the present rather than long-term investment –  and the future, with 
credit instruments such as the options form or the derivative premised on pay-offs 
contingent on future events occurring or future value being produced, as well as future 
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bets being placed. Stiegler captures both of these in his emphasis on the recursive 
'anticipations' of speculative capital and their 'short-term' outlook. Finance is thus 
intimately linked with real subsumption as it is the index of the extension of accumulation 
to consumption and reproduction once these are sustained by debt, that is the 
future-in-the-present. 
We can thus see real subsumption as a socialization of capital –  extensive and intensive –  
which doesn't just re-order the production process according to capitalist lines but seeks 
to efface the division between spheres of social life it itself put in place in an earlier stage of 
extending its domination, such as the one between production and reproduction, in order 
to maximise its speculative accumulation. Speculation as a mode of production then 
augurs precisely the loss of the division between production and reproduction, akin to the 
earlier reference to the porosity between art and work. Real subsumption to the capital 
relation tends towards establishing a homogeneity between art and work insofar as the 
production of subjectivity in both, once divided along the duality of use and exchange, or 
even actuality and utopia, becomes the same speculative one. Real subsumption displaces 
the autonomy/ heteronomy nexus which is predicated on art's difference from, and 
opposition to, productive labour. If all labour is less and less productive and more and 
more speculative, art's raison d'etre becomes dubitable. Likewise, real subsumption 
emphasizes art's role as a marker of the division between intellectual and manual labour 
(Sohn-Rethel) when art is massified into a professional category whose tools and products 
are immaterial (as in irrelevant) since its status relies entirely on the maintenance of the 




If the issue is whether 'real subsumption' can help to describe a newly flattened field of the 
'social' which is both immanently productive and open to 'pillage' in Stiegler's sense, then 
the historical precedents for such a debate are not far away. Here we can recall the 
analyses familiar from the Italian autonomist tradition of 'all life put to work' and 'the social 
factory' which sees all of social life as enmeshed in the antagonism formerly imputed only 
to the production process, since all moments of this life are potentially productive and thus 
potentially moments of struggle. As I noted in Chapter One, I would like to mark a 
departure in my analysis from this set of positions insofar as they place what I would claim 
is an untenable emphasis on production, and labour as a potentially positive pole in the 
capital relation ('workerism') even if labour is subsumed to the 'autonomy' of 'forms of life'. 
Insofar as cooperative multitudes can be said self-valorise, it is along a value-chain which 
hosts capital at both ends, whether it be 'human capital' or the corporate kind. What I 
would like to retain, however, from the Autonomist and post-Autonomist spectrum is its 
attention to composition (class composition) as an outcome and a horizon rather than a 
fixed vector of class politics; its focus on the production of subjectivity; and its emphasis on 
antagonism. Here I would also like to keep in mind the earlier discussion on the political 
implications of re-defining artistic labour as waged labour, a move that, however full of 
tensions and illusions, does have the virtue of highlighting the antagonism which artistic 
labour shares with waged labour, especially when it comes to artistic practices differentially 
embraced by art institutions but which remain marginal to the process of creating 
speculative products for the art market.  
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In the consideration of these practices, we can see a commonality with 'creative labour' as 
the commodification of quirks, habits, social networks, in short, of 'singularities' rather than 
'masses'. Singularity goes from being the spur to alienation in a de-humanizing and 
homogeneous production process to becoming itself the source of value in production. It 
could also perhaps be argued that alienation does not disappear, but becomes more 
intimate and transversal, saturating subjective and social affect. Capital as the 'automatic' 
subject’37 is reiterated at the level of individual subjects, whose social activity is 
determined by capital as a means of its own self-expansion, where each singularity 
becomes a way of valorising contingency in the future-oriented trajectory of this 
self-expansion –  contingency and future because the value that is produced may or may 
not be realized in circulation later on.38 However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
future-orientation of capital is fundamentally reliant on value relations continuing to 
persist, whereas this 'stability' for capital returns on the systemic level is translated for the 
individual subject of 'human capital' as infinite risk and constant flux. This then has 
consequences for the 'resistance' of labour to being valorised as capital, as the 
predominance of socialized (financialised) capital conflates the preconditions for social 
existence of 'always-already' labour into capital's own conditions of existence and 
expansion. We can then say that this removes the margin for alienation where the 
resistance of labour to being valorised or where the programmes for social and political 
autonomy used to find their source, or, conversely, it generalizes this alienation at such 
intimate and granular levels of subjectivity that it is at once everywhere and nowhere. 
'Human capital' then becomes one of the types of 'fictitious capital' that is the main engine 
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for valorisation in a period of capital's expansion where more and more of its expansion 
occurs by means of financial commodities and enclosure rather than productive 
investment. 'Fictitious capital' derives its value from not-as-yet or never-to-be performed 
surplus-value extraction from labour at the end of the value-chain, and thus takes a 
speculative gamble in a volatile climate of temporary high rewards which can trigger 
systemic backlash and even collapse when that value fails to materialize. It is also the 
extension of measure and the 'exchange abstraction' (Sohn-Rethel)39 to phenomena 
which are hard to measure, such as education, social skills, health and so forth, which 
contributes to the instability of this regime of accumulation. We can then say that human 
capital is the emblematic instance of capital attempting to realize itself in terrain where this 
realization is far from assured, to valorise itself from labour which may or may not be 
performed and skills which may or may not be marketable or quantifiable. As mentioned 
earlier, the notion of human capital also instils management at the level of subjective 
agency as the internalized directive to 'add value' to one's capital as a behavioural norm. 
We can say, in fact, that management is what acts to conceal problems in valorisation in 
many fields.40 
 
This has to be distinguished of course from the classic schema of how capital valorises all 
labour-power in the uncertainty of its realization: capital buys the potential to labour 
(labour-time) with no assurance in each case that the value added to the commodity by 
the labour performed will be realized in the sale of the commodity.41 When we speak of 
'human capital' it is simply to indicate that this labour-time or potential to labour 
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(labour-power) becomes extensive over the whole of the individual's life so that the 
capitalist and the worker are merged in one empirical individual. In this way we can speak 
of 'human capital' as the 'becoming-management' of labour, and this construction, with its 
implications for the figure of the artist as a figure counterpoised to the worker, will be 
developed more fully below. 
 
The Specialist of Non-Specialism 
Let us stay with the category of 'real subsumption' as a shorthand for describing the 
socialization of capital through mediations outside of the direct site of the wage-relation 
–  the sphere to which Marx originally applied the term –  in accord with contemporary 
theorists in the Italian post-Autonomia current, but also other contemporary Marxist 
currents such as the communisation theorists. 'Real subsumption' in this part of my 
discussion can be broadly conflated with 'speculation as a mode of production' according 
to the preceding definitions I have given this term, insofar as 'real subsumption' in these 
two currents is often used to designate the absorption of social affects and subjectivity into 
the capital relation; or, to be more exact, the remoulding by capital of the production 
processes of this subjectivity in the sphere of reproduction. In order to trace how the 
subject of contemporary work is modified by this kind of 'real subsumption' into the 
subject of 'human capital' and how that connects to the subject of artistic labour, we need 
to specify what kind of subjectivity was created in the division of social labour under capital 
between those who go to work and those who make art. Following on from the general 
lens that has been established through the concept of real subsumption, I would now like 
to focus more closely on the production of artistic subjectivity within it, as its constitutive 
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exception. In artistic subjectivity, (which is more properly called 'aesthetic subjectivity' to 
encompass the viewer/consumer as well as the producer of art, also since the classic 
philosophies of the aesthetic such as those of Kant or Hegel are more concerned with the 
viewer), the subject of labour is transformed into the subject of judgement.  
 
What follows from this? At first it seems as if we are presented with the artist as a 
conservative figure, where the direct relation to the world or with social reality entered into 
by the worker is replaced by a mediated one which is purely reactive; the artist as empty, 
abstract subject who takes no position and who evaluates the world rather than changes it. 
Alternatively, we can see the artist as a radical figure, whose formal relationship to the 
world is free from the mediations and power hierarchies imposed on the worker, as well as 
the entrenched understanding of reality imposed by repetitive alienated labour. This latter 
is the artist as the abstract subject of unconditioned freedom who gains a critical purchase 
on the world due to her (productive) autonomy from its utilitarian reason. As we track the 
generalization of the abstraction of value as pure creative subjectivity in the current 
moment which I have designated as the 'speculative mode of production', we need to 
return to the earliest moments of their contact to understand what has changed. To what 
extent was the splitting of the subject of aesthetics from the subject of productive labour, 
inseparable from the development of culture in modernity, already a reaction to the grip of 
abstract value on social relations?  In other words, what are the subjective grounds for the 
split between autonomy and heteronomy which makes art possible in capitalist modernity? 




Giorgio Agamben has recently narrated the production of subjectivity as pure abstraction 
in the figure of the artist –  recoded into the 'man of taste', thus, as indicated above, 
crossing between the making and the appreciation of art. He offers an exploratory 
genealogy of the subject of aesthetics primarily with reference to Hegel's philosophy of art. 
To risk an as yet-unfounded leap, what he discovers at the root of this genealogy is the 
demand for self-annulment, a Hegelian imperative of sublation. Can this be placed 
alongside the communist revolutionary principle of the 'negation of all that exists' and the 
self-abolition of the proletariat, as noted earlier? That which is nothing but its relation to 
capital can only overcome this condition by annihilating the relation itself. For this, the true 
contingency of the relation, and of its position in this relation must be recognized.   There 
must be a moment of alienation, where what is most concrete is transformed into the most 
incidental and contingent: 
The artist then experiences a radical tearing or split, by which the inert world of contents in 
their indifferent, prosaic objectivity goes to one side, and to the other the free subjectivity of 
the artistic principle, which soars above the contents as over an immense repository of 
materials that it can evoke or reject at will. Art is now the absolute freedom that seeks its end 
and its foundation in itself, and does not need, substantially, any content, because it can 
only measure itself against the vertigo caused by its own abyss. No longer is any other 
content –  except art itself –  immediately for the artist the substantiality of his 




This passage appears to provide some material for the further unpacking of the concept of 
'self-abolition' with regard to art. For Hegel, the more reflexivity art develops, that is, the 
closer art gets to philosophy, the more it renders itself redundant, its proper sphere of 
activity becoming merely to illustrate, using its own means, the philosophical endpoints 
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which overdetermine the very possibility of its continuation as art.43 Art can only realize 
itself by disappearing. For Agamben here, following Hegel, art as a specific kind of 
production of a specific kind of object is also liable to vanish on attaining to the condition 
of absolute freedom. It becomes simply discernment or taste, a capacity for selection. The 
subjectivity of the artist only registers as the measure of its own emptiness; or, as the 
power to choose from 'indifferent prosaic objectivity' and render the selection a proof or 
example of this subjectivity at work, a purely gratuitous act. However, when we look at the 
thematic of such a 'self-abolition' for art in Adorno, we encounter a more relational 
concept, one whose horizon is materialist rather than metaphysical:44 
Art and artworks are perishable, not simply because by their heteronomy they are 
dependent, but because right into the smallest detail of their autonomy, which sanctions the 
socially determined splitting off of spirit by the division of labor, they are not only art but 





With reference to the proposition that what is most characteristic of art in our period is to 
desire the end of art, be that in the axiomatic manner of Hegel, or in the performative 
blurrings between art and labour in present-day work, art and social action alike,46 it 
seems that this can also become a transcendental parameter, a criterion, a normative 
command. The wish for the end of art can become, or rather has long since become, the 
primary principle of its continuation. As Agamben notes, this end is in fact the beginning of 
autonomous art. This is testified by the role of criticality as mark of seriousness and 
ambition in art as it is currently produced and taught, even if the ubiquity of such criticality 
opens itself to charges that it 'adds value' to an otherwise consistently conservative sphere 
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of discourse and practice. For Adorno, the 'foreignness' of art to the reality principle, the 
very fact that a society based on exchange-value could find no use for it but to sell and 
collect it, was already a sign that its autonomy was potentially realizable: art could help 
bring about a world in which it no longer existed as the legitimating exception to the rule 
of value over the social and natural world. However, it may be that Agamben's point is 
more relevant in an era when it is artistic subjectivity that has been discovered to have a 
use-value all across the social field, a use-value historically derived from art's refusal to be 
art in the era that coincided with Adorno's later years and has lasted into the present.  
 
In The Man Without Content,47 Agamben describes in great detail, calling on a panoply of 
literary and philosophical sources, how the condition of the modern subject is first and 
foremost an aesthetic condition. He develops this through the figure of the subject who 
appropriates 'prosaic objectivity' through the faculty of taste. Taste is the distinguishing 
faculty of the modern subject who neither owns nor works, but cultivates his sensibility, 
and the rise of the modern philosophical discipline of 'aesthetics' coincides with the 
historical emergence of the middle-class consumption for which this figure is an emblem. 
The consummate man of taste is the artist, who in principle owns nothing but his 
discrimination, his sensibility which allows him to select his artistic material from an 
indifferent world. The non-necessity of the aesthetic subject's position also allows him to 
function as the absolute consumer, which is where the sensibility of genius crosses over 
with the dandy and the distinction sought and enacted by the discerning consumers of 
modern 'heteronomy' sketched by Baudelaire and Benjamin.48 It is an expertise and 
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training in seeing; the man of taste is dispossessed of everything save for his 
world-creating sensibility. The radical contingency experienced by the man of taste is then 
an index of his radical self-sufficiency, which in some ways brings us back to the subject of 
human capital which appreciates, with the double meaning of 'appreciate' key here.49 
Agamben shows how the abyssal loss of ground which creates the 'man of taste', as 
depicted in the writings of e.g. Diderot, exerted an influence on Hegel's own developing 
phenomenology of the subject in the 'dark night of the world'. In the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Hegel diagnoses the subject of culture as pure self-alienation, an entropic sign of the 
downfall of civilization. Spirit, having alienated itself in culture, can only return to itself in 
the consciousness of this utter alienation, and the absolute contingency of all attachments, 
principles, truths and laws. 'Pure culture' is the name of the 'I' that 'beholds itself outside of 
itself and split . . . everything that has continuity and universality, everything that is called 
law, good, and right, is at the same time rent asunder and destroyed.'50 In other words, a 
hypertrophy of judgement ('taste') and a corresponding inability or impossibility of action 
or understanding. Unlike for Kant, whose Critique of Judgement identifies the ability to 
appreciate beauty in nature or in art as the mark of a shared human sensibility and 
sociability, the 'sensus communis', in this account, the ability to appreciate constitutes an 
aesthetic subject liable at any moment to succumb to a keen sense of her own futility, and 
the futility of everything which binds her to other subjects and a world external to her own 
subjectivity. 
 
It should be noted that Agamben's intention in sketching this account of the emergence of 
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the aesthetic subject in Enlightenment and Romantic-era European literary and 
philosophical culture is to articulate a Heideggerian/Nietzschean argument in which the 
aesthetic subject is the exemplary subject of modernity insofar as it is primarily a nihilistic 
subject. For better or worse, my interest in the argument can be couched in more 
materialist terms. Agamben's inquiry seems to me to have some bearing on Adorno's 
account of the conflictual nature of the autonomy of art as both a confirmation and 
cancellation of social unfreedom.   This then points back to his account of autonomy, in 
which autonomy is invoked as an 'autonomy-effect'. Adorno writes 'The strongest buttress 
of subjective aesthetics, the concept of aesthetic feeling, derives from objectivity, not the 
reverse. Aesthetic feeling says that something is thus, that something is beautiful; Kant 
would have attributed such aesthetic feeling, as "taste," exclusively to one who was capable 
of discriminating in the object.'51 Taste is disclosed as a social relation marking inequality, 
one predicated on other social relations, much as autonomy is based on exploitation: yet, 
without the autonomy of critical judgement, exploitation remains the order of nature. 
 
The content of artistic subjectivity is then its form, the form which emerges from the split 
with wage-labour which creates the possibility of 'art itself'. The contingent, or 'inessential', 
is the primary characteristic of the artist's subjectivity since it is via this that she develops 
the singularity of apprehension, or 'taste', which makes of her consciousness a productive 
form for any content it might encounter, and enables her to transform this content by 
means of the singularity she has cultivated. Production is a moment of consumption, and 
vice versa. As the truth of artistic subjectivity is found in this detachment, contingency 
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colours its relationship to the world in (at least) two ways: the artist's autonomy and the 
autonomy of her production is founded in this detachment. It is at once utterly dependent 
on this detachment for its (non-)identity, and at the same time retains an agnostic attitude 
towards it, disavowing dependence and reifying detachment as the non-specialized 
specialism that distinguishes art in the social division of labour. Its scepticism towards 
content –  here for 'content' one might speak of constituted social reality, or 
heteronomy–  allows it to approach it as form, thus acceding to its demands without 
taking them seriously, as long as there is a possibility of continuing to reproduce oneself as 
an artistic subject within this heteronomy; on the other hand, it occludes the 
form-determination of this reality, that is, by the historically specific form of value which 
has engendered precisely these objective contents, and delivered them to the faculty of 
judgement at the core of artistic subjectivity and artistic labour.  
 
Negate Here 
However, the awareness of the untenability of this split and its call for self-negation, which 
has been expressed in the perennial theme of the artistic avant-garde as the overcoming 
of art or its dissolution into life, itself remains enclosed by the necessity of maintaining the 
split within which this agonized consciousness is sustained. The self-abolition of art as a 
programmatic vehicle for its reinvention has only very rarely continued into the call for the 
abolition of that which maintains it as art, that is, the form of value and the division 
between mental and manual labour established by capital. Thus, the expansion of art into 
life has historically tended to support the multiplication of sites for the operation of first 
artistic, then economic, value, a development which, it has been argued, eventually 
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forecloses the possibility of an artistic avant-garde as such, in common with its political 
variant.52 
 
The artist is the exemplary subject of modernity in this sense, in that she (historically the 
pronoun choice here is tendentious) grounds her identity in the awareness of its 
contingency, its constant flux and speculative ends. The historic avant-garde of modernity 
has certainly been eclipsed by the end of that modernity and its utopian horizons, wherein 
art had to be constantly revolutionized not just to advance as art, but for the sake of a 
wider idea of human progress or, on the other side of the same coin, the subversion of 
established ideals. Now this speculative subjectivity is a purely personal and socially 
homeostatic one, and the figure of the artist is simply that of a specialist of this process, 
one of a privatized radical openness, or, as discussed earlier, a manager of affect and freely 
given participatory labour. This figure is indeed related to the Romantic figure of aesthetic 
judgement we have seen, but a truncated one, lacking the deeper contingency of 
Romantic irony and its roots in the social dimension of the artist's alienation. The social 
dimension within which art functions, whether or not it confronts it with an attitude of 
'engagement' or aloofness, is not an alienated one, in which people, including the artist, 
are separated from their capacities –  the standard meaning of alienation in capitalism. It is 
one in which people are 'excluded' or 'marginalized' from a monolithic and unchangeable 
constitution of society whose rewards are inequitably distributed, in which critique 
helplessly imbibes the ethics and formulae of its targets. The 'vertigo caused by its own 
abyss' experienced by an artistic subjectivity split from social labour on the one side, and 
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internally split by contingency on the other, is now diffusely replicated in abstract socially 
(un)necessary labour restructured by a socialized capital in its own image. The form 
represented by art and the content represented by labour come to merge in the 
contingency of value systemically generalized by the restructuring of labour, with human 
capital as the homology between the value-form and an increasingly formal and empty 
subjectivity. But can we also think of this as a de-subjectivation that, paradoxically, is made 
possible through the suturing of the split of alienation by the homogenizing effects of the 
value-form on the production of subjectivity in art as it is in labour? The speculative 
subjectivity which is structurally reproduced comes to see its contingency everywhere, its 
subjective necessity –  labour, production, family, citizenship –  nowhere. Like the artist, it 
sees its primary responsibility as the refinement and further 'singularization' of this 
subjectivity as the source of its value. Like capital, it enacts a thoroughgoing negativity in 
the drive to valorise itself.   However, this 'self-valorisation' might proceed as far as the 
destruction of valorisation itself, which differentiates it from capital's own often 
self-destructive drive to valorise, since individuals enter into transformative historical 
moments with other individuals where individualizing logics no longer have the same, or 
any, relevance. In this sense, we can say that it is social relations that harbour the element 
of speculation which renders it social, that is, politics. Agamben, again, has an interesting 
reflection on this point, which loops back to my hasty correlation between the 
self-abolition of the proletariat and self-negation of the artist as the respective grounds of 
their political agency: 'I tend to think that every act emanating from the singular need of an 





As Agamben realizes, it is certainly insufficient to cancel the subject abstractly to arrive at 
an (effective) 'post-identity' politics; the shifts between de-subjectivation and 
subjectivation are at the core of political composition in time and space. In a similar 
fashion, art cannot dissolve itself in life as anything but a gesture of its own will to power so 
long as both 'art' and 'life' are organized through the form of the commodity. If 'the artist is 
the man without content, who has no other identity than a perpetual emerging out of the 
nothingness of expression and no other ground than this incomprehensible station on this 
side of himself',54 then the autonomy of this kind of subject can only seek its ground on 
'this side of himself' which is contradictory social reality. The ultimate result of such a 
nothingness entails an estrangement of the conditions of this emptiness, that is, the social 
relation of capital, rather than a withdrawal from them to a no-longer accessible aesthetic 
plenitude of the self or the dubious legitimacy of 'productive work'. Is the 'legislating 
subject' however so easy to win over to the side of a socially speculative praxis rather than 
an individual one? Adorno writes in Negative Dialectics that his project has consistently 
been to use the subject to destroy the fiction of constitutive subjectivity.55 Such a task 
seems to encapsulate the project of immanent critique, as well as to touch on the 
materialist gesture in Modernist and contemporary art of de-mystifying a medium (the 
constitutive subject being primary among the mystifications) by highlighting the technical 
and social conditions of that medium. The aesthetic subject may be an abyssal one, 
nothing but the collection of her preferences and references and thus not a 'subject' in the 
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strict, outmoded sense which implies a coherence and projectuality. But the coherence 
here may be substituted by the introjection of the 'automatic subject' of capital. The 
aesthetic subject is thus one whose hypertrophied sense of contingency remains 
circumscribed by the value-form and the parameters of abstract socially necessary labour 
as never before. These are the consequences of real subsumption for the figure that 
modernity has placed outside or at the margins of accumulation, and for whom it dictated 
an autonomy that finally proved redundant, as we will see with the Artist Placement Group 
in the next chapter. 
 
Of course, the appeal of cultural production is that it holds out the negation of all these 
parameters, i.e. through fulfilling and autonomous work on the one hand, and on the other 
the prospect of accumulation to a point where the coercion exercised by these parameters 
can be gracefully overlooked. A good illustration of this logic is the notorious 2011 gala 
benefit dinner organized by the star performance artist Marina Abramovic at the Museum 
of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, where young and attractive women performers were 
selected to be 'human table settings' for the entertainment of dinner guests. The two sides 
of this equation are represented by Marina Abramovic and the affluent collectors 
respectively, with the human table fixtures playing the mediating role of disposable living 
labour.56 
 
Here it might be interesting to turn to the category of 'judgement' as the defining gesture 
of conceptual, that is, post-Duchampian, art practice to see how it prototypes both the 
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polite rejection of all use-values, including the aesthetic, and then how a new proximity to 
use-value is achieved by the valorisation of the non-specialised specialist. For this, the 
eminent site of investigation has to be Immanuel Kant's third Critique, the Critique of 
Judgement , which is the first to make a case for indeterminacy as the core category of 
aesthetic judgement, a type of judgement that can only infer but never establish a 
'purpose' for natural or artistic phenomena. Aesthetic judgement becomes the 
representative category of human freedom, the manumission from the 'kingdom of ends' 
represented by both pure and practical reason. It is thus Kant who is the first to make a link, 
however vague and speculative, between aesthetics and social progress, which is the tenet 
that is developed by the German Romantic thinkers and philosophers who are informed 
but not satisfied by Kant's transcendental idealism. 
 
The Critique of the Power of Judgement and the Critique of the Powers of Art: Kantian 
Interlude 
Much of the analysis thus far can be elaborated on by reference to Kant. In the Critique of 
Judgment,57 Immanuel Kant sets out to find a mediation between the first critique (of pure 
reason) and the second (of practical reason) with an account of a subjective basis for the 
universality of judgement, one that departs from an aesthetic relationship to objects where 
this relationship is determined subjectively, which is to say, through taste. Without 
objective a priori necessity or an interest in the good or the pleasant, this is a situation of 
purposiveness without purpose, where a feeling of beauty or harmony derives from an 
intuition of an accord between means and ends in e.g. the beauty of a botanical or painted 
specimen of a flower, not from any knowledge based on concepts whose truth can be 
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demonstrated either scientifically or morally: 
 What is strange and different about a judgment of taste is only this: that what is to be 
 connected with the presentation of the object is not an empirical concept but a feeling of 
 pleasure (hence no concept at all), though, just as if it were a predicate connected with 
 cognition of the object, this feeling is nevertheless to be required of everyone. 
 
It follows that, since a judgment of taste involves the consciousness that all interest is kept 
out of it, it must also involve a claim to being valid for everyone, but without having a 





What is central to this kind of judgement is that it solicits, without any security in attaining, 
a general agreement on its conclusions in the very act of making it; it presupposes a sensus 
communis –  not a rational 'common sense' but a common faculty of sensibility –  which in 
principle encompasses all spectators capable of making the same sort of judgement on an 
object approached from the disinterested perspective of aesthetic pleasure. In other 
words, it presupposes a sociality, a multiplicity of perceivers, in order for the strictly 
subjective basis of an aesthetic judgement to hold. Crucially, it is not agreement in 
judgement which is posited here, but the possibility of making the judgement in the first 
place. Aesthetic judgement is offered as the best example of human freedom of the will 
because it is a judgement unconstrained by interest or the categories of the 
understanding, which is to say, it is the capacity of a harmony (or, in the case of the 
'sublime', an edifying discord) between the faculties of reason, imagination and sensibility 
that is most definitive of individual freedom as the basis for human community. It is an 
unconditioned judgement, and the capacity to make such judgements attests to at least 
the capacity if not the actuality of human freedom. As Pluhar writes: 
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But judgment's concept of nature's subjective purposiveness is especially "suitable" for 
mediating between these two realms [i.e., nature and freedom] only if no objective 
purposiveness (purposiveness with a purpose) has been based on it, i.e., only if the 
subjective purposiveness is merely subjective, a purposiveness without a purpose, and 
hence a purposiveness as judged aesthetically. [… ] the "play" in which our cognitive powers 
are when we judge subjective purposiveness aesthetically is "spontaneous"; i.e., this play is 
"active" inasmuch as it sustains itself (Ak. 313, 222, and cf. 220), and in this respect it is again 
similar to our will's freedom . . .
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Here we see that the focus on the indeterminacy of the will engaged in making aesthetic 
judgements and the emphasis on the cancellation or suspension of an interest in the 
object as the hallmark of aesthetic judgement has several consequences. First, it locates 
the freedom of the subject in relation to the object in abstraction: only by abstracting from 
corporeal desires and needs, as much as from intellectual needs for certainty or 
systematicity, can the subject be in a position to make a judgement such as 'this is 
beautiful' or 'this is hideous', thus asserting her freedom vis-a-vis the object. Whereas a 
statement of liking or disliking is a statement of interest –  of how the object affects her –  
beauty or ugliness is projected onto the object itself as a property of its own existence, 
hence the tenuous universality of aesthetic judgement: a subjective assessment which 
imputes a quality to the object as the basis of its elaboration and claims no other 
relationship to the object than the possibility of this judgement. 'Taste', then, is the 
capacity to make discerning judgements of this type, a capacity which operates in the 
abyss of contingency and neutrality created by withdrawal of interest, as Agamben 
discusses, and is thus, paradoxically, also the ground of a sociality enabled by the 
universality presumed in judgements not based in anyone's particular circumstances or 
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interests. Rather, this capacity is based on the commonality of the ability to bracket or 
suspend such interests and circumstances, to act 'as if' we were free. Without here wishing 
to engage substantively with Alfred Sohn-Rethel's crucial discussion of Kantian philosophy 
as the apotheosis of the 'exchange abstraction' in thought,60 it can be ventured that the 
account of subjectivity provided here by Kant is part of a project to authorize a 'shared 
sense' of an emerging class subjectivity, one that finds its realm of freedom in a relation to 
beautiful objects it neither seeks to possess, like the aristocracy, nor is constrained to 
produce or maintain, like the generality of artisans, labourers and servants which in Kant's 
time prefigured a working class. Freedom is dissociation from need, and community is only 
possible in the indeterminate space not dominated by need.61 
 
While the drawbacks of the stance of the 'disinterest' for a materialist aesthetics are not far 
from the surface, it is important to underline that the surface is not the exhaustion of 
contrary potentials. For Marx, historical materialism was indebted to German idealism –  to 
Hegel in particular, but on this point also Kant –  for freeing matter from the 
instrumentality it had possessed in the dualistic 'mechanical materialisms' that preceded it, 
thus setting the stage for the dialectical imbrication of matter and freedom. The role of 
'disinterest' in aesthetic judgement is a crucial site of such freedom, wherein something's 
'purpose' is located precisely in the indeterminacy or lack of direct relevance to the 
instrumental ends of the perceiving subject. If preconditions for aesthetic judgement such 
as indeterminacy, lack of purpose, and detachment from necessity are re-calibrated from a 
standpoint which queries the social organization at the affirmation of which critique has 
162 
 
too often been happy to stop, then the sensus communis can furnish a powerful 
counter-argument to the economic determinism, sociological aridity and critical 
complacency which leave their traces in a great part of the tradition of materialist 
aesthetics or 'social history of art' into the present.    
 
Kant's account of aesthetic judgement, with all its disavowals, is subversive of these 
tendencies through its central contention that art is not intended to be useful: that it is not 
based on determinate concepts and thus cannot be used to prove anything. It is 'simply' 
the possibility of a world which is organized differently and, conceivably, in opposition to 
the one that currently obtains, a moment of suspension in which that world's uses and 
priorities cease to apply. Moreover, it is capable of making such a world real to its 
producers and spectators, and placing subjectivity itself under the sign of suspension or 
erasure. This casts a light on the role of the aesthetic subject of the speculative mode of 
production who advances by ceaselessly accumulating, largely untransformed, the 
'contents' of heteronomy. Here 'constitutive subjectivity' shakes off its humanist trappings 
to fully identify with the metaphysics of displacement enacted by the automatic subject of 
value, capital, which is only ever itself. The space for judgement, for disinterest, has 
collapsed; it is now simply the space of selection. 
 
Those aspects of Kantian aesthetics that emphasized the indeterminacy and detachment 
from use peculiar to aesthetic judgement then went on to inform the Romantics who were 
expressly concerned with the social implications of the aesthetic, such as Schiller. It is also 
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the ground for Adorno's development of a dialectical notion of the autonomy of the 
aesthetic: aesthetic judgement's capacity to displace the viewer's 'constitutive subjectivity'. 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno returns again and again to a dialectical reading of Kant's third 
critique against the ostensibly more critical Hegelian philosophy of art to see if the 
structure of aesthetic judgement might have something to offer which that philosophy 
does not due to its cognitive and historicist bias:  
Paradoxically, Hegel's metaphysics of spirit results in a certain reification of spirit in the 
artwork through the fixation of its idea. In Kant, however, the ambiguity between the feeling 
of necessity and the fact that this necessity is not a given but something unresolved is truer 
to aesthetic experience than is Hegel's much more modern ambition of knowing art from 




This 'subjective constitution from without' is, as we have seen, the scene of the aesthetic 
subject. It is the contingency that unites both the artist and the viewer in the character of 
the 'man of taste' whose key claim to the aesthetic is the ability to make undetermined 
choices as a marker of their freedom. To update this depiction, we could refer to 
consumption as the emblem of much contemporary art, whether it is conducted through a 
reference to popular culture or esoteric research, and whether its thematizations are keyed 
as ironic or redemptive. 
 
As we saw earlier, Marx calls capital a 'subject' because it is self-positing, and absorbs the 
social and material conditions in which it arises as its own presuppositions. The world exists 
for capital, much as in Kant, the world exists for the subject (insofar as the subject emerges 
in the transcendental synthesis which is its relation to world). It is likewise 'automatic' 
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because it increases itself, realizes itself, as a condition of its continued existence, without 
the intervention of any other agency extraneous to it: once a capitalist mode of production 
is established, capital survives by constantly positing the conditions it needs to reproduce 
and survive as the conditions for that society to reproduce and survive: wage-labour, 
property, the commodity. When we come to examine the precepts of 'human capital', as 
we did in Chapter One, we find a subject which is modelled on the 'automatic subject' 
insofar as the 'owner' of human capital is urged to constantly augment and diversify it at 
the risk of redundancy and exclusion that a failure to compete would augur, as it would for 
its model, capital as a social expression of the rule of abstract labour and abstract value. 
Importantly, this is portrayed not as a scene of compulsion, but of liberation: flexibility, 
self-realization, choice, the development of individual skills and inclinations. Like all 
dreams of capital, its wish-fulfilment is sketched in the hues of a liberation from the very 
labour that provides it with the value it needs to survive. Here, the hatred for dependent, 
coerced labour is implanted as a decisive split in the very object of that coercion, namely 
the agent or bearer of human capital. Like the 'aesthetic subject,' the automatic subject of 
'human capital' is situated in an abyssal terrain where she is totally individualized and 
confronts an indifferent objectivity from which she may select and exploit at will for the 
goal of acquiring distinction as a self-determined commodity in the labour market.  
 
To the degree that all labour is increasingly mediated via the image of an independent and 
virtually cost-free labour pool which capital may on occasion profitably exploit, the 
aesthetic subject and the automatic subject meet on the terrain of 'human capital' whose 
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isolation and detachment is the very 'missing ground' of her productive capacity. The 
unconditioned judgement familiar from the figure of the modern artist since Duchamp –  
'it is art because I say so' –  comes from a rarefied abstraction which is self-sustaining and 
self-valorising. Not when it is a specific and discrete act of avant-garde artistic negativity, 
as e.g. Duchamp's was, in a world otherwise dedicated to mass industry and mass 
organisations, but when it becomes typical of a phase of capital which posits its 
presuppositions at the level of the subject. While with reference to the earlier discussion of 
artists as workers, it can be said that this exemplifies a world of work in which artists try but 
fail to identify with the regularity and recognition that no longer applies to this world,63 it 
should be noted at the same time that the 'proletarianisation' of artists/cultural producers 
and the aesthetic subjectivity structurally demanded of workers is equally a condition of 
changes to the regime of exploitation triggered by the financialisation of capital in recent 
decades. This is what I discussed at the start of the chapter as the thesis of real 
subsumption, and will explore further in the next category as the assumption of new 
economic forms by aesthetic judgment. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have proposed a constellation –  with pretensions to a narrative –  
between the concept of 'real subsumption' in Marxian theory, and the place of art in social 
reproduction.   I have further tried to develop what is distinctive about aesthetic 
subjectivity as it comes to represent the central character in speculation as a mode of 
production, once this latter concept has been articulated with 'real subsumption' as the 
re-shaping by capital of the processes of social reproduction as well as production and 
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consequently the role art is called upon to play. Art as a form of 'speculative labour' comes 
both to serve as the model for all kinds of work while providing a distinctive and desirable 
prototype of liberated –  non-capitalist –  labour which can either be antagonistic or 
conciliatory, two kinds of social outcomes whose premises are not determined by the 
concept of art itself but precisely by what 'role it is called upon to play'. The 'politics' of 
speculative labour, then, inhere both in this and in the detachment of art from use-value 
and useful labour, which can only be attained in their capitalist modalities to the same 
degree that art and labour can only be irreconcilable in capital, however 'speculative' this 
capital may become in its operations. 
 
We now need to examine Thierry de Duve's concept of the 'whatever' as the key 
performative condition for the statement 'this is art' after the readymade, as it displaces 
the category of aesthetic judgment irremediably from the relationship between object and 
viewer to the subject of the artist and her capacity to select and name. This can be 
perceived as a 'managerial' turn in artistic production, as the engineering of social activity 
and the combination of objects for the enhancement of their capacity to produce 
(aesthetic) value becomes the key characteristic of the type of social labour that is still 
distinguishable and commodifiable as art. I then follow this trajectory of 'management' 
and 'performance' as the concrete modes whereby the speculative mode of production 
transforms the conditions for contemporary art and labour by looking at several art 
practices –  especially the Artist Placement Group –  and situating them in this trajectory. 
APG embodies the contradictions of Romantic subjectivity as both empty and intensively 
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specialised ('taste') as discussed by Agamben. This is then the nexus of 
artistic-labour-as-subjectivity initiated by Duchamp, and standardized in the figure of the 
artist as the emblem for a type of labour which is no longer distinguishable from the 
valorisation of capital, that is, speculative labour, or, human capital. Further, a discussion of 
this emblematic historical (late 1960s to early 1980s) practice, which historically indexes the 
perturbations of 'post-Fordism' for art and labour in the West opens out into the aporias of 
post-Kantian and Romantic aesthetics briefly signalled in this chapter. A more extensive 
engagement with those aporias requires an excursion on the utopian role of aesthetics in 
social transformation proposed by Friedrich Schiller, taken in a more technocratic key by 
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Autonomy, Judgement, and Putting the Speculative to Work 
Introduction 
This thesis has been developing a theory of how speculation as a mode of production revises 
the relations between art and labour. I have used a historical and analytical approach to the 
production of subjectivity in art and labour on the one hand, and to discuss the modifications 
to the logic of capitalist valorisation itself as it skews towards the speculative, contingent and 
reproductive. These two strands of the inquiry connect in a look at the consequences these 
developments have for the specific mediations which articulate the differences and, 
increasingly, the parallels between the social forms of artistic (non-) labour and abstract 
labour. 
 
The last chapter demonstrated how art emulates speculative labour, and the paradoxes and 
potentials of its autonomy from capitalist subsumption as the logics of labour and 
management infiltrate its productive processes and conceptual idioms. To say that it 
'emulates' labour is to say that on the one hand art casts labour out, as its most intimate 
outside, in order to emulate it as a sign of its attentiveness to its own material conditions or 
the limits to its propositional character. This can happen either through the representation of 
and reference to labour in artworks, or through the deliberate blurring of what constitutes 
artistic labour and what abstract labour in performative, 'social' or 'invisible' practices. On the 
other, art production itself both prototypes and reflects the defining aspects of contemporary 
labour as a speculative form: mystified or attenuated wage relations, a disavowal of work in 
favour of management (curation, selection), the notion of reproduction (and production) as 
(self-)investment, and ecological rather than antagonistic (class-based) understandings of 
social relations. Again, what I am interested in is not so much a critique of the ideological 
parameters that generate the artist and the entrepreneur as the model social subjects 
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benignly mediating an entirely individuated, risk-based and crisis-ridden capital relation. The 
basis, as well as terminus, of such a critique must surely amount to no more than a diagnosis 
of the corrosive effect of intensified abstraction as ever more native to the 'free labour' of the 
artist as it is to the alienated factory or service worker. We should be cautious about the 
conceptual efficacy of 'alienation' for deriving a politics from social abstraction. My focus is 
instead on how speculation as a mode of production reveals the collapsed mediation 
between capital and labour in its fullest negativity in the figure of the artist. This figure's 
alienation from labour becomes the apotheosis of labour once abstract labour becomes as 
contingent, haphazard and socially 'unnecessary' as artistic labour. This is even more 
dramatically the case once both are subsumed into the valorisation model of human capital. 
Human capital then comes merely to denote the humanization of the 'automatic subject' of 
value. 
 
Building on these arguments, this chapter will further develop a genealogy of indeterminacy 
or, in Thierry de Duve's terms, the 'whatever' as the link between current expressions of artistic 
labour and the social form of abstract labour as it appears today. We have now ascertained 
this via two main axes: by reviewing Giorgio Agamben's discussion of Hegelian aesthetics to 
bring to light his concept of the 'groundless ground' of the modern aesthetic subject, and 
then with an exegesis on Kant's concept of aesthetic judgement. We now need to explore 
how the autonomy of the aesthetic comes to be determined by reference to the artist as a 
professional of 'indeterminacy', rather than the alienated aesthetic subject 'without content' 
of Agamben or Kant's positioning of aesthetics at the base of a sensus communis. To set up 
this inquiry, I would like to explore to Thierry de Duve's analysis of indeterminacy and 
judgement with respect to Marcel Duchamp's founding gesture for contemporary art, the 
readymade. My reason for taking this particular route is to use the indeterminacy of aesthetic 
178 
 
judgement to flesh out the dialectics of autonomy and heteronomy within speculation – to 
show how the 'automatic subject' of capital is determined not just by the negativity of labour 
which it constantly seeks to absorb and deny, but by its own intrinsic void which can be 
inflected in emancipatory ways: not-capital, not-labour, not-art. Speculative praxis, in other 
words, but a speculative praxis which can only be elaborated, and lived, by means of the 
determinate negation of what it already is: value-in-process, speculation as a mode of 
production. This antagonistic potential, however, is constantly enmeshed in the temptation to 
professionalize the special dispensation this affords the artist in capitalist society. This 
chapter's close case study of the Artist Placement Group is intended to act as an illustration of 
this very predicament in a historical moment just prior to the advance of 'human capital' as 
the new rubric for labour, and just after the demise of the 'autonomous artist' as a viable 
oppositional figure in cultural politics. The previous chapter's analysis of 'taste' in Kant and in 
Agamben's text has prepared the way for how aesthetic subjectivity can be mobilized as a 
force for triggering innovation for capital as part of a universalist avant-garde project in which 
the visionary artist acts as the 'conceptual engineer'. 'Taste' becomes the shorthand for how 
the indeterminacy of aesthetic subjectivity functions to guarantee its sovereignty in 
relationship to the 'prosaic objectivity' of the socio-economic merely given. 
 
In what follows, I will trace the implications of this notion of 'taste' for modern and 
contemporary art inasmuch as it presents a key for the production of subjectivity in the 
speculative mode. This will be done by means of a reading of Thierry de Duve's Kantian and 
nominalist account of art in Kant After Duchamp, and chiefly through his contention that 
aesthetic judgement is the bedrock of not just judgements of taste in nature or art, but is the 
ground for how something is to be defined as art – and someone to be defined as an artist – 
in the first place. First, it might be useful to make a short preliminary analysis of the historical 
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conditions for art and labour to converge on the semiotic, social and institutional field of the 
'whatever'. 
 
The Name of Art  
The thesis of 'de-materialization' often accompanies historical accounts of contemporary art 
that strive to link 'post-Fordist' labour to the rise of art that finds its 'purposeless purpose' in 
concept and context rather than matter (however this matter might be liberated from 
instrumentality, as it is in Kantian aesthetics).1 This is decisive for understanding how the 
'groundless ground' of aesthetic subjectivity is 'put to work' in affirming speculative modes of 
accumulation as socially normative and desirable.  
 
If we follow a number of contemporary commentaries which attempt to place transfor-
mations in the conceptual and productive infrastructures of art along a trajectory of 
economic and social change, then the axis where this change has been often situated is that 
of language. Just as the methods of value extraction became more oriented towards the 
semiotic and analytical, with labour process and rewards increasingly skewed toward the 
managerial and rent-seeking as a result, so did art become increasingly self-referential and 
linguistic, the proposal of a framework in which anything may appear as art rather than the 
creation of discrete, expressive objects. Conceptual art is the first to disclose the object 
character of language and, conversely, the linguistic character of objects in space with its use 
of seriality, documentation and collection to structure an experience of art, rather than an 
experience of a specific art object. 
 
We can say here, provisionally, that inasmuch as for Kant, the exercise of taste establishes a 
possibility of universality in the sensus communis of undetermined reflective judgement, this 
universal horizon is in turn made possible by the shared medium of language. This possibility 
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is what Agamben calls 'communicability as such', a communication undetermined by 
concepts or ends.2 Thus the more art comes to rely on the structure and practice of the 
linguistic, the more it becomes meta-linguistic, about the possibility of communication as a 
utopian rather than universal horizon in a world determined by technocratic, specialized and 
often incommensurable 'applied languages'. When communication itself becomes a capital 
good, with art works and practices included in that, then the question of communicability 
takes centre stage. While we can say that this is when the linguistic becomes pervaded with 
the affective and the somatic, this is equally the case for labour and production, tempering 
the emancipatory valence this broadening would seem to invoke. It may be a commonplace 
that 'affective labour' is now required from the most menial to the most elite positions in the 
labour market; however, as we saw in Chapter Two with the discussion of Pilvi Takala's work, 
this opens the door to the performance of labour as the readiness to work rather than any act 
of 'concrete labour'. Such an equivocal space – of embedded exploitation and its invisible 
refusals – can be seen as the negativity that traverses labour and art alike as realms where 
performance has eclipsed production, or, rather, the production of performances is strictly 
coeval with the production of abstract value. 
 
Such an expanded notion of the linguistic, which must include the 'attunements' and 'moods' 
of variable capital, but also, as we saw elsewhere in the second chapter, the recursive 
movements of algorithmic financial trades, becomes key to understanding this kind of 
production. A local instance, pertinent for the discussion of performance but also of 
judgement, as we will see later, is the priority of self-reflexivity, discourse or the linguistic in 
general as the key apparatus for art production, as cultural critic Lianne Ngai underlines as 
'the increasing convergence between art and discourse overall': 
 Art's identification with critical or theoretical discourse about art, in particular, seems to have 
 become one of the most important problems informing the making, dissemination, and 
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 reception of art in our time—as important, perhaps, as the loss of the antithesis between the 
 work of art and the commodity.
3 
 
This 'identification' with criticism – and critique – for art as an important parameter of its 
production does not only signal a rapprochement between art and the commodity, of course. 
If anything, the motivation for art's identification with discourse about art and the drive for 
self-reflexivity this signified was a refusal of the commodity, on par with the social and 
political radicalisms of the Conceptual art era. It was seen both as a re-assertion of autonomy 
of the aesthetic vis-a-vis the decorative and the hermetic qualities of object-based art whose 
natural home was the art market, and a refusal of the kind of autonomy such objects were 
purported to exemplify. 'Heteronomy' was welcomed, as long as it remained on the 
autonomous terms of art. Art became the transitive discipline able to emulate and 
incorporate all others, and its specific critique was articulated in the rupture of genres and 
properties where the aesthetic was to be cited, as Rancière writes.4 Correspondingly, it can be 
said that 'human capital' labour and the (financial) commodity have become self-critical in the 
same way, when their character is to overflow their boundaries by self-actualizing in ever 
more transient, blurred and unpredictable ways. 
 
Of course, 'de-materialization' did not for long remain a bulwark against art's ontological or 
economic valuation. Art and economic production now do converge on the value of the 
linguistic and affective – in its circulation, its means and its formal preoccupations. However, 
art still attempts to throw up a fragile critical barrier on the grounds of its own possibility, that 
is, what makes it art and not other kinds of labour and production – the indeterminacy of 
concept, communicability as such. Even Conceptual artists, while prioritizing the linguistic and 





While this can engender trivial, idealist or simply insular consequences for art practice – and 
the retention of art or the aesthetic as placeholder category for non-antagonistic social 
change will be examined more fully in the next section – here I would just like to stay with the 
abstraction of this position (that art's purpose is to be without any) to see if we can use it to 
ground a negativity towards the existent rather than the benign transvaluation of it 
guaranteed to all equally in their capacity to make non-conceptual judgements of taste. Such 
an attempt should not fail to take cognizance of the tendency of a negation rooted in the 
aesthetic to content itself with valorising alienation, and lending a positive moral weight to 
marginality. This Romantic-era tendency is not only pervasive in cultural but also in political 
radicalism.6 However, the relationship of negation and abstraction to judgement needs to be 
spelled out more fully here.  
 
To Be Done With the Judgement of Art 
In Kant After Duchamp, Thierry de Duve is concerned to show how the judgement 'this is art', 
as first instantiated by Marcel Duchamp's ready-mades, creates a sort of negative universality 
for the act of being an artist. Far from the Utopian concept of universal creativity championed 
by the Romantics and their latter-day epigones such as Joseph Beuys, this is a universal anti-
creativity. It is enough to call something art for it to be so, a purely procedural act of naming. 
Given that the relevant institutional and economic apparatus is in place for this act of 
valuation to be performed successfully7 – i.e. that there is such a referent as 'art' to begin with, 
which we will take as given for the purposes of the argument, what is the status of such a 
judgement in the age of art's tendential real subsumption? This is to say, do the conditions for 
this judgement change when it is far from self-evident what the judgement 'this is art' refers 
to – not because art is produced in industrial quantities for the market, or at least not 
primarily, but because the 'absolute commodity' of art has been discovered to have very 
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definite use-values? It is a linguistic act which is not just social in the formality of its (relative) 
autonomy, inasmuch as its critical potential is premised on this autonomy. In recent decades, 
art has also been demonstrated to have many social implications and applications, for 
governance, social services and urban redevelopment, to name a few realms where art – 
socially engaged and not – has been applied, sometimes as part of a broader program to 
change the economic and class composition of an urban area to a more 'creative' one. 
Concomitantly, the 'aesthetic character' has become the functional prototype for labour in 
general, even if we take that only as the flimsiest of veneers for unregulated exploitation or 
the imposition of self-regulated work – it is the subjective autonomy indissociable from the 
concept of the artist which is important. Kant's universality of aesthetic judgement finds its 
modern correlate in the universal capacity of creativity which aligns the labouring subject with 
the automatic subject of capital. 
 
For de Duve, however, the emptiness and formality of the judgement 'this is art' is what lends 
it an emancipatory dimension exclusive of context or content. Perhaps like Marx, who saw a 
progressive historical side to capital's power of accelerating social abstraction, it is the 
formality or regulative rather than substantial nature of Kant's idea of aesthetic judgement 
and Duchamp's gesture of selection which definitively frees art from the mystifications of 
cultic or individual transcendence and allows it to become an anonymous, commonplace, 
popular faculty: to make art by naming it.8 For him, it is nothing but this which furnishes the 
justification for all historical artistic avant-gardes, the anti-hierarchical impulse to locate the 
possibility of social change in the common access to taste or 'genius'. There is here then an 
attempt to flesh out a concept of social plasticity that infuses all these aesthetics-led 
iterations of revolution. The argument seems a bit inadequate, if its extent is merely to 
demonstrate that if anything can be art, then anyone can be an artist. But we shouldn't 
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assume that de Duve's intention is to give a firm basis to the imbrication of art with social 
praxis. This is more in the character of a byproduct, which is perhaps why it isn't that 
convincing. He is ultimately interested in what conditions obtain for something to be 
identified as art when the concept of art has no determinacy whatever, thus no extrapolation 
from art to e.g. politics can ever have determinate content either: 
 So, creativity is no longer a Utopian program in the form of a maxim, or a mythic belief in the 
 form of a presupposition [ …] It not only boxes the thing into the over-determined double bind 
 of having to be at once something and anything whatever […] it also abandons the thing to its 
 absolute impossibility of being determined as undetermined, that is, to its impossibility of 
 conforming to the law or the necessity of a universal whatever. And it's precisely thanks to this 
 abandonment that the readymade—and not the ready-mades—conforms to the universal of 
 this impossibility. In other terms, that the phrase "this is art," as it can be applied to anything, 




Here, de Duve signals the ontological quandary of art since the ready-made: it assumes a 
double character with respect to the commodity – it is both itself – an art object that is a 
special kind of commodity - and it is any commodity, a universality of values. The reason it can 
have this double character is that the imprimatur of art has migrated from the object to the 
subject. The artist produces objects or services like any other worker – but her labour-power is 
not the commodity since the works and services she produces are 'useless' in the sense I've 
alluded to previously.10 It is the artist herself who is the commodity through her authorship, 
through the particular kind of subjectivity she claims as an artist that endows her with the 
power to control the conditions of her labour and the choice of what she produces. Or, better, 
it is the indeterminacy and freedom of her working conditions that identify her as an artist 
and thus lend commodity value to what she produces, though these 'absolute commodities' 
may not have an iota of use-value.  
 
Apart from setting out these conditions of indeterminacy, the abstraction that de Duve calls 
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the 'whatever' in actuality need not follow the Kantian regulative idea of the emancipatory 
anonymity of the shared judgement of art. It can just as easily be folded back into the 
heteronomous law of the market: 'What this law tells artists to do can only go in the direction 
of its own enforcement. It enriches some, it crushes many, it frees no one.[...] Painting, which 
sells best these days if it is figurative, has never been so abstract; it has the abstract quality of 
money.'11 Additionally, the double bind of the artwork that is at once forced to be something 
and must be whatever can be placed in conjunction with the double character of labour in 
capital as concrete and abstract, or of value, which contains use-value and exchange value. In 
all three cases, there is an asymmetrical reciprocity, or, better, a dependence of the former 
term on the latter, even as the latter is largely mediated by the former. An artwork or practice 
can only be 'something' on the precondition that it is institutionally and critically articulated 
within the absolute 'whatever', that is, the qualified, but then limitless, conditionality of 
appearing in the field of art, regardless of its 'origin' (this is the crux of the readymade as an 
irreducible gesture shaping all that comes after). Similarly, concrete labour is mediated 
through the social institution of abstract labour – the exchange of 'whatever' kind of labour-
power for a wage, and the access to use-values is rigorously dictated by access to means of 
exchange in the market. However, we can see that the latter term is socialized through the 
former in each case: the 'whatever' of art takes specific (indeed context- and site-specific) 
forms, abstract labour must be embodied in concrete acts of labour which are performed with 
specific skills and in specific forms of exploitation, the dominance of exchange-value is 
legitimated through its (incidental) mediation through use-values.  
 
Counter-Artistic Production 
Here I am guided by Marx's understanding of advancing 'real abstraction' as breeding 
contradictions which undermine the rule of capital, which is to say the importance of social 
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abstraction and mediation in estranging nature and tradition: a salutary negativity which 
evacuates and sublates established social forms. We can recall the discussion in Chapter One 
of Moishe Postone's examination of abstract labour as a social form and Chapter Two's 
discussion of labour as 'not-value' through the optic of Christopher Arthur's The New 
Dialectic. What I would like to keep in mind from those discussions in order to more clearly 
situate what follows is that the first prevents us from thinking of labour as a positive quantity 
to be liberated from the capital relation and allows us to see it as one pole of this relation: 
use-value for capital; the second guards us from overlooking that this dialectic is internal to 
the existence, and experience, of labour itself as the negative other to value (which is why 
'human capital' must erase labour). Art can then be put into several, and seemingly 
paradoxical, lights as a mediator of or even just an 'other' to labour and value. On the one 
hand, it expels and absorbs labour just as capital does, subsisting on an image of free 
unconditioned creativity.12 On the other, the dialectics of autonomy and heteronomy are 
inherent to the social character of art itself, and it is thoroughly structured by the negativity of 
the labour it would put at a distance, even as changes in the capital relation cast them in the 
same speculative mould. The labour politics of art are then in a crucial sense impossible: as 
John Roberts writes, art may align itself with 'social technique' as a condition of its own critical 
reflexivity, yet its ability to make this gesture remains bound to the differentiation from it. 
Concomitantly, we need to perceive Arthur's point about labour being 'not-value' in a further, 
and a resonant sense. Arthur thinks that labour is (at least in one sense) 'not-value', while 
human capital argues that labour is not labour. On the surface these two arguments are 
essentially and even diagrammatically opposed to one another, but they do both also imply 
that it is essential to capital that labour exist as more than what it is, albeit in radically 
different modes. The status and the tenor of that more than is emphatically an aesthetic 
problem and is interesting for that reason. And, finally, Postone's positing of abstract labour 
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as social form (with the typical Frankfurt School articulation of social form as domination) 
enables us to develop a concept of how art as abstract labour can act as a suggestive analogy 
that discloses the role the social form of art plays in processes of real subsumption without 
supporting the claim that art production itself is really (or even formally) subsumed. This is 
important to keep in mind if we want to hold on to a dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy 
which engenders the negativity of art in relation not just to use-values and to labour, but to 
the social existence of art itself as a separate instance, that is, to the conditions of its 
problematic autonomy.13 
 
The notion of the 'readymade artist' proposed by Claire Fontaine registers a situation where 
art and labour come together on the terrain of neither any longer having an 'object'. The 
contradictions of the form of value that both dominate them and keep them apart in the era 
of de Duve's 'whatever' thus gain a new, if not politically unambiguous, salience. The 
'readymade artist' can then acquire a hopeful coding, since it portrays the figure of an artist 
who can no longer believe in her status as an exceptional or privileged kind of non-worker, 
but one who can recognize her exploitation by capital as a precondition of her existence 
regardless of what she does. Her 'refusal of work' can then very easily become generalized to 
the 'human strike' that refuses on a transindividual and affective level, and whose terrain is the 
whole of social reproduction not any particular labour relation. Fontaine has said in a recent 
interview: 
 Refusal to work is a part of human strike, but the more important aspect of the strike is the 
 wider refusal of certain human relationships and social dynamics. Human strike is open to 
 subjects that actually do not work, whose work is not recognized as a professional activity, who 
 are unemployed or precarious and therefore cannot organize themselves against some specific 




With relevance to the earlier discussion of the relationship between art and reproduction, 
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Fontaine historically locates the 'human strike' in the rupture introduced by feminism in the 
Italian workers' and autonomist movement of the 1970s. It seems like a combative way of re-
thinking the trope of the 'personal is political', of visibility and invisibility as the parameters of 
social contestation, a minoritarian politics which ungrounded the originary silences of the 
movement. It seems then as if the notion of 'human capital' was invented precisely to 
neutralize the possibility of 'human strike', thus not merely effacing the antagonism between 
labour and capital by ideologically folding labour back into capital but also to silence all the 
figures of agitation and refusal unfolding precisely away from the workplace, struggles which 
sought to dissociate the existence of the 'human' from the survival of 'capital'.15 On the other 
hand, the 'readymade artist' may be viewed less hopefully as the sovereign individual of the 
whatever, consolidating her social power as an artist as a manager and exploiter of 'indifferent 
contents', acquiring power as a competitive subject among objects. On this point, Andrea 
Fraser has written that '[t]he institutionalization of Duchamp's negation of artistic 
competence with the readymade transformed that negation into a supreme affirmation of the 
omnipotence of the artistic gaze and its limitless incorporative power. It opened the way for 
the artistic conceptualization – and commodification – of everything.'16 
 
Whatever Indicator 
As hinted in previous chapters, a figure which may be able to help us think further through 
this field of 'whatever' is 'performance'. Contemporary post-workerist theorists, art historians, 
labour-process analysts, critical management scholars and sociologists have contributed to 
the discourse of contemporary labour as essentially 'performative', which is to say, formal and 
empty of determinate content, more a series of dispositions, adaptations, and generic skills. 
As noted in this and in previous chapters, this can be understood as a potentiality or a 
readiness to labour, a production of subjectivity, which must be solicited and managed, in all 
its idiosyncrasy and contingency, if the value it may produce is to be captured. This gives us a 
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view of artistic practices and contemporary regimes of labour as united by their common 
attunement to contingency or the 'whatever' that the generic capacity to work or make art 
has established. In the terms I've been deriving from de Duve and from Kant, the 
performativity of art as art if the conditions of the generic judgement 'this is art' are fulfilled 
and the performativity of labour as labour under the generic conditions of 'human capital' (in 
other words, whether speculatively or immediately paid) both seem to rest on the abstraction 
of a measure that nevertheless remains ruthlessly operative. In the previous chapter, we 
encountered the accumulation of contingency in derivatives markets as exemplary for the 
behaviour of capital as it becomes more concretely ubiquitous while technically more 
'abstract' by seeking to directly valorise time and its own recursive motions in that time. 
Randy Martin speaks of this direct valorisation of time as the efficient cause for the 
proliferation of measures of performance; since in the derivative trade, prices have to be set 
for heterogeneous processes in the present for what they will be worth in the future, the 
future becomes 'actionable' in the present. Performance of assets has to be established into 
the future in order to determine their present values, and this requires a proliferation of ever 
more finely calibrated and standardized instruments of measure.17 So while this can be seen 
as a 'foreclosure' of the future, it can also be seen in reverse, a convergence of the present and 
the future through the speculative encounters of risk and value whose performances escalate 
in entropy at the same rate as metrics are put forward to measure them. 
 
The prevalence of 'general performance18 is then a generic form of judgement as 
management , shaping and demarcating art and labour, a way to control and shape 
contingency so as to capture its value. The entrance of '(do) whatever' with the readymade as 
the categorial arbiter of art production registers in the field of labour as the imprint of 
management acting to hollow out, de-skill and 'formalize' all kinds of concrete labour as 
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varieties of 'performance' judged by metrics arbitrarily and recursively set within the field, as 
is the case for art. Both can then be determined as modes of managing time and attention in 
a production regime which has developed to a stage where the 'production for production's 
sake' characteristic of capital accumulation takes on the mercurial and micrological forms of 
value extraction and social control elsewhere termed 'biopolitical' and which I will here term 
'performance', after its central evaluative category. 'Performance' is then, I suggest, the core 
subjective experience – and objective measure - of real subsumption in the field of art and in 
the arena of labour. It embodies its emptiness and formality as a code of management, a code 
of conduct of conducts, providing a common ground for how they converge, diverge and 
politically inflect one another in times of dwindling security and increased material and 
affective conflict for their respective conditions of reproduction.  
 
Building on the discussion in Chapter Two, and the connection between abstract labour and 
performance sketched out there, Kant and de Duve's anatomization of aesthetic 'judgement' 
might help us clarify some of those issues. This would be chiefly with regard to how the 
'generic' can be seen as not just an evacuation of content from both art and labour, but its 
positive condition for coming into visibility; for being performed and recognized in a shared 
social space. For Kant and de Duve, the rubric of judgement explains not only the actualizing 
condition for art (and, for de Duve, specifically the condition for art after Duchamp made the 
irrevocable gesture of naming and selecting as the ground zero for art to appear as art), but 
the social conditions of its reception, and, in fact, its potential sociality; the undetermined as 
the ground for both a distinct realm of the aesthetic and the possibility of human freedom. 
However, if this account is taken as part of the infrastructure of the division of social labour, 
then we see the production of a specific class subjectivity for aesthetic judgement and a need 
for the existence of commodified abstract labour for the self-realization of the automatic 
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subject of capital which art and labour both in their ways are bound to emulate. The generic 
here is both the ground for the possibility of community and freedom that art is supposed to 
model, and the formal logic of performance for the automatic subject. The question would 
then be whether this generic-ness can harbour a potential for negativity that emerges 
precisely when art tries to practically appropriate the negativity of labour as part of its own 
conditions of production, as part of the under-determination that distinguishes its own 
artistic negativity vis-a-vis capital from the kind that is harboured by labour. The key mode for 
this to happen, as we shall see in the section on APG, is through the kind of labour whose 
degree of abstraction and 'whatever' has the most proximity to art's own self-concept: 
management. 
 
In the thesis so far, we have seen how art, as a mediated social form and itself a social 
mediation, can be compared to abstract labour as well as money in its capacity to socialize 
and subjectify the valorisation processes of capital as innovation or creativity. When we speak 
about art as abstract labour, and how the blurring between art and abstract labour that is 
already occurring can re-define or renew the critical potential of art as a social practice, we are 
not affirming that art is 'like' abstract labour because it produces value, that it is one social 
practice on a continuum of immanently productive and self-valorizing living labour trapped in 
the extraneous domination of capital and the state. Nor are we saying that art is a subsumed 
labour process, differentiated from other labours only by its precarious and mystified 
remuneration structure – in which case it would hardly be different from an increasing 
proportion of waged labour nor the entrepreneurship which is propagated as that waged-
labour's ideal and ethical form. 
 
Importantly, we are not especially interested in analysing the concrete presence of abstract 
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labour within artworks or in their realization, whether this is empirically, as we saw in the last 
chapter with the brief discussion of large-scale fabrication and employment of specialized 
personnel answering to management, or structurally, insofar as artworks are commodities. 
Abstract labour inheres in all commodities by virtue of them being values and having the 
form of value; increasingly artworks and art gestures are compounds of many different 
material and social processes, so it's clear that art commodities contain definite quantities of 
abstract labour, even if we're only looking at commercially manufactured components such as 
paint or cameras. Yet, art itself is not considered abstract labour, and to the extent that this 
remains predominantly the case – the extent to which art is practised and assessed as a kind 
of exceptional 'free activity' in all the equivocal senses of both terms – the commodity status 
of its products and its subjects is guaranteed by that exceptional status. It is in this sense that 
we discuss art in terms of abstract labour, that it indexes and develops models of real social 
abstraction as aspects of free self-creation, advancing a representative mode of how labour is 
mediated and imposed in the speculative mode of production. It is a template for speculative 
labour if speculative labour can be considered the hegemonic form of abstract labour in the 
present, an ever-ramifying tendency.  
 
This can of course, and should be, connected to the debt-financed character of capital's 
reproduction today, which authorizes the decimation of a similarly debt-financed social 
reproduction as an investment strategy and the necessary de-valuation of labour-power. So 
when we speak about abstract labour in the speculative mode of production (or, more 
precisely, the speculative phase of the capitalist mode of production), we are speaking of an 
increasingly reflexive and unmediated regime of production for value, where value rises and 
falls are experienced immediately, personally, and ruinously, where value is experienced not 
just in the determination of the labour market but in all life. It is important to emphasize – if 
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not delve into – the dimension of 'experience' since (exchange) value has always determined 
production and the reproduction of life, inasmuch as it is actually or potentially labour-power, 
in capitalist economies. Yet it is in the speculative phase that 'the economy' saturates the 
sphere of reproduction and exposes it to oscillations in market value in a qualitatively 
different way. Here we could perhaps think of theorist Michael Denning's concept of 
'wageless life' as the ancient and now re-surfaced proletarian condition par excellence. The 
proletarian is one who is separated from her means of reproduction, exposing the priority of 
the condition of unemployment to that of waged work as the true universality of non-owners 
of capital in a capitalist society.19 
 
Bringing this discussion back to art, however, we need to see how this separation from the 
means of reproduction, and the speculative subjectivity this condition implants, is prototyped 
and popularized as an emancipatory one - as well as a negative and oppositional one – by the 
subject of artistic labour from the Romantic era onwards, as I started to outline in the previous 
chapter. The subject of artistic labour was, and predominantly remains, a subject defined as 
against, or apart from, the relations of domination and instrumentality integral to capitalist 
work. In a speculative mode of production, the artist is concurrently a self-determined subject 
and an automatic subject, speculating on the saleability of her assets as creative products 
with no immediate use-value (unlike, for example, other creative products such as design). 
Like the automatic subject of capital, she is an empty subject of whom principally any act can 
be predicated as art, given the social and economic grammar that establishes art. Recalling 
Marx's discussion of the automatic subject in Volume One from the last chapter, we can 
append to this the passage in Volume Two where he writes about the 'different forms that the 
same capital value, once advanced, successively assumes and discards throughout its 
curriculum vitae.'20 Capital as a subject with predicates, a subject that remains consistent 
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through all the accidents of its biography. It remains the same through all its metamorphoses; 
predicates only accrue to it on the basis of this consistency. Yet this is also a suggestive 
analogy with the mutable but self-valorising subject of human capital, who, as we saw in the 
first chapter with Michel Feher, can be understood as a subject who is both speculator and 
asset in one entity. 
 
Reproductive Potentiality 
To further this argument we must return to the question of art as reproduction. The 
reproduction of the automatic subject of art and the automatic subject of human capital are 
both ways of socializing the automatic subject of capital. Each produces nothing but the 
reproduction of the subject, and in this, the reproduction of the entire system of valorisation. 
The art critic Kerstin Stakemeier has written cogently on this topic, proposing that once the 
question of medium is no longer central for art and the artist doesn't produce objects or 
works, what she does produce is simply herself as an artist, thereby reproducing the whole art 
system or institution of art. This is 'the further step in the argument of art as automatic 
subject, that it must expand to survive and constantly reproduce its presuppositions.'21 This 
then is reflected in the reproduction of the worker of herself as capital in the speculative 
mode of production, reproducing the entirety of capital as the presupposition of her own 
existence. Capital as automatic subject reproduces its presuppositions now also subjectively, 
in living labour power itself, cancelling both alienation and antagonism, as Jason Smith 
notes.22 The subjectivation of the artist acquires a logical consistency within the speculative 
mode of production, reproducing its presuppositions while retaining the affect of exemption 
from them. This allows us to understand this relationship as not a derivative one – art follows 
the mandates of speculation – but more symbiotic, as the speculative as a mode emerges in 
and through art's antagonistic role to the rest of social production. Even as it has expanded 
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beyond art, it continues to carry a different potential in art, which is how the affect of 
autonomy can still be maintained. The subject and object of labour in artistic production are 
hard to separate, which is both the ground of the homology between the artistic subject and 
the automatic subject, and the root of their variance. 
 
It has likewise been argued that the form labour takes nowadays, in the increasingly dominant 
service sector, but normatively in every workplace, is premised on the erosion of the division 
between self and product, subject and object, as Diedrich Diederichsen has written recently: 
 the worker has been transformed into the product itself. The latter is now human, alive, 
 biological, sexual, and emotional. The worker is the object of her own subjective labour, which is 
 nothing but her self, which is nothing but a product.23  
 
Recalling the discussion of Tino Seghal at the end of Chapter Two, we can add here that the 
performance of the participants in These associations (2012) rests on the elision between the 
conditions of labour and the authentic personhood of the performer as it is relayed in the 
conversations with visitors to the piece. This problematic elision is structured in such a way 
that one can only be foregrounded at the expense of the other – drawing attention to the 
conditions of labour transpires in the dialogic situation as a disregard of the authentic self-
narration of the performer, while a focus on the latter dismisses the situation of the encounter 
and everything that subtends it. It thus replicates precisely the imperative to perform 
subjectivity in many types of service work, where questioning the conditions of labour 
becomes a painful reflection on the very conditions of production of the self. 
 
Here we would have to remember, as we saw in Chapter One's consideration of Michel Feher's 
empowering account of human capital, that the obstacle in the way of human capital's self-
determination is the same inseparability between bearer and commodity that obtains for the 
subject understood in terms of labour-power. The proletarian has nothing to bring to the 
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market but her capacity to labour, but this labour-power cannot be abstracted from her and 
used separately from her own survival as its bearer – this is why the reproduction of capital 
has to, at some level, assume the reproduction of labour, whether or not capital pays for it. 
Just so, capital cannot be separated from and productively invested by its owner if she, 
essentially, still has nothing but her labour-power to sell. Her existence may be speculative, 
just as the purchase of her labour-power by capital is speculative (the capacity may be 
bought, but may not be realized), but she cannot alienate her capital to watch it appreciate in 
her absence as all owners of capital in its usual sense can. Capital is dead labour, so human 
capital is an oxymoron.  
 
The commodity of labour-power can then be seen to be peculiar, as Marx calls it, in two 
senses: it produces more value than it consumes, and though it is sold by its owner, the owner 
retains her rights over its disposal after it is sold. The reason that it can be sold yet still remain 
with the seller is that this commodity is a capacity.24  For Paolo Virno, the fact that all sale of 
labour-power is in this sense speculative opens a space of politics or antagonism in the dual 
structure of ownership of labour-power. For him, the fact that the capacity is the commodity, 
rather than specific goods and services, particularly in the forms of 'communicative' labour 
most strongly evincing the product/subject blur alluded to above, means that there is a 
subjective moment for labour before or within its incorporation into capital in the labour 
process where this capacity is realized. This echoes Christopher Arthur's 'counterproduction', 
although he would place this in a Hegelian register of negativity apropos the self-valorising 
automatic subject of capital, whereas Virno views this subjective moment of labour-power as 
the difference between life and value which biopolitics strives to collapse and harness, and 
the bearers of this capacity strive to expand. This accords with the operaist and post-operaist 
tenet that the production process is the stage where the primacy of labour as a subject of 
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refusal is internalized by capital as the negativity that drives its own development (technical 
composition) and it is the workers' ability to organize politically (political composition) which 
can realize that autonomy and negativity. However, the point to be emphasised here is that 
the capital-labour relation is pervaded by abstraction in (at least) two ways: one, through the 
general form of abstract socially necessary labour, but also the very conditions of purchase 
and sale are built around a commodity that is only potential. Virno observes that '[t]he 
potential for working, bought and sold like just another commodity, is labour not yet 
objectified, "labour as subjectivity."'25 The reason capital buys labour-power, or capacity to 
labour – the surplus-value it produces when it works longer than the time which is paid for by 
the wage – is framed by Virno as part of this potential, the potential which is 'at the core of 
the exchange between capitalist and worker.'26 This can be compared to Marx writing 'The use 
of labour-power is labour itself. The purchaser of labour-power consumes it by setting the 
seller of it to work. By working, the latter becomes in actuality what previously he only was 
potentially, namely labour-power in action, a worker.'27 
 
If it is possibility that is the subject of exchange, then this possibility is inseparable from living 
labour, and, specifically, from life as the site of all production and exchange – the axis where 
Virno locates the relationship between the labour theory of value and Michel Foucault's 
concept of biopolitics. The same potentiality that is bought and sold as labour-power, the 
potentiality to produce, is also the potentiality for other social and productive forms, other 
metabolisms with nature. This seems like an articulation between potentiality as capacity to 
labour or produce and potentiality as species-being, the human capacity to transform its 
world and itself with it. The relationship here could also evoke the necessary reliance of 
autonomy on heteronomy as its condition of possibility, insofar as the autonomy of species-
being is predicated on its engagement with the heteronomously – externally determined or 
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pre-determined – social or natural world. Parenthetically, but not peripherally, we can add 
that the dependence of art's autonomy on heteronomy presents itself as the condition both 
for its critical independence and the agreement that this critique will have no purchase on the 
heteronomy that has licensed this space for free activity. We could even go further here and 
say that heteronomy does not so much license this space as it directly produces it, 
externalizing and alienating its own free potentiality as a separate zone of artistic license. 
 
Subhuman Capital 
We can here remark that potentiality as the state of the commodity labour-power in which it 
is sold holds implications for a politics of the 'speculative' which would be immanent to the 
labour-capital relation as such. However, we are interested in the tendency of the 'speculative' 
as self-valorising value to efface labour completely and turn that into a moment of liberation, 
a moment when capital and the subject are identified. The dual ownership relation critical for 
the bearer of the commodity labour-power cannot apply when the owner and the capital are 
one and the same entity. If we think of all the transactions the commodity labour-power 
engages in as speculative insofar as labour-power is a commodity in a market and can have a 
price put on it, and no less because it is bought for its potential, not its actual, value, then it 
becomes evident that the re-description of labour as capital can have no analytic credibility or 
emancipatory valence. Of course, labour has always had a dimension of capital in Marxist 
theory – this is 'variable capital', the wage, to be distinguished from fixed capital (machines, 
production equipment). Operaist and autonomist strands of Marxist critique have thus been 
interested in how the most recent phase of accumulation ('immaterial production' or 'real 
subsumption') renders variable capital into fixed capital: the subject becomes her own 
production resource, and is also seen as such by employers. However, the inquiry here has 
been into 'human capital' precisely because it overlooks such distinctions, which would still 
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bear a trace of contradiction and antagonism in the use of Marxist categories (even if these 
are ultimately erased in the post-Operaist precept of 'all life is put to work'). 'Human capital' is 
the vision and experience of identifying completely with capital as a mode of production, but 
also a way of life and a way of flourishing undetermined by structural constraints. It is the 
relation to self as which might seem at first glance purely auto-referential (self-maximising 
value), but which presupposes and activates social relations reinforcing the idea that there is 
no divergence of interests between capital and human life, between dead and living labour.28 
The notion of 'human capital' allows us to describe conditions of work in which the line 
between worker and product is effaced in the performance of the job and in the experience of 
precarity in and out of the workplace that besets the worker in a speculative mode of 
capitalist production. Central to my thesis is that artistic labour is the pre-eminent case where 
the speculative parameters of this kind of labour are turned into the ideological basis for 
autonomy and an exemption from the heteronomy of abstract labour. This denegation of 
heteronomy extends, for the automatic subject of art as it does for the automatic subject of 
capital, symptomatically, to reproduction. The potential value of human capital or the 
speculative commodity she produces, cannot have the material costs of her reproduction as 
bearer of labour-power recognized – here the cost of her investment in her capital – only the 
value of the product as assessed by the market. Perhaps here we should finally be content 
with noting the descriptive or analytical inadequacies of the human capital concept, and 
consign it to the status of ideological metaphor which seems to be its most common use. 
 
However, the material consequences of this metaphor should still have critical interest for us. 
Labour in the speculative mode of production is not only represented, but comes to 
experience itself, as human capital, since collective structures of class antagonism or simply 
class identity have fallen by the wayside. As we have seen in previous chapters, debt is an 
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ideal vehicle for crafting workers (and artists) into 'human capital', enforcing 'self-investment' 
on all those who lack other means. There is no principal conflict, in this case, between the 
valorisation of the subject as capital, and the valorisation of capital by the labour of that 
subject – like all ideologies, it is a fiction based on how things really work. But as a fiction also, 
it links the subject of human capital with the aesthetic. As developed in the last chapter, 
aesthetic subjectivity and human capital have certain structural correspondences which 
cluster around a 'groundless ground' (Agamben), an autonomy which is determined by a 
logic which is speculative in both senses – speculative social praxis, and the speculative form 
of value. The speculative character of art, with a circumscribed or absent social use can then 
come to seem like a dramatization of value-in-process, untethered from the fiction of useful 
labour and comparable to the financial markets whose profits subsidize it. But even as we 
elaborate this line of inquiry, the constitutive 'excess', or, better, negativity of the aesthetic 
should be kept in view consistently, as the whole impetus and dialectical content of this 
inquiry is staked on it. Framing the inquiry in terms of the production of subjectivity from and 
as speculation since Kant allows us to approach concepts such as 'abstraction', 'reproduction' 
and the 'automatic subject' (or even 'counterproduction', as in Chapter Two) from the 
perspective of their uselessness as an active negativity. These concepts should be mined for 
the ways they allows us to understand how it can be that what does not produce value – art 
and (reproductive, service) labour alike – can be made actively hostile to valorisation. The 
optic of 'speculation' allows us to depart from the autonomy/heteronomy dialectic of art to 
root it in the conditions of labour and life as we encounter them today.  
 
Artist Placement Group – Incidental Person or Negation of the Artist 
I will draw on a concrete episode in the recent history of art which links the two ways art has 
tried to come to terms with its relationship to abstract labour in capital that have 
predominated in the discussion so far: artistic labour that highlights its use-value or what it 
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has in common with other forms of labour, arriving at a 'labour politics of art' that focuses on 
art's heteronomy, as opposed to the autonomy staked out by art that orients its critique on its 
distance from rather than convergence with, other forms of social labour. The example I will 
foreground, that of the Artist Placement Group, has been a clarifying one for me as it shows 
an attempt to broker artistic uselessness directly to corporations and government agencies as 
a speculative good. The APG argument went that it was precisely because artists are not like 
other workers that they should be integrated into the workplace, since their lack of 
investment in the product or the remit of the organization was precisely what would produce 
visionary results that organization could potentially use. In the second chapter, we saw a 
latter-day performance of this notion in the piece by Pilvi Takala, albeit in the mode of a 
reductio ad absurdum of the APG concept which also jettisons its programmatic link to art. 
 
APG identified the traits that the post-object artist had in common not with other workers but 
with other professionals – a certain form of socialization such as a managerial worldview or 
cultural confidence, a certain adaptability and ability to mobilize situations. The conditions of 
the reproduction of an artist as a social being is already her role in production, without the 
mediation of artistic autonomy or politics. A 1975 document setting out the characteristics of 
the Incidental Person – APG's proposed re-definition of the artist – states, 'The innovatory 
artist has always developed skills and conceptual material that he needs different from those 
that are already familiar. The I.P. is someone who does this within any frame of reference. Thus 
we should regard him as a formulator, with experience of social customs and behaviour. He 
works to no party political requirements and as far as possible independently of the declared 
objectives of the Organisation with which he is associated.'29 
 
The Artist Placement Group (APG), operating in the UK and Europe from 1966-1989, initiated 
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'placements' of artists in firms and organisations, creating a forerunner to artist residencies. 
The main difference from the artist residency as it exists now was that the artist was re-
defined as an Incidental Person (IP),30 a kind of de-skilled and disinterested agent whose 
insertion into 'alien' organisational sites promised no specific outcome. When examined 
alongside contemporaneous tendencies by artists to repudiate art as they found it either by 
negation, i.e. withdrawal from art, or the expansion of its boundaries, APG took a further turn. 
The notion of the 'IP' bracketed both 'art' and 'work' in the emergent concept of the 
'professional' as a neutral and unmarked social being who can have visionary impacts in all 
social contexts but need belong to none of them. John Latham, the artist who co-founded 
and did much to establish the theoretical slant of the project, described the 'professional 
autonomous artist' as a figure who was 'ahead' of society, and was thus positioned to 
advance society and economy. This 'professional autonomous artist' was someone who could 
'sow the seeds of intellectual controversy from which so much economic progress develops'. 
The focus on the artist as a visionary socio-economic agent was key to the formulation of the 
'placement' programme and to the corporate structure of APG itself – by 1970, APG had 
formed into a limited company nonprofit under the title of APG Research Limited and Trust.31 
As this was at a time when the 'artistic entrepreneur' had not yet emerged as the emblem of 
cultural policy agendas, and arts funding was not then geared to reward artistic practices 
designed to emulate business ones, it is safe to say that this was a theoretical and pragmatic 
move set to place APG on an equal footing with the corporations who at that time were the 
principal targets of their 'placement' activity. It can also be hypothesised that the entire 
project was a sophisticated exercise in procuring the maximum funds, materials and latitude 
for displacing artistic practices from the studio to a social context where both artistic practice 




Where does the idea of the artist as an elite professional in a complex modern society with 
ever-ramifying needs and productive forces find its origins? We could briefly situate the 
development of the IP concept by examining its connections to the doctrines held by a 
forerunner of Marx, the early 19th century Utopian socialist technocrat the Comte de Saint-
Simon. For Saint-Simon, politics was a 'science of production' and the role of artists was itself 
a political role bound up with the multivalent aspects of art, use and poiesis. Here we can see 
a prefiguration of the deployment of artists in industry as promoted and practised by APG. 
The significance of Saint-Simon in this lineage is not only that from a certain perspective APG 
appropriated the role of the artist as part of a problematic managerial vanguard of a new 
system. It also rests in the fact that Saint-Simon's 'prosperity' is not productive in the capitalist 
sense but emancipates workers from work to pursue 'enjoyments'.32 Similarly, the IP's 
presence in an organization is not productive; if anything, it can only be her 'abstraction' from 
the organization's productive goals which can ever deliver 'value' for the company. Her labour 
is unpredictable and indescribable, but real. The point that it is a kind of labour is important: 
her presence is conceived in terms of labour, with repercussions for the labour of the other 
employees of the organization. If this were not the case, then the company could more 
straightforwardly achieve the enhancement of its brand management goals with a numinous 
'creativity' via art sponsorship or collecting.  
 
Several statements from the documents assembled in the APG archives held by the Tate 
concisely testify to the salience of these ideas for their project. In a 1971 Group Report to the 
Arts Council of Great Britain, who funded their activity for the two years previous, they write, 
'The proposal to industry that“useless”activity may be to its own future advantage, unless, 
that is, in terms of any preconceived notion of what is useful that has become rigid or too 
protective of the position to accommodate fresh approaches. The useless can provide a 
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catalyst where decision making has become lacking in“snap.”'33 From the beginning of the 
project, it was emphasized that the important thing was not what the Incidental Person did in 
a placement, but how she affected her context, that is, what the others around her did in 
response to this 'x' variable. Finally, there was an interesting, though less emphatic, attention 
to placements as a solution to the post-object, non-market artist's confusion about her social 
role in the turbulent era of the late 1960s and 1970s. The earlier-quoted Report from 1975 
observes: 
 There is a growing population of individuals without a social function which includes 
 independent artists, film and sound producing people. The I.P. concept would integrate these, 
 to function on behalf of the long time-based Event to which most of them are committed. The 




As we saw in the first chapter, the status of 'creativity' as an unquantifiable engine of value 
creation has been central in the economic re-structuring of recent decades, a truism that 
need only point to the hegemony of the creative industries, the 'creative city' or the 'creative 
class', however evidently discredited post-crisis they may seem. With APG, we see a sort of 
'bottom-up' and deeply idiosyncratic approach to this problem of valorising the 
unquantifiable. John Latham indeed proposed a 'delta unit' which would be a metric capable 
of measuring long-term and complex impacts like the influence of an IP in an organization or 
his theory of 'flat time' for the economy or government policy.35 In this light, we can think of 
the proposition of another theorist of human capital, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., that in the end we 
have to use an unquantifiable 'factor X' to account for the way human capital is mobilized in 
different geographic and historical contexts. It may be observed here that both the delta unit 
and factor X would strictly exclude the determinations of class, and thus productive relations 
in capitalist society per se, from their scope of analysis.36 This principled 'neutrality' of analysis 
hence gives us a crucial insight into exactly how the nature of the IP's involvement in non-
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artistic employment contexts was conceptualized. APG had been operating for nine years 
before the term 'Incidental Person' was coined, presumably to deflect criticism and 
misunderstanding, although the conception of the artist in non-artistic contexts had 
remained consistent throughout, as can be seen from the 1969 text quoted earlier. 
 
Traditionally, capitalist modernity has excluded art from instrumentality because it was seen 
as an exception, a free creative practice which was pursued for different ends than other 
business or professional activity, and a sphere untainted by politics. But this can also of course 
be re-framed as placing art in service of a 'higher' instrumentality, the one of displacing and 
reconciling bourgeois contradictions. The concept of the Incidental Person can thus be read 
as a subversive affirmation of this: putting purposeless purpose to work.  
 
APG's 'non-technical non-solution' exposed them to accusations of having social-democratic 
illusions, fetishising management, and capitalizing on the naiveté of an explicitly non-
antagonistic research-based approach.37 Politicized artists such as Gustav Metzger inveighed 
with the principle that 'the middle way always leads to the right', while formerly APG-affiliated 
artist Stuart Brisley wrote in a review of their seminal Art and Economics exhibition at the 
Hayward Gallery 1971 that the 'APG idea gravitates towards the source of power and must 
tend to reinforce it' and that they worked in 'connivance with management' to realise their 
goals'.38 Several years later, an internally-commissioned report intended to mark the 
'termination of the experimental phase' of the group cites the Arts Council of Great Britain's 
fears that APG was 'highly compromised by dubious relationships with industry, capital and 
other ancillary agents'.39 This is certainly intriguing in light of the current position that Arts 
Council England takes, which encourages entrepreneurial behaviour on the part of its funded 
artists and organisations while it itself 'reach[es] out to a broad coalition of public, private and 
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community organisations that we feel can help us achieve our goals as we work to create the 
conditions for talent, ambition and innovation to prosper.'40 
 
Whereas APG's placements were guided by a characteristically obtuse notion of 'use', artists 
are inserted into social contexts in the UK and US now precisely because they are approved as 
mediators of specific state or corporate goals, which is to say helping to deliver pre-existing 
agendas such as inclusion or regeneration – no longer so much of a sovereign IP deranging 
the managerial class, and more of a support worker. Such an outcome was, however, already 
evident in the history of the contortions APG went through in trying to 'sell situations' to UK 
culture bureaucracies in the 1970s, as they alternately embraced and backed off from the 
entrepreneurial and employment potential of the 'placements'. They asserted that they aimed 
to 'provide a service to Art, not a service to artists', while the notion of the Incidental Person 
was itself predicated on a loss of self-evidence of what Art is or even its right to exist, as 
Adorno put it.41 The IP was a 'de-materialised' artist, operating undercover just as a notebook 
or a chair may turn out to be a piece of art.42 
 
The very absence of instrumental benefit in the long 'time-base' impact of the presence of the 
IP in organisations was framed by APG as economically productive in the visionary sense 
today's business climate needs. By the early 1980s, the concept of 'human capital' had begun 
to circulate in policy circles, and APG's proposals started to make more sense; importantly, 
'human capital' was taken in the most diffuse of senses as well, contrary to the accounting 
fictions that characterised the later 'creative economy' paradigms pervading arts funding at 
the behest of New Labour.  
 
A few implications arise here. One is the IP's repudiation of the Productivist legacy of sending  
artists into the factories so they could re-engineer and improve the labour process: the IP 
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brief was totally undetermined – APG took artistic alienation from productive life seriously, 
even if they entered the factory under the same managerial auspices as the Productivists.43 
Yet this challenge to use-value and useful labour was beholden to a vision of artistic neutrality 
which can be seen as readily morphing into the non-specialised but omni-adaptable 'creative' 
of today. The negativity of non-specialism has to harbour a moment of refusal or it leaves 
itself open up to be colonised by the abstract value, abstract labour and concrete hierarchies 
against which its own 'abstraction' of indeterminacy has no power. For example, much has 
been written, by Benjamin Buchloh and others, about the 'aesthetic of administration' 
heralded by Conceptual Art.44 This refers to the artist adopting the position of the manager or 
bureaucrat rather than the worker in the productive relations as well as the sensible forms of 
the art, thus reinforcing the division between mental and manual labour that Conceptual Art 
saw itself as challenging with its radical de-sanctification of art objects and processes. 
Nowadays, we can observe that this condition has been, if anything, exacerbated, with the 
massification and globalisation of post-Conceptual practices no longer operating as a 
challenge to the ossified hierarchies of Modernism but functioning frictionlessly in the 
smooth spaces of art markets and cultural economies. The suspension between mental and 
manual labour is enacted indefinitely in the field of post-Conceptual practices, insofar as 
artistic practice is determined by its greater claim to the ontological 'whatever' than others, as 
we saw earlier. 'Administration' too is no longer a counter-pole to art which it needs to reckon 
with to get traction on transforming social and productive relations, but the medium through 
which everything must pass. As we see with the Artist Placement Group, the encounter 
between the artist and the organisation was at the time of Conceptual art understood as one 
of fundamental incongruity and ironic allegory – the Incidental Person emerged against this 
background of the growing professionalisation of the 'autonomous individual' represented by 
the artist. Such a perspective would be difficult to uphold in the present, when the 
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relationship between art and administration, art and the corporation has been overhauled 
and rationalized – partly, as always, due to the disruptive efforts of the protagonists of three 
and four decades ago. 
 
Excursus on Use-Value 
A critical trope that has enjoyed favour among many art theorists and art historians of a Left 
persuasion over the years is that art behaving like a commodity is de facto 'bad', rather than 
the fact that art exists in and as an artefact of a social relation which must commodify as 
much of the world as possible in order to ensure its survival. Moreover, insofar as artistic 
production has been approached, often not explicitly, as a commodity sphere, one side of the 
commodity – its exchange-value – has been condemned, while the other side – its use-value – 
has been exalted. Such an analysis serves to mystify several aspects of the social existence of 
art, like its specificity as an 'exceptional' kind of commodity and kind of labour in capital. It 
also tends to moralize the 'relationship of art to society' as a channel between two 
undifferentiated masses – one effete and detached, one concrete and urgent. What is more 
urgent, in my view, is to return to Adorno's dialectical understanding of the artistic commodity 
to help us understand art's existence as a social relation, specifically with regard to the (fetish) 
character of artistic labour. The exposition on use-value that follows will be somewhat 
elementary and far from novel. Its intention, however, is to offer a corrective to the largely 
ambiguous or positive (not to say positivist) accounts of the nexus between art and social use 
which obtain in many otherwise careful surveys of critical, politicized or 'engaged' practices. 
The structure of an identified art fulfilling an identified use can be melancholically queried or 
celebrated, but neither of its terms are generally questioned at the same time, and this tends 
towards the production of conservative accounts. This ends up being the case because the 
gesture of holding up social use against exchange value is not one that merely disregards 
what 'socially useful' or 'socially necessary' means in a capitalist society, that is, necessary for 
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the reproduction of capital. It more saliently expresses the hope for a humanized capitalism in 
which art plays the very same role as now – mediating the coercion of capitalist 
contradictions as individuation and singularity – but even more crudely, because any allusion 
to capital's abstraction would be condemned, if art can only be justified by a display of use-
value for the social relations of this abstraction (which still is a use value for capital).  
 
Because all capitalist commodities are products of abstract labour, the dimension of use-value  
supposedly unrelated to their social form is integral to their existences as values. The 
homogeneity and abstraction of value extends to use-value insofar as use-value is part of the 
commodity. Use-value bears the same relation to exchange-value as concrete labour does to 
abstract labour; it is its opposite (particular, individual), but subsumed into the general form 
of value which hollows out particularity. Moishe Postone identifies 'labour' as a capitalist 
category and thus a reified one.45 The same applies to the de-socialised or idealised notion of 
use-value. Use-value's imbrication with exchange-value has implications even for the complex 
commodity of art. It testifies that the seeming opposition of art into life versus critical 
autonomy for art cannot be resolved within the current form of society so long as the social 
form of their production is determined by value. The form of social labour in capitalism is 
nowhere the same thing as concrete labour, or even the ahistorical 'metabolic interaction with 
nature': 
 “Labour”by its very nature is unfree, unhuman, unsocial activity, determined by private 
 property and creating private property. Hence the abolition of private property will  become a 
 reality only when it is conceived as the abolition of “labour”(an abolition which, of course, 
 has become possible only as a result of labour itself, that is to say, has become possible as a 
 result of the material activity of society and which should on no account be conceived as the 
 replacement of one category by another).
46 
 
Most mainstream and even libertarian communist and socialist theory continues to pose the 
problem of production as one of separating use-value from exchange-value. Yet a basic value-
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form analysis suggests that destruction of the capital-labour relationship must also bracket 
off and destroy use-value as a constitutive category presupposed by value, thus questioning 
the category of 'production' itself. The principle that labour cannot serve as a ground for 
emancipation is a perspective common to the left communist theory of the Frankfurt School, 
German 'wertkritik' (value-critique) and the ideas around 'communisation' circulating today, 
as discussed briefly at the beginning of the previous chapter. We can say that art cannot 
perform this function either, despite all its salutary effects in short-circuiting use and 
complicating exchange in its object production and modes of subjectivation, which would go 
under the earlier-cited category of 'modelling' free activity, a speculative liberated labour. A 
form of modelling which relies, inevitably, on the heteronomous channels of social media or 
education institutions to disseminate beyond its coteries but which does not yet have the 
social means to function adequately even as a model. A pedagogical potential that would be 
secured by a political and affective circuit between the artistic and labouring subjects of 
human capital remains a 'suspended step'.47 
 
Artistic Communism – A Speculative Gesture 
In APG, we can see an important bridging practice: between the artist as worker and the artist 
as manager, between the artist as autonomous creator and the artist as decorative support 
worker; from the artist enhancing social technique by raising outputs in the factory and the 
artist as an agent of indeterminacy in the post-industrial organization. It can be said that, like 
the Utopian Socialists Saint-Simon or Fourier, APG – and John Latham in particular - came up 
with new metrics for harnessing indeterminacy to the aims of social development (the 'delta 
unit', the 'long time-base'), while on the other hand, APG sought to turn indeterminacy, or, 
more classically, artistic 'uselessness', into a quasi-commodity to be sold to corporations and 
the state. The artist's new lack of a social role could be normalized through the support of 
these actors, who would acknowledge artistic indeterminacy as useful both in and of itself 
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and for their own organizational ends. The artist could be socially validated and materially 
supported by these powerful entities in society for the value of her 'non-specialism' rather 
than an accomplishment in craft or her work's market value (the artist would no longer be 
dependent on state funding or market movements to recognize her production). In a sense, 
this could be read as an attempt to short-circuit the contradiction between artistic labour and 
abstract labour, turning the former into the latter by directly capitalizing the qualities proper 
to the former, rather than through the mediations which translated artistic labour into money 
thus far.  
 
It is in this sense also that APG could in fact be viewed as latter-day Productivists, breaking 
out of the boundaries of art in order to harness the new-found indeterminacy of the post-
object artist's social role - whose activities had no evident market value at the time - to 
existing social ends. However, the distinction between these projects is inarguable – the APG 
placements were 'sold' to organizations on the basis that there was no set outcome for their 
presence. This is the importance of the notion that the marketing of artistic indeterminacy 
was direct. We can thus see that APG placements were nonetheless producing an antagonism 
from their embedded position, precisely because the artistic labour they performed in the 
workplace demonstrated the potential of all other work performed there to also become 'de-
functionalized', to encounter its own contingency.    
 
It is important to emphasize here that it was the indeterminacy of the artist's activity that was 
the aspirational good promoted to companies. This had a double nature, inasmuch as the 
vague concept was both advanced on its own and was subtended by a different concept of 
use or social benefit – 'in the long time-base' – which could not be communicated as clearly 
to the marketing departments of possible placement contexts as could the somewhat trite 
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allusions to a kind of 'blue-sky thinking' that pervade APG's discourse. The proposal of new 
metrics and the ostensibly non-antagonistic version of systemic harmony flowing from their 
adoption links APG to the tradition of the Utopian Socialists, where Romantic conceptions of 
the artist's genius – the aesthetic subjectivity discussed in the previous chapter – do not serve 
as sources for alienation from or negation of capitalist modernity, but instead as the source of 
its reconstruction on a rational basis, as in, again, the vision of Saint-Simon's artist-engineers. 
A notion of social use or socially useful labour is advanced which is in many respects quite 
other than the one which obtains in the capitalist mode of production: a distinctly speculative 
notion. It is a notion which, like the Adornian understanding of a heteronomously-
determined critical autonomy for art, rejects an actual social role for art in the present order, 
but, unlike Adorno, does not see this critical alienation from use as what links art to the 
revolutionary negation of the capitalist order. In APG in particular, as we have seen, the 
avoidance of political content in their proposals about revising the relationship between art 
and socially useful labour is, while of course strategic, characteristic of the idealism that says 
there is a functional, rather than socially determinate, separation between artistic labour and 
abstract labour that rational action by powerful actors and motivated artists can remedy. I 
would argue further that this is a misrecognition of the instrumentality that such 'uselessness' 
already does have in that order. 
 
In order to demonstrate this, it might be helpful to turn to Stewart Martin's theorization of 
'artistic communism', since this represents an important recent attempt to reveal a trajectory 
for art's progressive trajectory in the writings of the German Romantics and in Marx, but also 
in the current shape of art's social and economic relations.48 His hypothesis is that 
communism is the realization of art in the concrete form of social organization. Unlike the 
Situationists, art is realized without being 'superseded' – communism simply is art, with its 
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rejection of divisions between work and leisure, labour and life. Crucially, it emerges from the 
possibilities created for it by 'artistic capitalism', that is, aspects of real subsumption advanced 
by means of art. He sidesteps the negative dialectic between art as a form of separation 
resulting from and shaped by the dominance of socially necessary abstract labour and art as a 
prefiguration or crystallization of the antithesis of the separation. This makes his position an 
interesting hybrid of APG's pragmatic idealism and the Marxian critique of political economy 
– in its more 'Left' variants, which denounce labour and use-value as capitalist social forms to 
be eliminated in a communist future or in the process of 'communisation'. Here, it would be 
productive to revisit the Romantic aesthetics which set the background for Martin's thesis not 
only from the perspective which he does employ, which is the confluence of those ideas of 
free creativity and liberated humanity with Marxian vision of a humanity freely inventing itself 
in metabolism with nature once it has left behind the bonds of profit-oriented production and 
its 'asocial sociality'. What I have in mind is a tentative loop- back to the discussion of Kant's 
aesthetic judgement, with its positing of disinterest as emblematic of this type of judgement, 
and the initially Romantic, and then avant-garde critical vision of art as alienated from 
usefulness or useful labour.49 A caveat should be observed here, however. There is an 
argument to be made that Kantian 'disinterest' cannot principally think art, or can think art 
only as a fall from grace from natural beauty, which is untouched by earthly interest. The 
detachment from interest, or from 'ends', that is proper to aesthetic judgement thus must 
remain unworldly, an idealist aesthetics in its Kantian variant. The early German Romantics' 
approach to aesthetic judgement, by contrast, expands this rejection of 'ends' onto the 
contingencies of the mutual relation of humanity and nature. Humanity and nature are 
constantly reflected in one another, and this reflection measures the distance between art's 
propositions and the material relations in which art subsists. Thus, with regard to the aesthetic 
roots of 'speculation' as a form of subjectivation, the detachment of aesthetics from 
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instrumental reason is sustained by a specular relation which avoids Kant's tendency to lose 
all reference to social reality but instead grounds it in the materiality of distance between 
what is and what can be, an indeterminacy shared between humans and the world. This then 
brings us back to Marx's affinity to German idealism. As cited earlier, he saw it as introducing 
an active principle into the relation between matter or nature and humanity or social life, and 
that, also as cited earlier, it is precisely Kant who proposes a way to think change through 
matter by furnishing the philosophical tools to separate matter from brute instrumentality.50 
 
If we can think about the opposition of disinterest to consumption or exploitation of the 
object by the subject as an opposition of art to instrumentality, then the argument around 
use-value as neither innocent nor natural but fully determined by the value relation of a 
society organized around abstract exchange comes into focus as a negative aesthetic politics 
– aesthetic in the sense of an affect which sees the distance to be traversed between art's 
propositions and the social relations that currently obtain as the structural place of art in any 
project of social transformation. The critical premise of art as autonomous from practical 
human ends comes to stand in for, if not ideally displace, a humanity independent of the 
heteronomy of the capital relation; a humanity which can finally undertake a conscious, 
aesthetic project of creative and autonomous self-determination. Certainly we need to be 
aware of the ambivalence or indeterminacy of disinterest when framing it this way – 
disinterest as rejection of the use-value of an object or activity (whether this is enjoyment or 
utility) need not be an antagonistic relation; it can be simply a contemplative one, reinforcing 
the class relations that obtain on interest and disinterest. Distance from use or consumption 
does not countervail use or consumption as principles to be upheld outside the aesthetic 
encounter. A 'contemplative attitude' can be said perhaps to be key to much contemporary 
art production which is held to be 'asking questions', for example.  
215 
 
With regard to locating where art is now in the project of 'aesthetic communism', Martin does 
not discuss whether or not art can be considered as really subsumed: what is more salient to 
his argument is that art acts to facilitate capitalist subsumption more generally through 
inculcating a culturalised capitalism and a capitalist production of subjectivity. He writes, 'Art 
needs to be understood within the context of this expanded capitalist subsumption. It is 
emblematic of a realm beyond traditional wage labour that has become capitalised. […] The 
dissolution of art into life not only presents new content for commodification, but a new form 
of it in so far as art or culture has become a key medium through which commodification has 
been extended to what previously seemed beyond the economy.'51 Art is the principal way 
that autonomy and creativity are commodified by the capitalist mode of production, and a 
main source of the legitimation of these processes at the same time. However, if we look to 
the positions articulated in documents such as the 'Oldest Systematic Programme of German 
Idealism', we can find a post-French Revolutionary-era fervour for the emancipatory potential 
that lies with art – rather than with labour, or with politics, as it would later do for one of its 
best-know co-authors, G.F.W. Hegel, and the Hegelian Marx. As Martin notes, 'Art is proposed 
as the realisation of freedom. Autonomy or self-determination seeks the unconditioned or 
absolute, and the absolute is revealed in art.'52 They departed from Kant's concept of 
aesthetic judgement as a bridge between pure reason and practical action, 'the bridge 
between freedom and nature', but sought to radicalise the concept into a blueprint for moral 
and political education as it fed into a re-invention of society. Friedrich Schiller's discussion of 
beauty and play as the basis for human community in Letters on Aesthetic Education is 
guided by a similar intuition. For him, the unconditioned activity that these moments embody 
is prefigurative of human freedom, just as aesthetic judgement in Kant helps to actualize 
freedom, since it operates without a concept on activities and objects which have no end 
outside themselves. Such a role cannot be played by labour, since it does have a practical- 
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hence constrained – purpose, and thus presupposes a hierarchy between use and 
uselessness. For F.W.J. Schelling, even more fundamental is that aesthetic activity transcends 
conscious or rational activity, because there freedom would be cancelled out by the hierarchy 
between consciousness and non-consciousness, self and non-self. Only the aesthetic 
subjectivity of the genius is able to suspend these determinations in his free activity – but 
aesthetic subjectivity can in principle be enacted by anyone, which it would have to be if it 
were to supply the basis for an emancipated community.53 If for Kant, aesthetic judgement 
was the mediation between human freedom and natural constraint, for the German idealists 
who followed him, art was hypostasized into the practical unity of these poles. 
 
It is in these formulations about free and unconditioned activity that Martin finds the main 
affinity between German idealism and Marxism, which envisioned communism in terms of 
free activity, as well as some divergences – materialism would not recognize art as an 
'Absolute' realization of human freedom, since that could only be achieved through the 
collective self-determination of political action. He concludes that this apparent discrepancy 
may be reconciled, albeit speculatively, by virtue of positing that both art and communism are 
centrally concerned with the liberation of life from capital, which is why it is art that capital 
deploys to effectively subsume life under its regime of valorisation. If this was once achieved 
via the recourse to the standardizations of the 'culture industry' anatomized by Adorno and 
Horkheimer, it is now achieved through attention to singularity, contingency and the 
fractalisation of elite consumption. But this 'artistic capitalism' is always confronted by art's 
logical and historical affinity to communism.  
 
Art – Departure or Destination? 
Martin's speculative conclusion thus transpires at a level of abstraction which takes note of, 
but doesn't reckon with, some of the consequences of 'artistic capitalism' for the prospects of 
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'artistic communism'. As I've been discussing, these would include the merging of artistic 
labour and abstract labour, or the merging of production and reproduction in art as it is in the 
subject of labour translated into human capital. He is not interested, at least in the text under 
discussion, in art's conditions of production, but in their mediation and consumption, and his 
theory of 'artistic capitalism' bears admitted similarity to Guy Debord's concept of the 
spectacle – a production of passivity, except now this is attained via full mobilization of 
producers-consumers. Yet, this 'mobilization' is not scrutinized as a semblance of self-activity 
which is determined by the form of value as it operates differentially within and across art and 
abstract labour in a mode of production that is speculative insofar as it implants the 
automatic subject of capital into the logic of every social activity. Perhaps in this manner we 
can extend the significance of 'artistic capitalism' utilized by Martin to locate a structural 
correspondence between the logic of art and the logic of capital. It may at least help us avoid 
the doubtfulness of the categories of 'capitalist' and 'non-capitalist life' which Martin finally 
comes to when defining a new era of real subsumption where capital has gone beyond 
subsuming labour to subsuming life directly, and where 'artistic communism' has to confront 
'artistic capitalism' as the absolute, and absolutely opposed, vision of human life. Here, we 
would have to remember the relevant lesson of Foucault's 'biopower' and biopolitics, that is, 
capital is interested in life insofar as it can be made productive, insofar as it can be made into 
labour.  
 
Despite these reservations, Martin's account is relevant because it tries to think the separation 
between art and labour, the 'uselessness' of art, in terms of a positive political project, with 
determinate philosophical and historical roots, and one based on the transformation of 
labour into free social activity. This differs strongly from many critical Marxist aesthetic 
account of the relationship between art and abstract labour in capital, which eschew the 
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idealist tendencies of something like 'artistic communism' only to end up with a negative 
theology of the 'useless' commodity and a political quiescence. APG's project of valorising 
artistic uselessness – art can renew and refresh value production and its labour routines - 
makes for an intriguing asymptote with Martin's conception, which pivots on making art truly 
useless for capital, but useful for communism. This then appears to be a use of art to ideally 
overcome capitalism and realize a communism which looks very much like a generalization of 
one pole of the art/labour divide, rather than an abolition of the divide itself (though it 
presupposes the abolition of the divide in a free social activity in order for such a 
generalization of art to take effect). In this ideal overcoming by means of art, APG and Martin 
seem to occupy the same ground, in spite of their political disparity. This owes to their 
common conception of art as the realization of human freedom and the Romantic image of 
the artist as the subject of this realization. Neither have a concept of the negativity that must 
be appended to both art – as existing in a state where this realization is indefinitely 
postponed – and to the realization itself, a realization which, insofar as it opposes the present 
state of things, may include in this the abolition of an art whose main expression of negativity 
– uselessness – has already been put to work. In sum, what is illuminating about the practice 
and proposals of the Artist Placement Group and Stewart Martin's argument alike is that they 
try to think through the consequences of artistic 'uselessness' for capital, the major strand of 
negativity in a Romantic aesthetics which otherwise tends to positively absolutise the figure 
of the artist. They are not content with the immediate practical negation of uselessness by the 
artist – a labour politics of art; or with dismissing uselessness – autonomy - as a pure 
ideological fantasy. Both visions, however, defend a non-antagonistic notion of this 
uselessness, though in Martin's case, an abstract antagonism is found in the stand-off 
between 'artistic capitalism' and 'artistic communism'. It seems that both try to overcome the 
dialectical double-bind of art as the dramatization of the conflict between autonomy and 
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heteronomy, but in leaving this dialectics behind, they seem to end up reinforcing the most 
uncritical axioms about art's transformatory powers in capitalist society. We could call this 
perhaps, after Hegel's 'bad infinity', 'bad autonomy'. 
 
Conclusion 
Taking this into account, along with the previous chapter's exploration of aesthetic 
subjectivity as the 'groundless ground' of both capital's mobilization of creativity – the 
'whatever' - and the socially shared indeterminacy that portends a free community, I would 
like to return in more detail to the 'communicability as such' that both Agamben and Kant 
locate at the centre of art's emancipatory potential. Here it may help to develop a contrast 
between 'communicability as such' being the focus on a pure means without outcome as a 
way of describing both the social and immanent excess (negativity) of the aesthetic with 
respect to capitalist accumulation and the extent to which this 'communicability as such' is a 
condition for contemporary labour, especially labour which does not identify itself as labour 
and is enjoined to identify with capital. The speculative mode of production would then be 
understood as a wager that this labour can be valorised, can be turned into a productive 
asset, and this done ideally by mediating it as the antithesis to labour, i.e. art. However, this 
wager, and the speculative structure around it, is highly contradictory and fragile. We could 
even say that the extent to which it is emblematic is the extent to which it is a lens for capital's 
systemic problems of valorisation. So long as art is not really subsumed, a labour politics of 
art can never catch up with those problems, nor succeed in valorising artistic labour on the 
terms of the worker who is not one. Its survival is only imaginatively, (or, even, ideologically) 
pegged to the survival of the system it helps to reproduce, as in the figure of human capital.  
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Conclusion: Whither Speculation? 
 
In this thesis, my project has been to develop a theory of 'speculation as a mode of 
production' in art and capital which is capable of articulating how speculation is and has been 
rendered productive for capital – not just in the hegemonic instance of finance, or its 
transformative effects on the social, but as a general logic which thrives on open-endedness 
and the conversion of capitalist imperatives like the expansion of value ('real subsumption') 
into a social logic of infinite creativity at a time of maximal social contraction. Speculation 
thrives on valorising previously un-capitalised or indirectly capitalised domains. Art is 
exemplary here because it is a domain that is 'socially speculative' – unconstrained, that is, 
removed from social, economic or conceptual constraint since it emerged as an autonomous 
sphere in modernity – and thus in a position to model forms of labour and subjectivity that 
suggest emancipation, or at least protection, from exposure to capital's orders. What does 
this mean for the present moment? Insofar as speculation can be deemed a mode of 
production, it is important to see just how it is rendered productive in order to see how that 
rendering is thwarted or fragile, and what kinds of co-ordinated social action need to happen 
to change the circumstances in which it takes place. We need to comprehend how it is that 
artistic indeterminacy appears in both the guise of an extension of value imperatives and their 
negation, a dialectic which becomes much more pronounced in the times of social crisis that 
ensue from capital's inability to successfully valorise itself and when the relations that sustain 
that valorisation are thrown into doubt as well. 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to depict artistic production, along with the figure of the artist, 
as emblematic of larger shifts in capital accumulation, the nature of work and the production 
of subjectivity that goes with a 'speculation' become socially general. In theorizing these 
conditions, I tried to pick out the contradictions and antagonisms that constitute the 
negativity of both artistic practice and wage-labour with regard to capital accumulation. In 
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our era, this accumulation is increasingly premised on occluding the nature of labour and art 
as not-capital, effecting a de-politicization which identifies their goals with that of capital: 
self-expansion for the sake of profit. This part of my argument was above all an inquiry into 
whether contemporary artistic labour can be said to have distinctly modified the character of 
abstract labour, just as the dominance of fictitious capital heralds a 'speculative' mode 
overtaking capitalist production and capitalist society.  
 
Further, in drawing attention to this negativity, which lends itself to structural, historical and 
ontological types of analysis, I wished to retain focus on the correspondence between the 
artistic subject as it has developed since the modern era and the 'automatic subject' of 
capital. This is the affirmative axis of art's relationship to capital and one that I have examined 
through notions such as autonomy and heteronomy, the aesthetic subject, and aesthetic 
judgement. The establishment of art's 'complicity' with capital was not here the central 
concern; the objective was rather to establish how art and labour's participation in the 
'generic' – analytically and practically – can be compared to the hollow and self-expanding 
core of capital's relation of itself to itself that preserves its character through all changes in 
form and context. The idiom of 'human capital', designed to conclusively replace labour-
power's potentiality for negation of capital with an all-encompassing desire for valorisation 
common to labour-power and capital alike seems germane in this respect. It is such a helpful 
term because it at once reflects an affirmation of capital and a subversive critique. From the 
side of ideology, it describes the desired symbolic erasure of labour by capital, while as a 
structural diagnosis, it describes the subject of debt who has no option but to 'self-invest'. 
The subject is thus at the same time 'human capital' in her own set of constraints, and a 
source of accumulation to financial capital which extracts profits from her speculative 
'investments'. Art, here, is seen as the emancipatory discourse which conveys the 
'spontaneous ideology' of neoliberalism's notion of this kind of subject: not a cost-benefit 
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analysing homo economicus but the creatively fecund subject curating her brand value. 
 
It may be objected here that my account partakes of certain unwelcome conventions of 
Marxian cultural critiques of 'late capitalism'. According to art theorist Gail Day, such accounts 
share some features. The use-value of art is denegated, or dismissed as shallowly ideological, 
in the service of a chiliastic and one-sided prognosis of the irresistible spread of 'social 
abstraction' across the contemporary lifeworld, in which contradiction and resistance become 
notional in general and voluntaristic at best. Narratives which see a fully reified art reflecting a 
fully commodified set of social relations, in which exchange-value has been hypostatized to 
the degree that there is no longer even a memory of 'loss' much less of what has been lost, 
tend to depart from two touchstones in particular: Adorno's category of art as the 'absolute 
commodity' without a particle of use-value and Baudrillard's thesis in The Mirror of 
Production that the prevalence of the 'sign' and its simulacral exchanges has effectively 
eclipsed the naturalism – and politics - of use-values.1 The consequences tend to converge on 
a horizon of abstract radicalism tinged by nostalgia. Day offers an admirable discussion of the 
closures of such accounts in her recent book, arguing that: 
Understanding use value as a socially determinate form is central not only to Marx's account of 
the historical specificity of social forms and categories but also to his analysis of exploitation 
and social contradiction. Attending to the specific social form of use value – as opposed to 




In full agreement with this stance, I would like to now reflect more precisely about the 
relationship of the categories I cited above – and throughout the thesis – of abstract labour, 
art, and speculation, to use-value. The previous chapter's 'Excursus on Use-Value' was 
intended to set out an orientation to use-value as just such a 'socially determinate form' 
which bears a very specific relationship to art, whether art is understood as keeping use-value 
in abeyance or courting it directly. It is important to consider the specificity of this 
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relationship, for instance, when considering the use-value of labour and art to capital: the 
use-value of labour to capital is that it generates surplus value, the use-value of art to capital 
is that it creates an 'aperture in use' – that it is useless because of the kind of social form that 
it is. Insulated from direct social use, it is very much a commodity, a desirable and profitable 
asset class. In order to develop this argument, we need to, as Day cautions, see use-value as 
one side of value, a side of value which the value-form cannot shed without ceasing to exist 
as a determinate social form in the capitalist society. Thus, 'total' social abstraction, however 
'real', is a fanciful polemic, though capital's logic may displace and compress its dealings with 
the so-called concrete in time and space, and critical analysis should always look for labour 
and use (value) where it is deemed to be missing, for instance in art. Nonetheless, holding on 
to the category of use in critical socio-economic analysis which takes as its central lens the 
form of value does not mean, and cannot mean that, when dealing with art we can 
unproblematically assign it a category of use-value on the basis of it seeming to be 
'objectively' useful to social actors and activities besides the obvious propagandistic use that 
can devolve upon an exceptional area of unproductive activity (that of legitimating the capital 
relation or its wealthy specimens). This kind of use is contingent upon art emulating other 
social activities, such as education or therapy, and the degree of use of this kind depends on a 
willingness to downplay its character as art, thus downplaying the conditions which allow the 
emulation to occur. Hence, this scepticism should extend to art which announces its 'use-
value' through political or institutional critique, taking care to forswear any simply supportive 
role which it would locate or have located for it. The use-value of art, insofar as we can speak 
in these terms, has to be located in the abeyance of use, not in its identifications with it. The 
reason for this is that the articulations, and even the methodologies, that artistic practices 
deploy to establish their negativity or surplus to the existent, are effective only insofar as they 
remain comprehensible as art, even at its extreme boundary of meaning or process. This 
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comprehensibility relies on the scission of art from use-value and useful labour (labour useful 
to capital), and so long as social relations are mediated by the form of value, this scission is 
absolute. 
 
Although art is not-labour, I have found that it is both indirectly mediated by and directly 
contains – whether the analysis is trained at the level of artworks or the institution of art – 
abstract labour (wage-labour), without which it could not be produced as a special kind of 
non-labour activity or a special kind of non-use-value bearing commodity. It is in this sense 
that I spoke of art as 'reproductive' in the sense that reproduction maintains the capital 
relation without itself being directly mediated by it, like unpaid domestic labour or being a 
student or community work, with the different degrees of personal and market coercion 
typically implied in each of these realms. Reproduction has a systemic function which is 
grounded on its status of exceptionality from the contractual relations of the wage, yet 
operates in proximity to them. Art is exemplary here because it does not directly produce or 
reproduce the commodity of labour-power, as Marxist analyses of unpaid housework or 
education have argued is happening in those spheres. With its proximity to the speculative 
art market, it reproduces the commodity of labour-power in analogy with the reproduction of 
the value-form itself by inculcating not-labour in the artist as free activity's pact with capital's 
own growth process: human capital. Any work that is not done for remuneration is done as an 
investment, and those who don't work for a living must be investors. This nexus of financial – 
or, more concisely, capital – logic and autonomy is most crucially illustrated in and by art 
because art is already defined as that which gives itself its own law and can thus more easily 
be aligned with the self-valorisation of capital, as opposed to other forms of work which must 
be visibly transformed through managerial paradigms from work for others into work for self, 
into entrepreneurship. We thus saw how art is defined in the Modern era, a state exacerbated 
in the 'post-medium' or 'post-Conceptual' condition, by the emergence of the aesthetic 
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subject as a particular type of individual whose relationship to social reality is one of 
judgement and selection, who assumes a critical distance from the types of useful or 
profitable activity which are deemed normative in that reality. The artist renounces direct 
influence on social reality in favour of the capacity of contributing something genuinely new 
to it which will, for that reason, often go unrecognised. This formula, while generative of many 
kinds of a/political commitments among artists in the past two centuries or so, was both 
founded in and gave rise to the bourgeois romanticism of the artist and its corollary notion of 
artistic labour: work cannot be evaluated in 'economic' terms but rather in terms of a 'life', the 
'life' which both capitalist and working classes have had to renounce. Art was pre-eminently - 
if not residually – the only activity available which had its own intrinsic end. In this way it was 
always 'pure' speculation, since capital's goal – self-expansion – is also intrinsic to itself. 
 
I have proposed that this is important to consider not only in light of art's continued 
engagements with labour, but the recent emphasis on the sphere of art as not only a place 
where 'services' and 'experiences' are generated, but as a site where infrastructures are 
generated – here we can think of distribution networks, educational and archiving 'turns' in 
'social practice'. Such practices can be understood as laying the stress on a proximity to extra-
artistic forms of socially necessary labour which is pragmatic rather than traditionally critical, 
deploying the resources and freedom available in the sphere of art, particularly when such 
infrastructures are deemed to be in crisis more generally. The emphasis on infrastructure 
highlights the reproductive aspect of contemporary art's relationship to social labour. It 
additionally reflects the sway of Thierry de Duve's 'generic' in its abdication of artistic marking 
in favour of a nebulous reflexivity and functionality. One could even say that it hearkens back 
to the construction of the artist as the (contingent) centre of aesthetic judgement, as 
explicated by de Duve. Like Duchamp's original gesture, the staging of useful infrastructure in 
the art institution discloses the power of the institution and the artist in its ability to valorise 
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any object or practice as art. However, it abjures the institutional critique which that gesture 
can now be said to have long since exhausted, seeing the art institution as simply a site of 
material resources and conviviality. 
 
Here it might be apposite to consider the category of 'intrinsic value' as a term currently 
migrating from arts funding policy to everyday discourse in the UK. 'Intrinsic value' seems to 
be a term that helpfully marks a conjunction between the notion of human capital and that of 
the 'Big Society'. 'Intrinsic value' refers to what is produced by work not only when it is 
disconnected from the cash nexus but as a justification for disconnecting previously paid 
kinds of work from the cash nexus because it is either satisfying or necessary to perform for 
its own sake. The work would in fact be less satisfying if it was performed for a wage as the 
justification for working would be money and not the 'intrinsic value' of the task. The wage, 
then, comes to signify alienated labour, and its absence, the full identification of the worker 
with her task. While such constructions are familiar from volunteering and internship 
contexts, whether they are promoted by the organization or freely assumed by the workers 
themselves, they start to take on another valence in times of economic contraction where the 
state is determined to renew accumulation by lowering the value of labour-power. The 
performance of work of 'intrinsic value' thus comes to guarantee social cohesion in times of 
austerity. We again see art as pioneering these kinds of concepts and discourses, as the 
emancipatory valence of labour undertaken for its own sake – without an employer, demand 
or even an objective in mind - is definitive of the kind of activity art is. Further, it is the 
centrality of 'intrinsic value' to art as a practice and an institution that defines its reproductive 
task in the social relations of capital, since it is both absolutely emblematic of the rule of the 
value-form (the 'absolute commodity') and prefigures a world where labour and exchange 
can be structured in radically other ways. We could say that art both has a value – market 
value, say – and is a value: intrinsic value, or, autonomy. 'Intrinsic value' becomes in fact, a 
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more 'socially useful' inflection for 'autonomy' in art and, as such, is probably the most 
effective delivery mechanism for heteronomous goals. All sectors of capitalist production 
which are indirectly mediated by it, and remain relatively un-subsumed, are sectors which are 
required to demonstrate, or depart from, their 'intrinsic value', and this is what lends them 
reproductive significance for the system as a whole. As we saw above, this intrinsic value can 
be used to mediate de-valorisation in sectors of capitalist production and reproduction (such 
as welfare state institutions), and also e.g. bring art and labour closer together on a shared 
terrain of value without price. So, under general conditions of the de-valorisation of labour-
power, it is evident that abstract labour becomes a more adequate category for discussing 
the relationship between art and labour. This is because the social form of labour changes in 
its most typical features as it moves to include those typical facets of artistic labour that help 
to drive down the value of labour-power overall. Whereas the artist was until not very long 
ago, and in some quarters is still, the prototype for the ultimately self-exploiting worker of the 
creative industries and the paragon of the entrepreneurial self, now this entrepreneurship 
comes back as 'community work' and is mystified as social solidarity. This operation can only 
be effective because social solidarity is required to compensate for the withdrawal of social 
provision, turning the effect into its own cause. Labour-power is thus subsumed into capital 
but without a wage, generating what we might then call 'hyper-surplus value' in sectors which 
were once reproductive, rather than productive of value.  
 
So here we can see that artistic work, as the paradigm of an activity undertaken for 'its own 
sake', having only an indirect relationship to financial reward, personal advancement or social 
instrumentality, becomes the paradigm for promoting wageless labour, more or less 
coercively (if we think of such labour on a continuum from internships to workfare), where 
work itself becomes an aspect of an 'experience economy', premised on the subject as her 
own speculative capital. In this way, artistic labour directly ties into austerity-era re-
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structuring of the capital-labour relation, as more and more social activity is re-allocated into 
the upkeep of this relation even as its material premises show signs of breaking down. We 
need to look more closely at how the category of art can be used to valorise work which is not 
directly valorised by capital, that is, through the payment of a wage.  
 
In this light, we can discern the speculative assumptions of artistic subjectivity and artistic 
labour reflected in the recomposition of work at large, aiding in the promotion of 'imaginary 
subsumption'. It seems to offer one more, and very apposite, way of thinking about the 
relation between art and real subsumption, with the vector of 'imaginary' hewing close to the 
idea of art as a logic and a haven of double-edged 'speculative practices'. The term 'imaginary 
subsumption', which would need to be developed far more closely and in analytic proximity 
to Marx and Marxist writers on the category of subsumption, is taken from a recent article by 
William Clare Roberts on the re-structuring of the university along corporate lines. Roberts 
defines 'imaginary subsumption' as the process whereby 'prices have been slapped on things 
that nonetheless have no real value, much as in Marx's discussion of the“imaginary 
price”that can be set on honor or conscience', a situation in which '[t]he profit motive is not 
effective, but everyone is supposed to act as if it were.'3 He notes that imaginary subsumption 
may lead directly to real subsumption, without passing through formal subsumption: 
production may be re-organized along capitalist lines without capital coming into ownership 
or control of the production process. The exemplary instance given by Roberts of this is the 
university transformed by the 'managerial revolution' into behaving as if it is producing 
commodities and serving costumers when the nature of education – whatever the price 
charged – and the relationship between staff and students is nothing of the kind. But we can 
also think of art institutions, art colleges and artist studios adopting such organizational and 
disciplinary forms – hierarchies, outputs, performance assessments - even though they do not 
employ commodity-producing labour (we have to keep in mind that art objects may find a 
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price in the market but that insofar as they are not produced through surplus-value 
producing wage-labour, they have no value). Additionally, as we have already said, artistic 
practice is in a position to promote imaginary subsumption due to its structural role of 
mediating labour as free activity, even when, under the form of value, unpaid labour can 
never be anything other than human capital in crisis. It thus has an important role to play in 
socializing and humanizing capital in its mode of imaginary subsumption, when 'productive 
labour' is no longer at issue. The resurgence of 'human' or sometimes 'social capital' 
paradigms seems corollary to a general withdrawal of capital from reproduction of wage-
labour, even if it is not averse from drawing profits from the privatization of the resources that 
are needed for that reproduction. It is also at such times that we can see 'human capital' 
regain its emancipatory valence, when there doesn't seem to be any other capital around.4 
 
Art, again, reflects and transforms this situation and this set of ideological co-ordinates. Once 
we could say with Hegel, in his analysis of the Romantic concept of artistic genius which held 
sway in his time and which he was concerned to undermine: 
For the work of art came to be regarded no longer as the product of an activity general in 
mankind, but as the work of a mind endowed with wholly peculiar gifts. This mind, it is thought, 
has then nothing to do but simply to give free play to its particular gift, as though it were a 
specific force of nature, and is to be entirely released from attention to laws of universal 
validity, as also from the interference of reflection in its instinctively creative operation.
5 
 
Now we live in an era where the 'generic' has supplanted 'genius' as the operative category of 
art's self-understanding and its relationship to its outside. Since the era of Conceptualism and 
the various 'de-materializations' of the art object or even the artist (APG), but really onwards 
from Duchamp, the artist is a 'generic' or 'incidental' subject who need produce no works 
which would be intuitively interpreted as art – it is simply her selection or production of 
'anything', her performance of any kind of activity, that is designated art, since she is ratified 
as an artist by the art institution, the institution which she reproduces with every work. The 
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activity of art has collapsed into the aesthetic, since 'judgement' is the emblematic gesture for 
both.   And yet the 'generic' is not equivalent to a return of art to 'general activity' from which 
the category of genius tried to elevate it: the form of artistic labour remains different from 
abstract labour, even as its content becomes indistinguishable from any other act of 
heteronomous or subsumed labour. This is because the 'generic' as a modality of artistic 
production did not suspend nor do away with the category of the 'genius'; the 'genius' 
remains the foundation of artistic subjectivity, its principle of identity (and non-identity) and 
thus of the institution of art, even as 'the generic' becomes the universal parameter of artistic 
activity. Here we would need to explore the pivotal role of authorship in art as a metric, a 
currency and added value, and how this relates – often directly – to speculative value as it 
drives both the financialisation of the economy and the de-monetisation of socially necessary 
labour. 
 
As John Roberts has discussed extensively, art is mobilized to approach closer, albeit 
asymptotically, to the current state of 'social technique' which prevails in society, be that the 
use of technology, legal structures, cultural logics or forms of labour.6 He posits a dialectic of 
de-skilling and re-skilling which artistic labour undergoes, refracting these tendencies in non-
artistic labour processes. This is proximate to what I am naming 'the generic'. The more art is 
de-skilled, the more it becomes indistinguishable from other kinds of labour, the more the 
artistic subject becomes truly automatic, that is, reproducing the art institution as the distinct 
kind of subject that she is, consolidating herself as an artist regardless of the material and 
social diversity of her actions or inactions. But the generic, paradoxically, still relies for its 
justification on the artistic genius cited above. We saw this in the instance of the Artist 
Placement Group and their 'Incidental Person'. The idea of a non-specialized specialist who 
can exert transformative agency in sites of business and administration simply by dint of who 
she is is indebted to the Romantic (and, parenthetically, the Saint-Simonian) notion of the 
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artist's irreducibly distinct capacities. 'Talent is specific, and genius universal capability, with 
which a man has not the power to endow himself simply by his own self-conscious activity.'7 
Artmaking can never be mediated as a simple product of 'training'; it takes a special kind of 
person. This distinctive quality can then in principle be extended to everyone, whether or not 
their activities are pursued or recognized as art, and this is what is captured in the notion of 
'human capital' – the exploitation of distinctive and intangible qualities.  
 
To sum up this discussion on the generic for now, we can connec it to the foregoing 
discussion of use-value. Use-value is closely imbricated with identity: a worker's identity, for 
example. If the 'generic' refers to a loss of occupational identity, or to discrete products 
produced in the labour-process, then we can venture that the condition of the 'generic' can 
describe greater and greater swathes of concrete labour in capital, as well as being the 
enabling condition for art. In my third chapter, I briefly mentioned communisation theory and 
its argument about the loss of positive formations of workers' identity. A positive formation 
would be a worker's identification with their work, and with the politics deriving from that 
identity. This means that labour as an identity whose politics are grounded in use as opposed 
to the power of capital, which is founded in exchange. What, then, could be the use-value of 
the 'generic'? Use-value is a pole of value, and it is positively separable neither from 
exchange-value nor from the form of value for this reason. However, it is also one side of a 
contradiction, since labour-power is the source of value and the immanent negation of 
capital. There is a structural antagonism between capital and labour, just as there is between 
art and capital, although both art and labour's role in capital's reproduction disguises this 
fact. Art has no use-value, but increasingly much of the activity performed as wage- labour 
does not have it either. Can we then find a way to a dialectical concept of use-value founded 
in the 'generic' of both art and labour that would pose a challenge to the politics of identity of 
any kind and to the generic as it currently functions to maintain an unbearable totality? To do 
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this, we would have to develop a far more concrete and politically responsive understanding 
of negativity as an operative sphere where use is defended and deconstructed at the same 
time, and the reifications of use (labour) and uselessness (art) which make capital disappear 
from the scene of action and analysis, thus preventing this task from getting under way. One 
way to elaborate such an understanding is to conduct a more in-depth analysis of 'value-
reflexive' art: artistic gestures which confront art's affinity to the form of value through their 
methods and concepts. From this we could go on to deduce how the art market is itself an 
exemplary and an eccentric instance of speculation as a mode of production, exhibiting its 
insular and erratic tendencies in high relief, as well as legitimating its accumulation of capital 
through non-economic motives. This latter is one of the definitive aspect of speculation as a 
mode of production, and while this work has primarily been concerned to follow the 
implications of this for the changing conditions of labour, my future research will try to follow 
this other trajectory of 'value-reflexive' art practices which take financial speculation as their 
immanent logic. 
 
To conclude, the question could be whether the thesis has fully determined the relevance of 
art in speculation as a mode of production. It remains an open question, as the object cannot 
be fully determined since, as an analogue of value, it exists in time and in process. If art can 
still be considered the antithesis of social fact (autonomy), regardless of how effectively this 
antithesis can be implemented to support the social fact (heteronomy) – an effectiveness 
predicated on its autonomy – then it remains a praxis and a model of relations to the 
individual and collective, to things and concepts, which are other, if not necessarily inimical, 
to the value relations which currently obtain. It is not to disavow art's reproductive function 
for those relations, nor the divisions of social labour which produce it as exceptional or the 
classed, gendered and racialised divisions of labour within the institution of art per se, to 
acknowledge that art's uselessness is actually as well as potentially a source of antagonism in 
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a society of 'human capital' where use-value is no longer thinkable apart from exchange-
value. Weak and formalistic as this hypothesis might seem on its face, it is this very 
uselessness that endows art with its characteristic power within real abstraction, be it the 
emblematic power of enhancing an autonomised capital with the glamorous brand of artistic 
autonomy or inculcating a knowing alienation from capital's purposes and ideals. This 
dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy can be seen in the art institution as a site of 
pedagogy, whose own material conditions necessarily remain beyond the scope of the 
criticality otherwise encouraged. But it is the presumptive uselessness of art that allows this 
dialectic to becomes visible in a way that cannot apply to other sites of critical educational – 
or professional - practice, where this kind of disjunction between form and content is 
programmatically subsumed into the tenets of service or professionalism: in other words, 
where the use-value of an education or a practice can never be seriously questioned. As we 
saw with the previous chapter's discussion of the politics of German Romantic aesthetics, it is 
precisely in the distance from calcified use-values that a materialist relation between 
humanity and the world it has produced has a chance of being actualized. This is the logic of 
'speculation' which rhymes with collective experimental praxis of which we cannot afford to 
lose sight, even if what we know of art, labour and production cease to exist in the process of 
this actualization. 
 
If art faithfully mirrors and imparts the 'pedagogy of human capital',8 being a realm of social 
production accustomed to eliding and mystifying labour, this does not mean that the fidelity 
has no bounds. On this point, there has been extensive attention to a mooted 're-
politicization' of art since the global economic crisis was judged to have affected the health of 
the art market, while the critical traction of the sorts of complicity and self-referentiality that 
market used to embrace diminished thanks to the upsurge of popular protest against 
austerity. Such prognoses have turned out to be more or less hollow- there have been few 
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structural repercussions for art – or the art market – from the epiphenomena of the crisis. 
Here, as elsewhere, if we are to look for the sources of art's material and ideal oppositionality 
to capital's social relations, 'politicization' should not be seen as a matter of consciousness or 
an empirical tendency observed on a narrow scale. We have to see where art situates itself in 
the real abstraction that permeates those relations, specifically in the changing configuration 
of forces between capital and labour. This is not an extrinsic relation, of course: art, in the 
figure of the aesthetic subject, is constitutive of real abstraction as it developed historically in 
capitalist modernity. If this figure existed in a relation of alterity to the mainstream of social 
relations in capital in the 19th century up to the recent past, the normalization of 'human 
capital' has placed the 'aesthetic subject' and its excess, singularity and speculative ethos at 
the centre of subject constitution, labour discipline and value production. This can be seen 
directly, as in worker- management relations, or indirectly, as in culture-led urban re-
development projects which elevate speculation above production and flexibility over labour. 
However, to examine the political possibilities of this new centrality, we would have to return 
to the substantive Marxist question of the revolutionary determinations stemming from role 
in the relations of production or, in class composition terms, the relationship between 
technical and political composition. This is not within the scope of the present work, which 
must restrict itself to indicating the kinds of contradictions the social centrality of speculation 
entails for both artistic labour and wage-labour.  
 
Another avenue I have attempted to open up with this thesis might pertain to the formation 
of 'artistic research' as a field of useless knowledge production. As currently constituted, 
'artistic research' is a knowledge field shaped by the existing state of the academy and its 
hierarchies of discipline and labour. It is thus an entity which aligns, if obliquely in practice, 
with the disciplinary norms and marketable 'impacts' which organize other fields of 
knowledge production. However, it also evokes a notion of 'research' as a means whereby the 
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open-endedness of artistic praxis can veer into practical critique, can enact the negative 
dialectics of use and uselessness, ornamental and emancipated labour which generally 
subsist as a mere representation within the confines of the art institution. Without doubt, 
such a vision stands in tension with 'artistic research' marking the place of art's subsumption 
into academic protocols and economies, itself a sign of 'imaginary subsumption'. I 
provisionally conclude here, with this inadequate gesture to the outside of re-conceiving 
research as a potentially militant praxis for art which can easily wander beyond the weakly 
subsumptive confines of the academy. 'Weakly subsumptive' contexts may be the best we 
can hope for at present: other mediations will have to arise in new social configurations which 
articulate art with its others if art's incalculably dense and strange forms of deixis are to be 
approached as forms of truth. 
 
The relationship between art and labour in the speculative mode of production has been 
shown to be one of reference, mimesis, and negativity. Secular changes in the logic of capital 
valorisation have their respective impacts on the antithetical character of each to the other, 
finding new economic uses and labour processes for art and new forms of speculative and 
unwaged self-investment for labour. The historical roots of the emergence of each as a self-
contained logic, and the politics of the scission between them have been glossed but much 
more remains to be excavated and concrete arguments made if we are to assess not only how 
art and labour have been distorted and re-shaped by a speculative phase of capital, but 
where their own speculative and negative dynamics are taking them in the future as a crisis-
ridden capital can only head further in the direction of speculative valorisation. 
 
Hopefully, this presentation of future research directions has not appeared as a detour into 
dispersal at just the point where the threads should come together to form a perfect illusion 
of a landscape in perspective. As my field of investigation has been the speculative and the 
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indeterminate, my conclusion must remain appropriately provisional, or, rather, the 
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